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Abstract 
The Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy and the Re-Production of State 
Identities in Finland and Britain 
The European Union activities in the field of foreign, security and defence policy have 
developed significantly during the past ten years. Accordingly, a distinct European system 
of foreign and security policy/ies with the European Union at its core has emerged. This 
poses challenges to the conventional understanding of foreign and security policy 
governance in Europe. The state-centric approaches conceptualising Europeanisation as 
cooperation between the European Union member states fail to account for the increasing 
governance on the European Union level. On the other hand, the accounts operating with a 
more integrationist conceptualisation of the Europeanisation tend to overlook the role of the 
member states. 
Using Finland and Britain as case studies, this dissertation elucidates the relationship 
between the European Union and the state level foreign and security policy governance in 
contemporary Europe (an analytical question). I deploy a discourse analytic approach to 
investigate what difference, if any, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy has 
made for the Finnish and British foreign policy discourses as well as these states' identities 
(an empirical question). The empirical findings suggest that - the official foreign policy 
discourse in Finland changed from one of neutrality to one of alignment, whilst the official 
foreign policy discourse in Britain displayed coniinuiý. Combined, these two findings 
generate a third finding: that the effects of EU policiesýhave a differential impact on the 
foreign policy discourses and national identities of member: states. The analytical findings 
implicitly comprise two elements: firstly, that comparative discourse methodology enables 
one to gain new insights into the process of Europe4nisation; and secondly, that 
Europeanisation should be understood as both a top 
Tn 
and a bottom-up process, in 
which state identities are both transformed by EU discourses (differentially depending on 
prior national identities), and also themselves shape the nature of EU discourses. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation elucidates the relationship between the European Union 
(EU) and its member states by analysing how the process of European 
integration in the field of foreign and security policy is shaping the state 
identities of two EU member states, Finland and Britain. Therefore, 
although the thesis focuses on Finland and Britain, the theoretical 
propositions underlying the argumentation have wider applicability. The 
dissertation grew out of my Bachelors Degree on international studies and 
political science in Birmingham. As a Finnish person studying in Britain, I 
found puzzling the variation of the political and academic argumentation 
related to the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) in these two contexts. In Britain, some far-reaching generalisations 
argued that the CFSP was rhetoric instead of reality. As such, it played a 
marginal role in the political and scholarly debates. On the other hand, in 
Finland the CFSP became one of the buzzwords of the 1990s, and the key 
feature of the new and previously neutral EU member state's foreign and 
security policy discussions. Consequently, I became intrigued by two related 
questions: How to account for these differences? What do these differences 
tell us about the European foreign and security policy/ies? 
European Union is now seen as a major force in world politics. The EU 
protagonists argue that it constitutes the largest and most prosperous market 
area and trading block in the world. It has been referred as the most 
powerful actor within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the largest 
contributor to the development aid. Due to the enlargement process, 
European Union now comprises most of the European states and it is argued 
to form a substantial regional and global political power. Its role for local, 
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regional and global cultures and identities has been also noted. Indeed, the 
very question of Europe and its boundaries is increasingly discussed in 
terms of the European Union. 
The European Union's activities in the field of foreign, security and defence 
matters have developed significantly. The long process of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) which aimed to increase foreign policy 
coordination amongst the member states was reformulated in Maastricht in 
1992. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP) with the 
prospect of the common defence policy. The High Contracting Parties 
argued that member states 'shall support the Union's external and security 
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity' 
('Treaty on European Union' 1992). Further they suggested that member 
states 'shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the 
Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in 
international relations' ('Treaty on European Union' 1992). Although the 
European Union's ability to turn this bold rhetoric in reality has been 
refuted, significant institutional developments have followed. The EU 
decision-making has been re-formulated in several subsequent treaties and 
the office for High Representative of the CFSP established, for instance. In 
1997 the common defence policy - European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) - was launched and in 1999 the European Union agreed to develop 
independent military capability for crisis management operations. Currently, 
the European Union is engaged militarily in Europe and beyond. 
The central assumption of this dissertation is that we have witnessed the 
emergence of a distinct European foreign and security policy system with 
the European Union at its core. This system is not based on traditional state- 
boundaries but on a progressively robust form of transnational governance 
cutting across member state and EU boundaries. Further, the suggested 
growth of this complex and multilayered European system pose a challenge 
to the conventional studies of foreign and security policy. 
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The theoretical framework of the thesis relates to two recent trends. On the 
one hand, an emphasis on globalisation (Clark 1999; Held 1999), 
regionalisation (Fawcett and Hurrell 1997), Europeanisation (Tonra 2001; 
Featherstone 2003; Radaelli 2004) and multilevel-govemance (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001) has challenged the autonomy of the state and emphasised 
interdependency. The dissertation aims to contribute to the study of 
International Relations (IR) and the European studies. It discusses how to 
conceptualise and analyse the European foreign and security policy/ies in 
the context of increasing transnational interactions by examining the current 
developments and considering the importance of EU level governance - 
such as the CFSP and the ESDP - to the national contexts. 
Despite the recent theoretical developments, state - conceptualised as an 
autonomous and unitary actor - has largely retained its significance in the 
United States dominated IR as well as in the dominant approaches to 
European integration which highlights the intergovernmental nature of the 
process. Accordingly, majority of the literature on European foreign and 
security policy/ies conceptualise the emerging EU governance as 
cooperation between states. Within these state-centric approaches the units 
emphasis)O 
The great power discourse, then, constructed the ESDP as an unfeasible 
d, and due to rapid development of the EU foreign and security policy, more 
integrationist theories have gained relevance also in the field of foreign and 
security policy. This study recognises the contribution of the integration 
theories and, in particular, the recent turn to comparative politics and 
Europeanisation. 
I argue that there is nothing inherently wrong in analysing the European 
Union and its foreign and security policy in a cooperation frame or 
integration frame. However, I am interested in examining whether we could 
formulate a fuller picture of the foreign and security policy governance in 
contemporary Europe by utilising the concept of Europeanisation in a 
different way. Within European studies, Europeanisation has represented an 
analytical move from bottom-up to top-down analyses. That is, instead of 
seeking to explain the integration process and the European level institution 
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building from a bottom-up perspective, scholars have been progressively 
interested in explaining the effects of the integration and the EU institutions 
on member states in a top-down frame. Recently, the literature on 
Europeanisation has spilled over to the analyses of European foreign and 
security policy/ies. In this field, within which the centrality of the state in 
the field of foreign and security policy is conventionally taken as given, 
Europeanisation appears to offer intriguing analytical possibilities. 
Subsequently, this study aims to explore whether our understanding of the 
foreign and security policy governance in Europe can be improved by 
conceptualising Europeanisation as a top-down and a bottom-up process, in 
which states' political processes both shape, and are shaped by, the EU 
governance. 
To address the reciprocal features of the relationship between the European 
Union and the member states, this dissertation turns towards social 
constructivism and poststructuralism. These approaches have tackled the 
complex social relationships within and amongst various levels of social 
interaction. Consequently, the concepts of identity and discourse have 
gained a central location within the analysis. In this study, the states' foreign 
and security policies are understood to be boundary-producing political 
practices. As such, they do not merely reflect state identities; rather, they are 
part of the re-production of those identities (Campbell 1998; Weber 1998; 
Weldes 2001). 1 deploy a discourse analytic approach (Doty 1993; Weldes 
1996; Torfing 1999; Wwver 2002; Howarth 2005) to investigate what 
difference, if any, the EU foreign and security policy has made for the 
Finnish and British foreign policy discourses as well as these states' 
identities. The dissertation identifies and analyses the dominant foreign and 
security policy discourses in these two countries. Utilising concepts of 
articulation and interpellation (Weldes 1996), it examines how the EU 
foreign and security policy fed into the chosen national discourses and what 
role it had in the continuous process of re-producing these states' identities 
through foreign and security policy discourse. In order to elucidate the 
analytical question on how one should understand Europeanisation, the 
empirical findings are analysed in a comparative framework. 
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In terms of methodology, the dissertation engages in two contemporary 
debates. First, the study combines Europeanisation with the discourse 
analytic approach (Larsen 1997; Hansen 2002; Howarth 2005). In so doing, 
the dissertation explicates what poststructuralism can bring into to European 
studies (Diez 2001, Tonra and Christiansen 2005). 1 suggest that it enables 
us to resist the tendency to produce general and generalising comparative 
frameworks (Hix 1994; Manners and Whitman 2000). Second, the study 
embraces the recent tendency within discourse theory to adopt comparative 
frameworks and it attempts to further reflect on this issue (Howarth 2005). 
In so doing, the dissertation expounds what Europeanisation and 
comparative politics can bring into discourse analysis. 
Comparisons between Finland and Britain address the differences between 
these states' identities, which highlight the need for context-specific 
(foreign policy) theory. In so doing, the dissertation - its assumptions and 
findings - reflects a turn away from the idea of a grand theory with given 
and fixed actors, such as a unitary state (cf. Wendt 1999), and focuses 
instead on constructions of the state through specific state discourses and 
practices (Wacver 2002). Highlighting similarities and differences between, 
and within, these two states, the dissertation aims to explicate the 
complexity of the foreign and security policy governance in contemporary 
Europe. Although intuition and commonsense have a role to play in 
research, the case selection of this dissertation is based on analytically 
interesting observations: whereas Finland represents a small and previously 
neutral state, which is a relatively new EU member, Britain stands for a 
major state and an internationally engaged security actor with a long term 
membership in the European Union. 
In addition to these specific theoretical and methodological contributions, 
the research purpose is to add to the understanding of the Finnish and 
British foreign and security policies in an increasingly interdependent 
Europe. The empirical data and analysis has policy relevance beyond 
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academics. After all, increasing interaction calls for detailed context specific 
knowledge. 
In sum, building on the context specific discourse analysis the two central 
research questions in the dissertation are: (i) what impact, if any, the 
European Union foreign and security policy has on state identities in 
Finland and Britain and how are these identities changing (an empirical 
question) and (ii) how should one understand the process of Europeanisation 
and the relation between EU and state level governance (an analytical 
question). 
The focus of Chapter I is on a critical analysis of the dominant approaches 
to the European foreign and security policy/ies. I suggest that the literature 
can be divided in two distinct approaches labelled as cooperation approach 
and an integration approach. Whilst it is suggested that the cooperation 
approach is not a uniform school of thought, the theories under this label do 
share common assumptions. Even at their most subtle forms, when 
increasing interdependence is brought more clearly into the frame of 
analysis, as in neo-liberal institutionalism and regime theory, their focus on 
the state prevails. On the other hand, although the contribution of more 
integrationist theories has been lately increasing, this dissertation suggests 
that the questions of identity and foreign policy should be brought into 
explicit focus in the analysis of Europeanisation. Further, this analytical 
move enables us to conceptualise Europeanisation as a bottom-up and top- 
down process. 
In Chapter 2, the contribution of literature tackling questions of identity and 
foreign and security policy is considered. Subsequently, a discourse analytic 
approach, highlighting the mutual constitution of social structures and 
political agency in various levels of governance, is developed. It is here that 
the questions of methodology, the comparative element and the material 
selection are addressed. 
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Chapters 3 and 4 provide a context specific analysis of the Europeanisation 
of foreign and security policy discourses in Finland and Britain. The Finnish 
case study suggests that Europeanisation was central for the articulation of a 
radically different foreign and security policy discourse in the post-Cold 
War. That is, for the transformation of a Finnish neutrality identity to an 
alignment identity. On the other hand, given the increasing importance of 
the EU foreign and security policy in official foreign and security policy 
documentation and debates in Britain, the discourse displayed continuity. 
That is, EU foreign and security policy became a feature of the re- 
production of the conventional British great power identity. 
Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between the European Union 
and member state level foreign and security policy governance. Through 
comparison of the differences and similarities between the Europeanisation 
of foreign and security policy discourses in Finland and Britain, it is 
suggested that the constitutive effects of the process on the member state 
identities are different. Analytically, the utility of the context specific 
discourse analysis with a comparative element is demonstrated. 
Significantly, the findings also suggest that Europeanisation should be 
understood as both a top-down and a bottom-up process, in which state 
identities are both transformed by EU discourses (differentially depending 




Europeanisation of the Foreign and Security Policy: From 
Cooperation to Integration 
Introduction 
In recent years, scholars of both International Relations and European 
studies have paid increasing attention to the foreign, security and defence 
policy developments in Europe. In particular, they have focused on the 
emergence of a distinct European foreign policy system that is not based on 
traditional state boundaries but on a progressively robust form of 
transnational governance. The suggested growth of this complex and 
multilayered European system has been seen to pose a challenge to the 
conventional studies of foreign and security policy. Hence the question, how 
to conceptualise and analyse the European foreign policy/ies in the context 
of increasing transnational interactions cutting across member state and EU 
boundaries, has been progressively raised and addressed in the scholarly 
literature (see also, Hill 1993; White 2001: 40-41; Carlsnaes 2004). 
Thus far the debate has centred around three interrelated dimensions of the 
developing European system. The first dimension, it is argued, relates to the 
traditional and distinguishable foreign and security policy activities of the 
European Union's member states, which have increased rather than 
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decreased. The second dimension deals with the European Union's foreign 
and security policy, referring to the increased EU level coordination of the 
EU member states' political and military relations with the outside world. 
This aspect is associated with the development of the CFSP and, more 
recently, with the ESDP. The third dimension reflects the European Union's 
external economic and development policies. In this field, the European 
Union is seen as an influential actor in the world politics. 
Reflecting the traditionally narrow conceptualisation of foreign policy and 
the pre-eminence of the so-called 'high politics' issues such as diplomacy, 
war and peace, the debate on the emerging European foreign policy system 
has largely focused on the first and the second dimensions of the debate. On 
the other hand, the third dimension of the debate - European Union's trade 
relations and development policies - has featured in the research agendas of 
International Political Economy (IPE) and the Development Studies, for 
instance (Lister 1997; Hay and Rosamond 2002). Although, the contribution 
of these fields as well as the theoretical innovations underlining the 
increasing interdependence in world politics is notable, the focus of this 
chapter is largely on the conventional debates on European foreign, security 
and defence policies. This is because these debates have been predominant 
in the scholarly literature on the European foreign and security policy/ies. 
This chapter suggests that two scholarly traditions are central in the analyses 
on European foreign and security policy/ies. I label these traditions as 
cooperation and integration approaches. The way in which these traditions 
approach the conceptual and empirical puzzles related to these three 
dimensions is rather different. Whereas the cooperation approach has 
focused on the first dimension of the foreign and security policies of the EU 
member states, the integration approach has centred on the second and third 
dimensions of the EU foreign and security policy. However, recently, some 
scholars have attempted to move beyond the cooperation and integration 
approaches. I suggest that the concept of Europeanisation is valuable in this 
regard. 
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This chapter first lays out the context in which the debates related to the EU 
foreign and security policy take place. Second, it discusses the literature on 
European foreign and security policy/ies in terms of the cooperation and 
integration approaches. Third, the chapter introduces the concept of 
Europeanisation. Drawing on the recent theoretical innovations of the 
scholarly literature, the chapter invites us to consider the Europeanisation of 
the EU member states' identities. 
1.1. European Foreign, Security and Defence Policies: The CFSP and the 
ESDP 
Today virtually no major foreign policy issue goes unexamined by the EU, and cooperation 
is under serious consideration in related areas such as security and defence (Smith, M. E. 
2004: 17) 
It is argued that EU policies in the areas of foreign and security policy have 
developed significantly during the 1990s and 2000s. In Maastricht in 1992, 
the earlier attempts to coordinate member states external policies, known as 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), were renamed and reformulated. The 
second pillar of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union (CFSP) 
'including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defence' ffreaty on European Union' 1992). 
After developments towards the end of the 1990s, the defence aspect of the 
CFSP became known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Whereas the aim of the CFSP has been to create a common voice for the 
European Union in the world politics, the purpose of the ESDP has been to 
increase the Union's military capabilities to deal with security issues and 
threats. 
Although the development of the CFSP and the ESDP has been widely 
acknowledged, a powerful set of arguments has highlighted the 
contradictions and problems of the CFSP and the ESDP. Initially, it was 
claimed that these policies were more rhetorical than real. That is, some 
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great expectations were created by the treaty texts but, in practice, the 
development of the CFSP and the ESDP was, at best, partial. The European 
Union was widely held to lack institutional structures enabling strong and 
decisive decision-making (Hill 1993) as well as military capabilities to back 
up its policies. Consequently, it was argued that the power in foreign and 
security policy-making in Europe still lies within the states. 
The crisis related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been central for 
these arguments. In the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, 
violent conflicts among and within the former republics of Yugoslavia 
intensified. These unfortunate developments were broadly seen to require 
EU action. As such they constituted a test for the newly established CFSP. 
The widespread view is that the European Union failed to address the crisis 
in the Balkan. EU member states could not agree upon a common policy. 
Jacques Delors, a former president of the EC Commission, comments: 'I 
took part in all the Council of Ministers meetings during the Yugoslav crisis 
and can attest to the deep divisions, based upon history with the Balkans' 
(cited in Andretta 1997). Even if it has been noted that the European Union 
was neither politically nor militarily prepared for a crisis of such proportions 
(McCormick 1996: 281), the images of the bloody conflicts in Balkan and 
the European inability of action are still seen as failure of the European 
foreign and security policy. ' Nevertheless, these representations of crisis 
punctuated institutional and political development. 
After the Amsterdam Treaty was agreed in 1997, some instruments of the 
CFSP, such as common positions or joint actions arising from the common 
strategies, could be decided by qualified majority voting (Kendall 2002). In 
addition, the Treaty of Nice agreed in 2001 introduced a new policy making 
mechanism. 'Enhanced cooperation' can take place between several 
1 According to a popular view, indecisiveness, incapacity and inaction were brought to an 
end by sound US diplomacy backed up by decisive military action in Bosnia in 1995 and in 
Kosovo in 1997 followed by NATO led peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the European 
failure was largely internalised by the European governments. For instance, deep sense of 
guilt was evident in the Dutch government's resignation in April 2002 in an emotional 
atonement for the inability of the country's troops to prevent the Srebrenica massacre of 
1995 (Cramb 2002). 
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member states in the areas where the objectives of the European Union 
cannot be achieved by the member states as a whole (Cramb 2002). In the 
CFSP field, those member states which are in a position to do so can 
cooperate in the implementation of a joint action or a common position, 
arms or security and defence initiatives contributing to the acquisition of 
crisis management capabilities (Cramb 2002). 
A brief overview of the recent developments in the field of CFSP and ESDP 
are illustrative of the scale and nature of the change. 2 On the eve of the 
Stockholm European Council meeting in March 2001, an EU delegation, 
including External Affair Commissioner Chris Patten, was due in Skopje to 
offer support to the Macedonian government and to appeal for a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict between the Albanian rebels and the Macedonian 
government. Two days before the former NATO's Secretary General, Javier 
Solana, who represented the recently established office of the European 
Union's High Representative of the CFSP, visited Macedonia and Kosovo 
with a similar message (2334th Council Meeting'2001). 
The EU policy was supported by NATO's actions to secure the border of 
Macedonia and Kosovo through its international KFOR peacekeeping force 
in the region. Three hundred British, Swedish and Finnish soldiers were 
moved to the border. Their aim was to interdict any logistic support to the 
rebellious National Liberation Army in Macedonia. On 13 August 2001, 
after intense diplomatic negotiations led by the European Union and 
supported by the United States, the rival sides signed a peace accord 
('Common Foreign and Security Policy Statement' 2001). Moreover, an 
2 The following presentation is based on a diary I wrote throughout the research project. 
The diary is based on systematic media watch techniques and it is supplemented with 
official documentation. I found this method imperative, while writing the first draft of this 
chapter in 200 1, due to contemporary and evolving nature of my research topic. 
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intemational NATO force of 3,500 troops led by the British 16th air assault 
brigade was sent to Macedonia to collect and destroy rebel arms (Nato 
Press Release' 2001). 
In March 2003, the European Union took over the Macedonian 
peacekeeping project from NATO. The short-term disarmament mission had 
turned into a longer-term peacekeeping mission. The rapid development of 
the ESDP enabled the transition of authority in Macedonia. At the Helsinki 
European Council meeting, in 1999, the member states decided that by 2003 
the European Union would develop military and civil forces capable of 
acting independently under the EU command in peacekeeping and conflict 
management situations ('Presidency Conclusions' 1999). In November 2000 
in Brussels, the EU governments agreed to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 
100 000 troops, 400 combat aircraft, 100 ships and 100 buildings from 
which a force of 60 000 troops could be put together and supplied, 
depending on the requirements of a given mission ('Military Capabilities 
Commitment Declaration' 2001). In May 2003, the EU Council confirmed 
that the European Union now had 'operational capability across the full 
range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls' 
and the European Union's commitment to overcoming these obstacles was 
restated ('Declaration on Eu Military Capabilities' 2003). Within two years, 
the European Union had launched seven ESDP operations of which five are 
ongoing and two have been ended. 
Significantly, the CFSP and the ESDP, have not been merely concerned 
with the European Union's 'near abroad' in the early 2000s. Seeking to 
extend its reach globally, the European Union has mediated in the slow- 
moving peace process between North and South Korea filling the gap 
created by US disarray over policy towards the divided peninsula. In May 
2001, the holder of the European Union's rotating presidency, the Swedish 
Prime Minister G6ran Person, travelled to both Korean capitals. He was 
accompanied by Javier Solana -the High Representative of the CFSP - and 
the External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten (Precidency Conclusions' 
2001). 
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The European Union also took an active role in the international efforts to 
end the violence that had followed the collapse of the Middle East peace 
process. Solana intervened in the escalating conflict several times. In 
February 2002, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto ruler of 
the kingdom, sought the European Union's support for his peace moves 
within the Arab League. The European Union's role was further highlighted 
in April 2002 when the United States joined the European Union, Russia 
and the United Nations (UN) in calling on Israel to withdraw 'immediately' 
from Palestinian cities. Significantly, the European Union member states 
spoke with one voice. 3 
In 2003, the European Union launched a military operation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa. The operation, code-named 
ARTEMIS, was conducted in accordance with the European Council Joint 
Action adopted in the framework of the CFSP. The European Union had 
been involved in the efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1996, for instance, through its 
Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region. For the European Union 
the military intervention represented 'further tangible evidence of the 
development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and of the 
European Union's contribution to the international community's efforts to 
promote stability and security' ('The Council of the European Union' 2003). 
3 The joint statement was delivered by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Spain representing the EU presidency and High Representative Solana took part in talks. 
The British Broadcasting Company's news said that the 'world's most powerful diplomats' 
call an Israel to halt its operations in Occupied Territories (Kendall 2002). 
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However, the residual doubts about the direction of the further development 
of the EU foreign and security policy have not disappeared. Prominent 
observers have argued that there is no evidence for convincing collective 
responses to successive stages of the multiple crisis such as '9.11', 'the war 
on terror' or 'the war against Iraq' (Smith, M. 2003: 557). In particular, the 
deep divisions between the EU member states were exposed in relation to 
the war on Iraq in 2003. As Smith points out, according to commentators, 
'the cause for EU foreign and security policy was set back for years to 
come, if not permanently, and that the holy grail of unified European 
diplomacy - let alone defence activity - had become effectively 
unattainable' (Smith, M. 2003: 557). For some, the deep European and 
transatlantic divisions presaged the 'death of the West'; for others, it simply 
4underlined the fundamental weakness at the core of the European Union's 
pretensions to international influence and identified the notion of EU 
foreign and security policy as the key are of self-deception' (Smith, M. 
2003: 557). 
Nevertheless, the foreign and security policy mediation in the EU level has 
increased, rather than decreased. Importantly, in combating terrorism a link 
between the EU foreign, security and defence policy as well as the Union's 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) - the third pillar of the TEU - has been 
emphasised. Tackling the threat of terrorism forms a key rationale of the 
first European Security Strategy, a Secure Europe in a Better World, 
formulated within the framework of the CFSP. In order to combat 
contemporary risks and threats to the Union and its member states and to 
enhance Union's influence in the world, the recently agreed Constitutional 
Treaty of the European Union also highlights the need for further 
development of the EU foreign and security policy ('Official Journal of the 
European Union'2004). 
Interestingly, the agreed further development of the institutional structures 
of the CFSP and the operational capabilities of the ESDP was one of the 
least debated issues in the Constitutional Treaty negotiations as well as in 
the ratification processes in those member states in which the ratification 
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process took place before the Treaty was turned down in the referendums in 
France and Netherlands and the ratification process was suspended. 4 
Consensus on foreign, security and defence issues indicates that although 
crises -such as the disagreement among the EU member states over the 
direction of the policy towards the war on Iraq - are likely to expose 
divergence, they can lead to convergence. Moreover, although the extent 
and implications of these developments are debated among the policy 
makers and scholars, they are increasingly acknowledged as shaping the 
parameters of foreign and security policy-making in Europe. Accordingly, 
analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies have been put under 
close scrutiny. 
1.2 Analysing the European Foreign and Security Policylies: Cooperation 
or Integration? 
After a brief introduction to some of the questions related to the 
development of EU foreign and security policy in the 1990s, I now turn to 
the scholarly literature focusing on those developments. I suggest that the 
literature falls under two broad and interrelated categories, which I label the 
cooperation and integration approaches. The cooperation approach, mainly 
reflecting state-centric approaches to the study of IR, foreign policy and 
European integration, has been the dominant approach. However, towards 
the end of the 1990s, the rapid developments have increased the amount of 
analysis operating within a more integrationist understanding of European 
politics. Accordingly, European foreign policy/ies have been increasingly 
approached in terms of Europeanisation. I consider the cooperation and 
integration approaches in turns. However, before doing so a conceptual 
discussion of the subject matter is needed to establish analytical clarity. 
1.2.1 European Foreign and Security Policylies 
4 Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Italy, Greece, Slovakia, Austria, Germany, Latvia, Cyprus 
and Malta have already completed parliamentary ratification of the treaty. The European 
Parliament has also approved the treaty. Ten member states have announced their intention 
to hold a binding or consultative referendum on the subject. Four referenda have now taken 
place, resulting in Spain and Luxembourg ratifying the constitution, with the constitution 
being rejected in both France and the Netherlands. ('A Constitution for Europe') 
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At the outset, the terminology of the scholarly literature dealing with 
European foreign policy/ies appears to be confusing. The field is referred 
for example, as 'European foreign policy', 'Europe's foreign policy', 'EU 
foreign policy', 'foreign/security policy cooperation' and 'foreign policies 
of the European Union member states' (Smith, S. 1994; Hill 1996; Manners 
and Whitman 2000; Nuttall 2000; White 2001; Zielonka 2002; Smith, M. E. 
2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). At times, these labels are used 
5 interchangeably. Following White's call for conceptual reflection, I seek to 
clarify my choice of European foreign and security policy/ies. 
As White argues, there is a qualitative difference between the usages of 
qualifying adjective of 'European' foreign policy instead of the 'European 
Union' or 'EU' foreign policy. The analytical rationale of this choice is 
based on the recognition that the foreign policy activity in Europe is not 
coterminous with the territorial and institutional boundaries of the European 
Union (White 2004: 12-13). For instance, Norway is not an EU member 
state, but its foreign policy has significantly been shaped by the CFSP and 
the ESDP (Sjursen 2003: 7-8). On the other hand, within the European 
Union, the member states have continued to Pursue their own external 
policies and they are likely to do so in the near future. Moreover, other 
organisations such as NATO and OSCE are also significant in the making of 
European foreign policy. Therefore, the European foreign policy 
incorporates states' foreign policies and increased European governance. To 
avoid being misinterpreted as suggesting an all encompassing and Europe- 
wide EU foreign policy, I label the subject matter as European foreign 
policylies. 6 
5 For instance, in M. E. Smith's volume Europe's Foreign and Security Policy terms 
'European foreign policy', 'EU foreign policy' and 'foreign/security policy cooperation' 
are used interchangeably (Smith, M. E. 2004). 
6 The focus of this dissertation is largely on the European Union and its member states level 
governance. This is because the European Union is explicitly argued to have supranational 
characteristics. This, in turn, has opened up a host of interesting foreign policy related 
research questions which address different levels of foreign policy governance in Europe 
and beyond. Although, other organisations do not feature high on the research agenda of 
this dissertation, the theoretical frame adopted is aimed to enable incorporation of various 
local, regional and global institutions and levels of governance. 
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In terms of the concept of foreign policy, this study recognises the broad 
scope of this policy area, and indeed, embraces the theoretical debates 
questioning the narrow definitions which highlight foreign policy's 
distinctiveness from the other policy fields. Nevertheless, instead of 
searching for a general theory of European foreign policy, applicable for all 
the aspects of foreign policy formulation in Europe, my purpose is to 
elucidate the relationship between the European Union level and the 
member state level governance in the area of traditional foreign and security 
policy. That is, the policy fields related to national security and defence. The 
rationale for this decision is further elucidated in Chapter 2. 
However, here it is imperative to note that this is the policy area that is 
widely viewed to be immune to integration within the commonsense 
understanding of the state. As such, it forms an analytically interesting 
policy field. Due to the focus on foreign policy centring on the traditional 
question of state security and defence, the term European foreign and 
security policy/ies is applied throughout this dissertation. Whereas the 
European foreign and security policy/ies refers to the overall context in 
which the EU and state level foreign and security policy making takes place, 
the term Europeanisation of foreign and security policy relates to the 
process of ongoing transformation in this context. In other words, the 
Europeanisation is symptomatic for the emergence of a distinct European 
foreign policy system and the increasing importance of the European level 
foreign and security policy governance: namely, but not exclusively, the EU 
foreign and security policy. 
1.2.2 The Cooperation Approach: Re-producing State-Centrism 
Writing on the European foreign and security policy/ies in the light of the 
CFSP and the ESDP is predominately based on accounts that define these 
twin policies as examples of cooperation among the EU member states. 
These approaches draw on the commonsense understandings of realism and 
neo-liberal institutionalism underpinning the study of IR. Although these 
approaches differ in some of their basic assumptions and focus they share an 
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ontology: they assume an anarchic international system within which state is 
the prominent actor. 7 
According to realist assumptions, states are rational agents operating 
according to principles of self-help within the structure of anarchic 
international system or society (Morgenthau 1973; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979). 
Although, in theory, collaboration among states is possible, in practice it is 
seen to be restricted by the ubiquitous possibility of cheating. However, 
cooperation might emerge due to the presence of a dominant state (i. e. 
hegemon) or a common threat (Gilpin 1987; Walt 1987), for instance. In 
terms of the European foreign and security policies, the emergence of the 
common defence organisations such as the Western European Union (WEU) 
and NATO as well as the initial drive to European integration in the 1950s 
could reflect the dynamics of the Cold War rivalry, Soviet threat and the 
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security guarantee provided by the United States (Smith, M. E. 2004). 
However, the emergence of the distinct European system of foreign policy 
governance has been largely overlooked by the realists. 
Williams suggests that whereas the end of the Cold War was widely seen to 
demonstrate realism's limitations, the emerging post-Cold War world of 
state fragmentation, globalisation and environmental degradation presented 
further challenges to realism which it was ill-equipped to address (Williams 
2005: 1-2). 9 Indeed, the lack of analytical tools to address the CFSP and the 
7 It is suggested that debate between contemporary mainstream approaches of IR, neo- 
realism and neo-liberalism, known as the neo-neo debate, is not between two polar world 
views. Rather these approaches focus on similar questions and agree on number of 
assumptions. As Lamy notes, both theories assume that states are value maximizers and 
that anarchy constrains the behaviour of states. However, a certain division of labour has 
been agreed between the contemporary realists and liberals. Whereas neo-realist have 
tended to focus on security and military issues, neo-liberals has concentrates on issues such 
as political economy, environment and human rights issues. (Lamy 2005: 215-218). Due to 
similarities and emerged consensus between these accounts some scholars have argued that 
instead of a 'neo-neo debate' we should talk about 'neo-neo synthesis' (Wwver 1996: 163- 
164). 
' Further development of cooperation can be explained , for instance, 
by the 'alliance 
dependency' theories, where fear of abandonment or exclusion leads weaker members to 
support any cooperation advocated by stronger powers (Smith, M. E. 2004: 20, footnote 4). 
9 This is not to suggest that the realism would have been absent in the scholarly debates of 
the 1990s. Quite the reverse, realism has responded vigorously to criticism. As Williams 
suggests, significant theoretical developments have followed and in the early 2000s realism 
has re-gained its position as the dominant approach to the world politics. As Williams 
27 
ESDP and the general decline of realism in the early 1990s explains the 
relatively modest number of realist engagements with the increasing foreign 
and security cooperation in Europe. They have also shaped the outcomes of 
the realist analyses. In short, realists have tended to downplay the 
significance of the European Union led cooperation. They have rendered 
suspect the suggested supranational elements of the European foreign and 
security policy/ies and they have interpreted the agreed common policies as 
reconcilable with national interests of the member states (Pijpers 1991; 
Jakobsen 1997; Regelsberger, Schoutheete et al. 1997; Tank 1998). As 
Ojanen notes, the argued difficulties in the development of the CFSP and 
the ESDP have been used as evidence for the timeless wisdom of realist 
core assumptions (Ojanen 2002). 
Lately, realism has been increasingly visible in political and academic 
debates of transatlantic divide in the United States and in Europe. Relatedly, 
and as I have elsewhere argued, the development of the European Union's 
foreign and security policy has been increasingly viewed as an emerging 
counter-power to the United States (Jokela 2002). However, some realists- 
inspired authors have refuted such claims. As Kagan argues: 
It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemon, as 
Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing 
power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their 
goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power without 
wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and 
indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience. 
(Kagan 2002) 
argues, it is difficult 'to avoid a sense that in the twenty-first century realism is resurgent' 
(Williams 2005: 2). 
Nevertheless, as M. E. Smith suggests (Smith 2004) that realism's ontological 
assumptions resulting in a narrow conceptualisation of integration as cooperation among 
states have made it an ill-suited approach to analyse the recent developments in the 
European foreign and security policy/ies. He argues, for instance, that increasing 
cooperation cannot be explained with reference to the three dominant EU member state(s) 
France, Germany and Britain. Although they are important states, they have had a distinctly 
different foreign and security policy aims in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, the role 
of the smaller member states in enhancing the cooperation has been greater than realists 
would have expected (Smith 2004: 20). Also Arter notes the contribution of the small states 
(Arter 2000), and Joenniemi suggests that small states are becoming more influential 
because they are less likely to have any 'hang ups' in relation to the integration that the 
larger powers obsessed with questions of sovereignty may have (Joenniemi 1998). 
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Even if realism might offer some intriguing insights into the popular debate 
over current developments in the transatlantic relationship it, nonetheless, 
lacks the tools to address the changing foreign and security policy 
environment in Europe. Realism seems to be incapable and unwilling to 
address how the development of the European Union towards the 
countervailing power is arrived at. In doing so, it appears to be inadequate to 
address the questions related to the Europeanisation of foreign and security 
policy and re-production of state identity 
On the contrary, analysis highlighting increasing interdependence in world 
politics since the 1970s seems to offer some interesting insights to my study. 
For instance, neo-liberal institutionalists have highlighted the possibility of 
policy formulation through increasingly institutionalised international 
cooperation (Keohane and Nye 1977). 10 They argue that an 'array of 
subnational, transnational and supranational actors challenge the dominance 
of the state across wide range of issues' (Smith, S. 1994: 4). The focus on the 
mixed actor system based on transnationalism and interdependence has led to 
theoretical innovations that highlight, for instance, the role of international 
regimes defined as a set of implicit and explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures, around which actors' expectations convergence 
in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1983: 2). Although the 
multi-perspectival nature of the European project (Ruggie 1993) has been 
used as an exemplar of regionalisation (Fawcett and Hurrell 1997) or the 
emergence of 'post-modem' or 'post-sovereign' foreign policy (Smith, M. 
2003), the European Union's foreign and security policy has not occupied a 
central place in neo-liberal institutionalist literature. 
However, in explaining European integration the form of neo-liberal 
institutionalism known as liberal intergovernmentalism, associated with 
10 For example, interdependence theories suggest that as security concerns diminish among 
the set of states, and issues become increasingly entangled with each other, then states are 
more likely to cooperate to manage the costs and benefits of those issues concerned 
(Keohane and Nye 1977; Smith, M. E. 2004: 21). As the following section suggest, this 
position share resemblance with European integration theories such as functionalism and 
Deutch idea of security communities. 
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Andrew Moravcsik, occupies a central role (Hansen 2002). 11 Moravcsik has 
challenged functionalist inspired accounts highlighting the role of an elite 
alliance between European Community (EC) officials and pan-European 
business interest groups in negotiating the Single European Act (1986). He 
suggested that the negotiating history is more consistent with the alternative 
explanation that European Community 'rested on interstate bargains between 
Britain, France and Germany' (Moravcsik 1991). However, Moravcsik 
pointed out that in the analysis of state interests, scholars must turn away 
from structural realist theories and toward domestic politics. He argued that 
the way forward was the liberal intergovernmental approach which drew on 
Keohane's neo-liberal institutionalism labelled as a 'modified structuralist 
realist' view of regime change, 'a view that stresses traditional conceptions of 
national interest and power, rather than supranational variants of 
neofanctionalist integration theory' (Moravcsik 1991: 219). 
I suggest that Moravcsik's project is illustrative of the prevailing state- 
centrism of the many neo-liberal institutionalist accounts. Although, liberal 
intergovernmentalism represents a departure from some (structural) variants 
of realism, Moravcsik's desire to make his account conform to Keohane's 
neo-liberal institutionalism is indicative of the continuing salience of the 
state. As Michael E. Smith's notes, these theories generally adopt the realist 
assumptions of anarchy, state-centrism, and states' concerns in security and 
cheating, yet they also accept that institutions can serve as bargaining arenas 
to help states conclude agreements with each other, thus promoting 
cooperation (Smith, M. E. 2004: 23). Moreover, like realism, Moravcsik's 
intergovernmentalism also underlines the role of the major member states and 
downplays minor states' role in integration. 
The intergovernmentalist focus on the domestic interest formation is shared 
with some of the conventional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). The dominant 
11 Intergovermentalism can be understood as the theoretical approach dealing with the 
problems of integration. In so doing, intergovernmentalism has been especially powerful 
during the periods of perceived low integration and in the areas of alleged non-integration. 
However, and increasingly, intergovermnentalism has provided powerful theoretical 
accounts able to deal with the areas of expanding increasing integration (Rosamond 2000). 
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view of FPA is that a state's foreign policy is comprised of many competing 
(national) bureaucracies. In so doing, the foreign policy is understood as a 
compromise between various organisations' views of the national interest in 
the context of international politics. This is the view of the so-called 
'decision-making' model of foreign policy analysis (Snyder Richard, Bruck et 
al. 1962; Allision 1971) that can be further distinguished between 
4organisational processes' model and 'bureaucratic politics' models (Manners 
and Whitman 2000: 5-6). Given state-centrism, resulting in the narrow 
conceptualisation of integration as cooperation between states, the FPA 'is 
overwhelmingly an American subject' (Smith, S. 1994: 11). Despite the 
presence of a robust and healthy European research community, (mainstream) 
European scholars have tended to follow the theoretical lead of the US 
research community. Steve Smith suggests that this is because the US 
approaches dominate the literature to such an extent that being part of the 
foreign policy research community means 'addressing US concepts and, more 
problematically, US policy concerns' (Smith, S. 1994: 11). 
In terms of Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, this implies a 
particular state-centric view of international institutional developments and 
particular power related aims of foreign policy. This in turn raises concerns 
about FPA appropriateness to analyse recent developments in the European 
foreign and security policy/ies. However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a 
distinctly European foreign policy analysis has emerged. The theoretical 
innovations of this approach will be addressed in the final section of this 
chapter. 
In sum, the cooperation approach underpins a powerful set of arguments, 
which have highlighted contradictions and problems of the CFSP and the 
ESDP. Specifically, in the early and mid 1990s it was claimed that these 
policies were more rhetorical than real. This was manifested, for instance, in 
the argument of a 'capabilities-expectations gap'(Hill 1993). As introduced 
by Hill in 1993, some great expectations were created by the treaty texts but 
in practice, the development of the EU foreign and security policy was, at 
best, partial. Yet while Hill was mainly concerned about the European 
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Union's ability to formulate policy, other scholars highlighted the lack of 
military capabilities to implement policies. In doing so, the European Union 
was seen to lack institutional structures enabling strong and decisive 
decision-making as well as military capabilities to back up its policies. 
Consequently, it was argued that the power in foreign and security policy- 
making in Europe still lay within the states. 
Given the IR community's longer-term interest in increasing 
transnationalism and interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977; Little 1996; 
Keohane and Nye 2000), as well as the more recent focus on regionalisation 
(Fawcett and Hurrell 1997; Hay, Watson et al. 1999; Wallace 2000) and 
globalisation (Held 1999; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Marsh and Hay 1999), 
the scholarly literature's tendency to overlook or downplay the significance 
of the CFSP and the ESDP is, indeed, puzzling. However, in the light of the 
growing empirical evidence of the increasing Europeanisation of foreign 
and security policy, the cooperation approach is increasingly put under 
scrutiny. Consequently, the types of analytical engagements with the CFSP 
and the ESDP have diversified. 
1.2.3 The Integration Approach: From Functionalism to Top-Down 
Europeanisation 
As suggested, towards the end of the 1990s, the activities of the European 
Union in the field of traditional foreign and security policy increased. The 
EU institutions and policy-making mechanism were re-fonnulated to deliver 
common positions and the Union started to build independent military 
capabilities for crisis management. Consequently, the number of studies 
focusing on the EU foreign and security policy as the object of study 
amplified. As a result, accounts operating within a more integrationist 
understanding of European politics have sought to contribute to explaining 
and understanding the European foreign and security policy/ies. They have 
highlighted the supranational elements in the European foreign and security 
policy/ies. On the other hand, the member state polices have been 
increasingly approached in terms of Europeanisation indicating change or 
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transformation in member state policy through participation in the process 
of integration. 
Given the dominance of the cooperation approach, it is important to note that 
some alternative modes of thinking have been available for the analysis of the 
European foreign and security policy/ies throughout the post-war era. As 
Rosamond argues, the host of 'theoretical accounts that emerged in the 1950s 
and 1960s offered rival narratives of how closer cooperation in relatively 
narrow, technical, economic spheres of life could generate wider political 
integration among countries' (Rosamond 2000: 1). For instance, the early 
integration theory of functionalism was part of a broad movement that sought 
to theorise the conditions of the emerging human conflict in the turbulent 
political climate of 1940s. Considering the familiar question of avoidance of 
war, it attempted to produce a non-realist form IR scholarship (Rosamond 
2000: 48-49). 
Although recent integration theorists have highlighted the distinct features of 
their projects in comparison to IR scholarship and the links with comparative 
politics (Hix 1994), the dialogue among IR and European studies has been 
evident. Subsequently, some of the more integrationist theoretical innovations 
could have contributed to the analysis of the European foreign and security 
policy/ies. For instance, the work of David Mitrany on functionalism and Karl 
Deutch on transactionalism, are closely related to the debates within IR. As 
Rosamond suggest, functionalism, as articulated in the work of Mitrany, 
emerged in opposition to the dominant rationale of Morgenthau's realist state- 
centric word-view (Rosamond 2000: 3 1). As Taylor suggests, Mitrany can be 
read as 'an intellectual ancestor' of interdependence theory, world society 
approaches and regime theory (Taylor 1994: 125). Given that these 
approaches represented an attempt to move beyond the strict logic of state- 
centrism, the ontological assumption of conventional IR prevailed. Deutsch's 
theorisation serves as an exemplar. Deutsch argued that the level of 
communication (transactions) between states correlates with the sense of 
community among states. The more interaction there is between the states the 
greater the mutual relevance of the states to each other. The states are clearly 
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the most important actors in transactionalism. In short, they are constitutive of 
the 'community of states'. 12 Moreover, in terms of traditional foreign and 
security policy, Deutsch emphasised the continuing importance of the state by 
preferring the term cooperation rather than integration. Deutsch argued that 
security based on cooperation between states would be more likely to emerge 
in practise and that it would be more durable (Rosamond 2000: 43). 
The integration theory that has most vigorously attempted to overcome state- 
centrism is neo-fanctionalism. The key figure of neo-functionalist thought, 
Ernst Haas, defined integration as the formation of a new political community 
in which national political actors were persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities towards a new centre and the institutions 
of the new centre possess authority over the states (Haas 1968; Ojanen 2002: 
2). In their search for the non-state-centric theory of integration, neo- 
functionalists made an analytical move from 'high politics' to 'low politics'. 
That is, they considered the key issues of integration, not as those of war and 
peace, but matters of satisfaction of welfare and material needs. Neo- 
functionalists suggested that in these areas 'ideological boundaries' that used 
to block the cooperation between the states were breaking down and a 
6supranational scheme of government' was emerging in the regional level 
(Rosamond 2000: 56-57). In light of the developments in the economic field 
of the European integration in 1980s and early 1990s, neo-functionalism 
developed to a dominant integration theory (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989: 
195). However, it has not been incorporated in the analysis of the European 
foreign and security policy/ies until recently. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the neo-functionalism's key concept, the spill- 
over of integration from one area to another, seemed increasingly relevant in 
analysing the European foreign and security/developments. That is, the 
development of the CFSP and the ESDP indicated that economic integration 
12 Deutsch identified two distinct sorts of security community. The first, amalgamated 
security community, involved formal merger of states in to a larger community through 
institutional development. This was symptomatic for the neo-functionalists 
conceptualisation of integration. The second, pluralistic security community, was defined 
as entities where the component states retain their separate identities. Integration, here, 
emerges without institutional fusion. (Rosamond 2000: 43) 
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was spilling over to the foreign and security policy fields (Ojanen 2002: 6-7). 
Accordingly, neo-functionalism inspired thinking underpinning integrationist 
theories of the so-called 'New Europe' (Rosamond 2000-128) have spilled 
over to the analysis of European foreign and security policy/ies (White 2004). 
Two analytical approaches are central for this expanding body of literature: 
(i) studies focusing on the European Union's Foreign policy, and (ii) analysis 
of Europeanisation of Foreign Policy. 
Within the latter approach scholars have sought to demonstrate that the 
European Union has a foreign and security policy in terms of the broad and 
narrow definitions of the subject matter (Smith, H. 2002; Smith, K. E. 2003; 
Smith, M. 2003). In these accounts, the European Union is often assigned 
state-like features. Others have emphasised that even if the European Union 
constitutes an increasingly important element of the European foreign and 
security policy/ies, it cannot be fully accounted by comparing it to a state 
(Gingsberg 2003: 12). Hence the increasing interaction within the EU 
framework has been seen to represent a challenge to the conventional 
conceptualisation of foreign policy (Tonra 2001; White 2001; Smith, M. E. 
2004; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; White 2004) and a distinct European 
Foreign Policy Analysis have emerged. Within this movement the scholars 
have tackled the question raised by Steve Smith et. al. in 1994: Can the 
established foreign policy theories help us to understand and explain the 
developments in Europe since the late 1980s? (Smith, S. 1994). 13 
Accordingly, the traditional FPA analysis has been fonnulated (Manners and 
Whitman 2000: 3-4) and a degree of convergence between the IR and EU 
studies movement can also be observed (Christiansen, Jorgensen et al. 2001; 
Tonra and Christiansen 2004). 
13 Relatedly, M. Smith argues that the European order in 1990s is complex, fluid and multi- 
layered thus raising important questions about the sovereignty, autonomy and statehood 
(Smith, M. 1994: 23,42). Consequently, any analysis of the European order, including 
foreign policy, should emphasise, first (i) the strategies adopted by the state authorities in 
order to respond to the change; second (ii), maintain a clear view of the ways in which the 
European order is changing because of the absence of consensus about the rules of the order 
clearly affecting to the foreign policy action and strategies; and third (iii) examine the 
crucial role played by the international institutions setting up limits of legitimate behaviour 
of by the states and other actors (Smith, M. 1994: 43) 
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Many of the recent engagements with the European system of foreign and 
security policy have underlined its distinctiveness. Whereas Manners and 
Whitman seek to formulate a comprehensive framework for comparative 
analysis able to capture the diversity and complexity in the EU member states 
foreign policy making (Manners and Whitman 2000), Tonra as well as White 
highlights the process of Europeanisation of foreign policy (Tonra 2001; 
White 2004). Significantly, both approaches appear to be better to capture the 
complex and multifaceted relationship between the European and state level 
governance than the conventional analysis reflecting the cooperation 
approach. 
Top-Down Europeanisation and the Comparative turn 
Europeanisation is an interdisciplinary term. It has been deployed in across 
several disciplines including sociology, economics, social anthropology, 
history and political sciences. Subsequently, term has gained a wide set of 
meanings depending on the disciplines and the specific questions of 
different research agendas (Featherstone 2003: 3; Liebert 2003: 14). 
Recently it has profiled as a key concept of a new comparative approach 
within European studies, political science and IR and the term is now widely 
deployed in the literature. 14 Some have suggested that this reflects the 
emergence of a new distinct field of inquiry (B6rzel and Risse 2000; 
Featherstone 2003; Radaelli 2004). 
While discussing Europeanisation it is helpful to distinguish between 
Europeanisation as 'a background concept and systematised concept' 
(Radaelli 2004: 4). As a background concept, Europeanisation refers to all 
the possible meanings we can think of 'Thus, the historian may well look at 
the evolution of Europeanisation starting from Renaissance, and link it to 
the rise of trade and individualism in Europe. ' (Radaelli 2004: 5) As a 
14 The biblio-metric data collected by Featherstone is illustrative. In a survey of some 116 
academic journal articles as listed in the Social Sciences Citation Index, in 1980s five 
articles (4%) referring to Europeanisation were published (four of these were concerned 
with foreign policy). By contrast, between 1990-1995 twenty-seven articles (23%) and 
between 1995-2003 1984 (73%) has been published (Featherstone 2003: 5-6). 
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systernatised concept the scope of Europeanisation is more restricted. 
Within the community of scholars tackling questions related to European 
integration, Europeanisation reflects an increasing focus on the effects of 
process of integration, in particular, to domestic arrangements (Knill 2001: 
10). As such, Europeanisation provides a shift of focus in relation to 
theories of European integration, theories of governance and classic themes 
of comparative politics (Radaelli 2004: 5). 
136rzel and Risse has noted: for decades, 'European studies have mostly 
been concerned with explaining European integration and Europeanization 
processes themselves' (136rzel and Risse 2000). 15 Accordingly, the debates 
between the cooperation and integration approach - (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, for instance - have centred on 
the question of how to account for the emerging European polity. In so 
doing, scholars have largely adopted a 'bottom up' approach: the key 
rationale of their analyses has been to explain the dynamics and the outcome 
of the European institution-building process (B6rzel and Risse 2000). 
The study of Europeanisation, however, adopts a 'top down' perspective. 
Europeanisation accepts that there is a process of European integration 
under way, and that European Union has developed its own institutions and 
policies over last fifty years or so (Radaelli 2004: 5). Consequently, 
Europeanisation studies are not pre-occupied with the questions related to 
the nature of the integration, i. e., 'why and how do member states produce 
integration, and whether the European Union is more inter-governmental or 
supra-national'(Radaelli 2004: 5). By contrast, the theoretical effort of 
Europeanisation, it is argued, is about bringing domestic politics back into 
our understanding of European integration (Radaelli 2004) by focusing on 
the impact of European integration on domestic political and social 
processes of the member states (B6rzel and Risse 2000). 16 The concept of 
15 Also Knill argues that traditionally the study of Europeanisation has been concerned with 
developments on the supranational level (Knill 200 1). 
16 Within Europeanisation studies domestic politics is approached differently than within 
the cooperation approach. Whereas the cooperation approach largely assumes a particular 
kind of national interests with reflects the states locus within the international system, 
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Europeanisation thus seeks to capture the way in which the European 
dimension becomes an embedded feature framing policy, politics and polity 
within European states. ' 7 The issue is no longer whether Europe matters but 
how it matters, 'to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what 
point of time' (B6rzel and Risse 2000). 
Howeverý a central theoretical innovation of Europeanisation studies is that 
the domestic impact of Europeanisation is differential (Jupille and Caporaso 
1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; Knill 2001). Studies have 
demonstrated 'the importance of national context and the capacity of 
national administrative traditions to modify, accommodate, internalise and, 
perhaps, even neutralise European pressures' (Hix and Goetz 2000: 216). 
Hence, the processes of Europeanisation do not replace or reject national 
administrative structures, cultures, rules and norms (Jupille and Caporaso 
1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; Knill 2001). As such, 
Europeanisation has been defined as process of convergence towards 
shared policy frameworks (Liebert 2003: 14-15); or as a process of 
structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and 
interests (Featherstone 2003: 3). It does not, however, require assimilation, 
or indicate an erosion of the domestic level. (B6rzel and Risse 2000; 
Caporaso and Jupille 2001). Instead, member state's internal processes are 
seen as crucial for the Europeanisation. Consequently, divergence is also a 
possibility. 
Europeanisation assumes that European level institutions shape the domestic institutions 
and interest formation with the member states. 
17 B6rzel and Risse distinguish three major dimensions along which the domestic impact of 
Europeanisation has been analyzed and processes of domestic change be traced (B6rzel and 
Risse 2000). First, there are more and more policy areas that are affected by policy-making 
in Brussels (Radaelli 2000; Caporaso and Jupille 200 1; Knill 200 1). Second, if policies are 
increasingly made at the European level, this is likely to have consequences for domestic 
politics defined as processes of societal interest formation, aggregation, and representation. 
Studies have focused on how domestic actors strive to channel their interests into the 
European policy-making process (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; Tiilikainen and Raunio 
2003) and how electoral and party politics is shaped in the face of integration (Aspinwall 
2004). Finally, most works on the impact of Europeanisation focus on domestic institutions, 
both formal and informal. Scholars have analysed whether and to what extent European 
processes, policies, and institutions affect domestic systems of interest intermediation 
(Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 200 1; Knill 200 1; Smith, M. E. 
2004). 
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Recently, scholars have found the concept of Europeanisation useful to 
account for the domestic change in the new EU member states as well as in 
the candidate member states (Prange 2002). Therefore, Europeanisation is 
not restricted to the European Union and it does not end at the outer borders 
of the member states. Europeanisation scholars have also noted the link 
between European Studies and IR. As B6rzel and Risse argues: 
This move toward studying 'top down' processes is desperately needed in order to 
ftilly capture how Europe and the European Union (EU) matter. It fits nicely with 
recent developments in international studies in general which increasingly study 
the domestic effects of international institutions and norms. (B6rzel and Risse 
2000) 
Accordingly, Europeanisation can be approached as an exemplar of 
emerging systems of global governance (Held and McGrew 2002) related to 
the extensive political interconnectedness and institutionalisation of the key 
international policy-making forums. These include the United Nations 
(UN), G8, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (ASEQ, North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common 
Market - in Latin America), for instance. Others have pointed out that 
within the international system, the relationship between Europeanisation 
and globalisation is often difficult to distinguish in case studies of domestic 
adaptation (Featherstone 2003: 4). Thus, although the European integration 
scholars have tended to emphasise the unique character of the European 
Union, the study of Europeanisation has broader applicability. 18 
There is, however, a relevant concern related to these analyses ontological 
assumption. As Christiansen et. al. (2000) argue, that the "'European 
construction" is often regarded as so advanced that many European 
integration scholars have turned to comparative political analyses. In their 
18An interesting example of a broader application of the Europeanisation themes is Hay 
and Rosamond's discussion on Globalization, European integration and the discursive 
construction of economic imperatives (Hay and Rosamond 2002). It connects the 
discourses of globalisation and Europeanisation in an interesting way and develop a new 
institutionalist and yet social constructivist understanding of the appeal to external 
economic constrains within in contemporary European public policy and political economy. 
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view, the European Union (EU) has arrived at a stage where the shape and 
type of polity are less interesting than explaining variation in policy and 
politics' (Christiansen et al. 2000: 1). Relatedly, Hurrell and Menon dispute 
the desirability of the separation of (European) 'politics' and 'integration' as 
articulated by Hix (Hix 1994; Hurrell and Menon 1996: 388-389). They 
suggest that studying these aspects of European politics separately sidelines 
the crucial question how the 'politics' feeds into the 'integration' and vice 
versa. 19 The 'top down' notion of Europeanisation tackles only one dimension 
of the reciprocal relationship between the EU and member state. Although 
any theoretical approach is likely to be partial, I suggest that our 
understanding of the relationship between the EU and member state levels of 
governance can benefit from a fuller conceptualisation of Europeanisation as 
a top down and bottom up process. Moreover, I suggest that the 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy literature is useful entry point 
in this regard. 
1.3. Beyond Cooperation and Integration Approaches: Europeanisation as 
a Top-Down and Bottom- Up Process 
The issue of Europeanisation has also been raised in the field of foreign and 
security policy. Europeanisation has been connected to a process of 
incremental change which can be traced back to postwar years. Recently, 
scholars have found the concept useful to describe and analyse the increased 
interaction in European foreign and security policy-making and the concept 
has gained a particular prevalence in accounting for issues related to the EU 
foreign and security policy. This dissertation suggests that the concept has 
analytical value for the analysis of European foreign and security policy/ies 
(and beyond). It argues that Europeanisation enables us to capture the 
reciprocal features of the relationship between the EU and member state 
level of governance. To do that, Europeanisation should be conceptualised 
as a top down and bottom up process. 
19 The separation of 'politics' and 'integration' also fails to engage with the question of the 
politics of the integration, central for Critical Theory and Poststructuralism in political 
analysis and IR. 
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Scholars who have deployed the concept of Europeanisation in this field 
have taken us all the way back to the late 1940s when the post-war 
European defence cooperation was agreed (White 2001: 4-1 0). 20 Some 
scholars have started from the 1950s when the attempts to establish the 
exclusively European Defence Community failed and the notion of 'civilian 
power Europe' begun to emerge (Smith, M. 2003: 55 9). 21 On the other 
hand, a number of authors have highlighted the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) as a beginning of a process in which the European 
Community (EC) member states sought to consult one another on foreign 
policy issues and coordinate respective national positions (Tonra 2001: 1; 
Smith, M. E. 2004: 17; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). Common to all of 
these accounts is the notion of modest accretion of cooperation and 
institutional evolution. Consequently, the Europeanisation of the foreign 
and security policy is mostly understood as an accumulated effect of the 
longer-term process of the increasingly institutionalised cooperation. 
The role of the EU foreign and security policy is often underlined in this 
process. As Featherstone argues, amongst the IR scholars 'the use of 
"Europeanisation" as a term has reflected the evolution of EU foreign policy 
coordination itself (Featherstone 2003: 10). He notes that one of the first 
authors to refer to the Europeanisation of foreign policy in mid 1980s 
examined the reorientation of the national foreign policy as a consequence 
of EC entry. 22 However, such usages of the concept were rare partly because 
the EC competences in this field were seen as modest and faltering. 
20 White notes that the process began almost immediately after the Second World War 
when the fears of resurgent Germany prompted the Dunkirk Treaty (1947) of mutual 
defence between Britain and France followed by the Brussels Treaty (1948) extending the 
collective defence in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. In the face of 
increasing 
East-West tension manifested in the Berlin crisis in 1948 negotiations began to include the 
United States and Canada in European collective defence arrangements which resulted in 
the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) establishing the transatlantic defence arrangement. (White 
2001: 4) 
21 6 Civilian power Europe' related to European diplomatic coordination carried out mainly 
in economic register, but not in the traditional field of security and defence 
(Smith, M. 
2003: 559). 
22 Keatinge's (1983) analysis focused on Irish foreign policy and Saeter (1984) applied 
similar perspective to West Germany (both cited in, Featherstone 2003: 
10). In terms of 
European security literature, the term Europeanisation was also applied within the NATO 
context. In this field, the term signified strengthening the 'European pillar'. 
That is, the 
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Scholars agree that the crisis of the European foreign and security policy in 
the post Cold War world which was manifested, for instance, in the events 
related to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, punctuated further 
Europeanisation (Smith, M. 2003: 56 1 23 For many, the amazingly rapid 
development of the CFSP and ESDP both reflected and further enhanced 
increasing Europeanisation. Consequently, within the emerged literature of 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy the EU has been given a 
central role. Drawing on the European studies, foreign and security policy 
scholars have noted that institutional developments related to these twin 
policies have made it sensible to examine the Europeanisation of foreign 
and security policy in the first place (Rosamond 2000; Christiansen, 
Jorgensen et al. 2001; Howorth 2001; Tonra 2001; White 2001; Hansen 
2002; Smith, M. 2003; Tiilikainen and Raunio 2003; Smith, M. E. 2004; 
Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Rieker 2005). However, some important 
differences remain between the Europeanisation within European Studies 
and foreign and security policy analysis. 
In terms of the subject matter, Featherstone notes that in the field of foreign 
policy the analysis of Europeanisation has been obliged to take into account 
the relative weakness of EU competences in this area, as compared to many 
aspects of market regulation (Featherstone 2003: 12). This may explain why 
the approach developed by the authors in this area has been wider in its 
scope than in other policy fields. Instead of focusing on the 'mechanisms' of 
Europeanisation in a quantitative manner, foreign and security policy 
scholars have approached Europeanisation in a more qualitative fashion as 
an elite socialisation or a cognitive process, for instance. Moreover, foreign 
increasing influence and responsibilities of the European states within the Alliance (Allen 
1998). 
23 Considering punctuated evolution, Hay argues that the concept is useful to illustrate the 
interplay between the episodic and incremental political and institutional change. The 
concept refers to a discontinuous conception of political time in which periods of relatively 
modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense moments of 
trans forination. However, the terni also draws attention to the cumulative nature of often 
incremental change. According to Hay and Kerr, while it is important to emphasise the 
significance of punctuating moments such as crisis, it is equally imperative that this is not 
lead failure to acknowledge what goes on between punctuating moments (Kerr 2001; Hay 
2002: 161-163). 
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policy scholars have emphasised the reciprocal nature of the relationship 
between the EU and member states. 24 
For instance, Tonra suggests that Europeanisation of foreign policy means a 
transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, 
in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the 
consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising from a 
complex system of collective European policy making (Tonra 2000: 240). In 
so doing, Tonra contests the dominant cooperation approach to European 
foreign and security policy/ies. He also refutes the integration approach and 
argues that 'the relationship between national foreign policy formulation 
and European Foreign and Security Policy has been, and continues to be, 
reciprocal one'(Tonra 2001: 279, emphasis in original). Similarly Michael 
E. Smith argues that participation at the EU level has increased the 
communication and consultation between states. He notes that the EU 
process has increasing impact on national foreign policy cultures. This 
reflects, and it is reflected in, elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, 
constitutional change, and the increase in public support for the ECP/CFSP. 
In Michael E. Smith's view domestic procedures and cultures, in turn, are 
conductive to the forging of common positions at the EU level (Smith, M. 
E. 2000: 617-628). 
The conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a reciprocal process also relates 
to the broader theoretical debates within IR. As the section on cooperation 
approach suggested, the conventional approaches to foreign policy have 
emphasised the role of the state in international institution building and 
policy formulation. Hence one can understand the foreign policy scholars' 
willingness to see Europeanisation as a top-down and bottom-up process. 
On the other hand, Europeanisation can be seen to constitute a particularly 
interesting empirical and analytical puzzle which relates to the broader set 
24 Although the focus on the relationship between the EU and domestic level of governance 
connects studies of Europeanisation in different fields (Goetz 2000: 222), the foreign policy 
scholars have been particularly keen on to theorize this relationship. However, other fields 
have also moved in this direction. For instance, largely EU-centric and top-down orientated 
comparative politics now also focus on the institution building at the European level 
(Featherstone 2003: 13). 
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of questions tackling international governance (Ruggie 1993) and complex 
interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2000). Within these debates, states are 
both shaping and shaped by the structures of international governance. 
Relatedly, Europeanisation literature also tackles the issues raised in the 
lively methodological debates on structure and agency and levels of 
analysis. As White argues, European foreign and security policy clearly 
operates at different levels, most obviously at both the European and state 
level. Thus we need an analytical approach able to explore the linkages 
between them. Given the problems in locating agency within the constantly 
evolving institutional structure of the European foreign and security policy, 
it would be unwise to either separate agent or structure for explanatory 
purposes ("bracketing off') or to privileged particular epistemological 
position with respect to them. (White 2004: 20) 
Europeanisation, as means of bridging levels of analysis as well as structure 
and agency also has its critics. As White points out, some of its reviewers 
claim that it is a vague and widely applied concept that might describe the 
process of integration rather than explain how or why it occurs (White 2004: 
21). In terms of the concepts vagueness and wide application, this chapter 
encourages scholars to define Europeanisation more precisely in the light of 
their specific research interests. In terms of describing rather that explaining 
the integration, this chapter argues that this appears to be a problem only 
within a rationalist accounts, seeking to explain rather than understand 
social phenomenon. 25 That is, it is a problem only for approaches which ask 
'why question' rather than 'how possible' questions (Hollis and Smith 1990; 
Doty 1993; Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Weldes 2001). 
Thus, in the light of the recent theoretical ferment which focuses on the 
epistemological assumptions of the IR, a problem of the Europeanisation 
literature might lie elsewhere. I suggest that in general the Europeanisation 
literature largely lacks the so-called post-positivists or reflectivist 
contribution. This is peculiar since, in spite of the dominance of 
25 As White notes, certainly the Europeanisation debate with respect to European foreign 
policy/ies has tended to be located within a limited rationalist 
discourse (White 2004: 2 1). 
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conventional theorising, there has been a recent phase of theoretical 
reflexivity and innovation concerning European integration. This owes 
much to the spill over of creative thinking across political science and the 
social constructivist turn in IR (Larsen 1997; Diez 1999; Christiansen, 
Jorgensen et al. 2001; Diez 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). Moreover, 
in thinking foreign policy more generally, 'critical', 'dissident' and 'social 
constructivist' approaches have been increasingly visible (Weber 1995; 
Doty 1996; Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Neumann 1998; Wwver 2002) in 
the discipline. Significantly, all of these approaches explicitly discuss the 
complex and mutually constitutive relationships among political 
communities located in various levels (of analysis). 
In terms of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, some of the 
above-mentioned analyses have explicitly focused on questions of ideas, 
norms and identity (Sjursen 2001; Tonra 2001; Browning 2003; Sjursen 
2003; Tonra 2003). On the other hand, as Christiansen et. al. argue, the 
contribution of more radical positions remains yet to be seen (Christiansen, 
Jorgensen et al. 2001). The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to this gap 
in the literature. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to defend my choice of an Europeanisation of 
foreign and security policy approach. I argued that the developments in 
European foreign and security policy/ies poses a challenge for the 
conventional and dominant ways of analysis reflecting a state-centric 
cooperation approach in which the European foreign and security policy 
is 
largely, although not exclusively, the sum of the European states' foreign 
and security policies. Consequently, the subject matter 
is increasingly 
approached by scholars operating within an integrationist approach. 
However, these approaches appear to be highly limited to in their ability 
elucidate the relationship between the member states and the 
European 
Union. I have suggested that the concept of Europeanisation enables us to 
move beyond the strict logics of the cooperation and 
integration approaches. 
The chapter calls for a conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a 
bottom up 
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and top down process. However, many of the theoretical innovations which 
reflect 'critical', 'constructivist' and 'dissident' IR and explicitly deal with 
mutually constitutive relationships among several levels of analysis have 
been largely missing to date in the analysis of the Europeanisation of 
foreign and security policy. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical and Methodological Framework: Discourse 
Analytic Approach with a Comparative Element 
Introduction 
The emergence of a distinct European foreign and security policy/ies system 
has become one of the most salient issues in the scholarly literature in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. It is generally assumed that the major EU 
powers were coordinating a common policy in the area of security and 
defence, although medium and minor EU states, some previously neutral, 
were also seen to be part of this process. Conventionally, therefore, the 
European foreign and security policy/ies has been addressed by agency- 
centred analysis. It has been predominantly theorised in terms of 
cooperation among the member states. Attempts to analyse the structural 
aspects of the relationship between the European Union and its member 
states - specifically, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
the European Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP) impact on the member 
states - were largely missing. 
However, and as the previous chapter sought to demonstrate, in the late 
1990s it had become plausible to assume that the European foreign policy is 
increasingly based on the integration of, rather than cooperation among, the 
EU member states. Accordingly, the number of analyses operating within a 
N 
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more integrationist ontology has increased. Even if the European Union is 
not determining the policies of the member states in the area of security and 
defence, it is seen to be shaping the environment in which these policies 
were formulated. In turn, the member state policies further shape the 
European Union. Hence, the relationship between the European Union and 
the member states is reciprocal. 
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss how an approach which 
highlights the constitutive elements of the reciprocal relationship between 
the CFSP and the member states can be construed. By drawing on the 
Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy literature, this chapter 
seeks to contribute to the increasing interest in examining the 
Europeanisation of identities. In so doing, it lays out the theoretical and 
methodological framework of the study. First, I discuss some of the 
theoretical issues at stake in the question of structure and agency. Instead of 
solving the problem of structure and agency, present in the analysis of 
European integration and foreign policy, my purpose it to overcome it by 
deploying a concept of identity. Second, and in so doing, I outline a 
methodological framework based on discourse analysis. Third, I clarify the 
methods of the discourse analysis and present a comparative research 
design. My purpose is not to construct a conventional comparative model or 
framework for the analysis. Rather, I seek to explore some novel ways of 
thinking the relationship between the European and state level foreign and 
security policy governance. 
21 Theoretical Framework: From the Question of Structure and Agency 
towards the Concept of Identity 
The question of structure and agency has been central for the study of 
International Relations (IR) since the late 1980s. This reflects the 
developments within social theory (Bhaskar 1979; Giddens 1984; Layder 
1994; Delanty 1999) and political science (Hay 1995; Hay 2002) as well as 
the emergence of the social constructivism(s) (Wendt 1987; Wendt 1992; 
Wendt 1999) within the discipline. Consequently, sthe question of structure 
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and agency has become one of the most debated methodological issues of the 
IR (Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Hollis and Smith 1990; Adler 1997; Doty 
1997; Doty 1999; Doty 2000; Smith, S. 2000; Hay 2002). Essentially, what 
the analysts are concerned with here is the relationship between the political 
actors identified and the environment in which they are situated. In other 
words, the relation between conduct and context (Hay 2002: 89). Predictably, 
whereas in the political science literature the structure and agency question 
tends to deal with the question of how much intentional (and often individual) 
human agency mattered in social and political action, within IR it largely 
focuses on the collective (or corporate) agency of a state (Smith, S. 2000). 
The structure and agency question is imperative for this study because it 
offers an empirically grounded entry point - the analytical puzzle - 
informing the theoretical and methodological discussion. Although the 
structure and agency question has recently spread to the analysis of the 
European integration (Hay 2002: 89, endnote 1), it has been only recently 
raised in the literature of the European foreign and security policy/ies. 26 For, 
as the previous chapter suggested, conventionally the relationship between 
the European Union and its member states level had been analysed by 
agency-centred accounts that understand the recent developments as 
cooperation between the member states. 
The dominance of agency-centred approaches in IR of the 1990s and 
beyond is based on two commonsense understandings underpinning the 
study of International Relations (IR): that (i) states are rational agents; 
27 and 
26 Tonra's analysis of the Europeanisation of Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy starts 
with a similar analytical puzzle (Tonra 2001) although it ends up with a different theoretical 
and methodological framework more explicitly grounded in social constructivism. The 
social constructivist contribution to the structure and agency debate is also featuring in 
Sjursen's analysis of the CFSP (Sjursen 2001) and noted in White's European foreign 
policy analysis (White 2004). 
27 Although rational choice (theory) is regarded as an agency-centered perspective, it can be 
also viewed as a rather rigid form of structuralism. This paradox follows from the rational 
choice theory's assumption that individuals and their communities are egoistic and self- 
regarding utility-maximisers who behave rationally in pursuit of their preferences with 
almost complete knowledge of their environment. Moreover, in any particular situation 
there is only one rational course of action consistent with a specific preference set. 
Subsequently, we need to know nothing about the actor to predict the outcome of her 
behavior. (Hay 2002) 
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that they (ii) operate within the anarchic structure of the international 
system (Waltz 1979) or society (Bull 1977). " Accordingly, the aim of the 
foreign policy is to maximise a state's power in order to guarantee its 
security. In the previous chapter, I argued that given the important 
differences among the conventional approaches to the European foreign and 
security policy/ies, their insistence on the importance of the state has 
resulted in a narrow conceptualisation of integration as cooperation among 
29 states . 
This, in turn, reflects a particular solution to the structure and agency 
question that emphasises the political agency of state actors. Consequently, 
the examination of the structural aspects of the relationship between the 
European Union and state level governance has been raised only recently in 
the field of the European foreign and security policy/ies. In doing so, some 
approaches have focused on the question of the impact of the EU and its 
foreign and security policy on the member states. However, and given the 
nature of the recent institutional development in the field - namely the 
CFSP and the ESDP - the analyses have highlighted some structural aspects 
of the relationship rather than assuming supranational governance. 
Therefore, by utilising the concept of Europeanisation and comparative 
method, scholars have attempted to overcome the levels of analysis 
problem. Moreover, this problem is increasingly discussed in terms of 
methodological question of structure and agency, in particular, by the social 
constructivist scholars (Tonra 2001; White 2004). 
'8 These theories seek to account for regularities in observed patterns of behaviour, mostly 
the behaviour of states (such as foreign policy) within an international system by appeal to 
the operation of systemic logics. In so far as these logics are seen to operate independently of 
the actors themselves, these accounts are structuralist (Hay 2002). Within IR theory, neo- or 
structural realism (Waltz 1979) and world systems (Wallerstein 1989) theory can 
be regarded 
as systemic in this sense. 
29 Neo-liberal institutionalists suggest that the formulation of foreign policy also takes place 
through international cooperation and hence other international institutions and actors than 
states are important (Keohane 1989). Moreover, they point out that 
domestic considerations 
(i. e., actors within states) are significant too (Keohane and Nye 1987). However, also the 
neo-liberal institutionalist view that state as the most important actor within anarchic, rather 
than hierarchic, international system. Moreover, in explaining the European foreign and 
security policy/ies in 1990s both realism and liberal 
institutionalism have been manifested 
in intergovernmentalism which highlights the role of the state in the process of integration. 
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2.1.1 Beyond Structure versus Agency: Towards the Concept ofIdentity 
Even if intentional accounts have dominated the analysis of political 
integration, and structural approaches have been mainly applied in the area 
of economic integration, alternative views to the question of structure and 
agency have emerged. The debate between the rationalist and constructivist 
approaches to IR reached the field of European integration studies (Diez 
1999; Christiansen, Jorgensen et al. 2001; Diez 2001; Moravcsik 2001; 
Hansen 2002). This debate reflected a similarly vibrant discussion among 
and between constructivism(s) and poststructuralism(s) in IR (Katzenstein, 
P. 1996; Adler 1997; Campbell 1998; Hopf 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 
1999; Wendt 1999; Doty 2000; Smith, S. 2000). Accordingly, the process of 
European integration has recently been approached by conceptualizing the 
relationship between structure and agency as mutually constitutive 
(Christiansen, Jorgensen et al. 2001; Sjursen 2001; Tonra 2001; Rieker 
2005). That is, the existence of the social structures of integration, such as 
the CFSP, and the agency embedded in the agents of the process, like the 
EU member states, is relational. The agency is part of the reproduction of 
structure(s), but the structure(s) constrain and enable the agency. 
The debate between (mainstream) constructivists and poststructuralists, 
however, suggests that the mutual constitution of structure and agency can 
be addressed rather differently depending on one's theoretical position. 
Whereas constructivists attempt to overcome the problem of structure and 
agency with Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, poststructuralists argue 
that the question of structure and agency is not a problem (requiring a 
solution) in the first place (Doty 2000; Hay 2002) . 
30 Instead, it is a (meta-) 
30 The structuration theory, as articulated by Anthony Giddens, is an ambitious theoretical 
attempt to transcend the dualism of structure and agency. Giddens prefers the idea of 
duality instead of dualism. Structure and agency are seen as the two sides of the same coin, 
analytically separable but ontologically interwoven (Giddens 1976: 197; Hay 1995). This 
methodological claim has led to a well-established method of temporarily 'bracketing off 
the dimensions of agency or structure. This is clearly present in much of the IR theory of 
social constructivism, most notably on the work of Alexander Wendt (Wendt 1992; Wendt 
1999) Moreover, this so-called 'bracketing off is a well-established feature of the FPA and 
European foreign policy analysis. Basically, this methodological choice means isolation of 
structural or agential factors for the practical purposes of the research. In so doing, one can 
analyze the agential factors of, for example, national foreign policy-making, rather 
independently of the context (structural dimension). Alternatively, one can focus on the 
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theoretical assumption reflecting different ontologies about the social world. 
Therefore, the primary interest of poststructuralists is an examination of 
how structures of meaning constitute both agents and social structures 
(Weldes 1996). Accordingly, poststructuralists are interested in elucidating 
how subjects (agents) gain, or are given, a particular kind of identity which 
enables certain degree of agency and hence shapes the agents' (construction 
of possible) action. For instance, Doty's analysis of foreign policy as a 
social construction explicitly analyses the identity of different subjects and 
objects constructed in foreign policy texts (Doty 1993). 
Therefore, in their endeavours to capture the mutually constitutive social 
and political relationship between structure and agency, both constructivists 
and poststructuralists have found useful the concept of identity. However, 
their difference in 'solving' or 'moving beyond' the structure and agency 
question has some significant methodological implications. 
2.1.2 Social Constructivism and Identity 
Because of the social constructivist turn in IR, the explanations highlighting 
identity (Wendt 1992; Adler 1997; Wendt 1999), often understood as based 
on a particular culture (Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein, P. J. 1996), have 
experienced a general revival in IR theory. The focus on identity and culture 
has spread to conventional rationalist accounts such as neo-realism and neo- 
liberalism. 31 Moreover, forms of 'critical' and 'dissident' thought in IR have 
dealt with the questions of identity and culture (Campbell 1998; Weldes, 
Laffey et al. 1999). 
context (structural) factors such as the CFSP and leave the agential factors aside. In the end, 
these analytical engagements should, however, be brought together 
31 Neo-realists have aimed at integrating sub-state conflicts between antagonistic ethnic and 
nationalist groups within a structural theory of international system. However, they have 
not 'revised the 'identity of constitutive unit' as being that of self-help'. Hence, in 
theorizing nationalism, neo-realism is unable to account for the construction and 
reconstruction of national identities (Wxver 2002: 2 1). On the other hand, neo-liberals have 
emphasized that the self help identity can be viewed as a starting point of the analysis, but 
the cooperation beyond the realist predictions is possible (Keohane and Nye 1977). 
Moreover, neo-liberals have recently argued for the importance of ideas and norms shaping 
the (national) interests. However, these are viewed as causal factors intervening the policy 
outcomes based on self-help, not factors constituting the (national) identity and interests 
(Laffey and Weldes 1997). Consequently, these two 'neos' do not seem to offer a 
compelling starting point for a development of a framework of how particular state 
identities are constructed, re-produced and modified in the face of the evolving European 
integration (Wxver 2002: 2 1). 
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In searching for a theory that unites structure and agency through the 
concept of identity (mainstream) constructivism is a tempting option. This is 
because Wendt' s work, which has set up the terms of debate of much recent 
IR theory, explicitly addresses the 'structure and agency problematique'. 
Moreover, his work is identity-related. Wendt's constructivism, however, 
operates at the level of the international system. The relationship between 
structure and agency, here, is between the international system and the state 
(Doty 2000; Smith, S. 2000). In terms of identity, Wendt is interested in 
general meanings of 'state', 'sovereignty' and 'anarchy'(Wendt 1992). As a 
consequence, the ability of Wendtian constructivism to deal with the 
meanings generated from within the state - how each state, nation or unit 
creates its own identity - is limited (Smith, S. 2000: 161-162). 32 
Katzenstein's (1996) collection of essays tries to address this shortcoming 
by focusing on the construction of national identity in particular cases. A 
particular national identity based on deeper cultural factors explains, for 
instance, Germany's and Japan's relatively low political profile in the 
international arena (Berger 1996), China's foreign policy (Johnston 1996) or 
the collective identity of NATO (Risse-Kappen 1996). The concept of 
identity, here, is not determined by the international structure but by 
national culture(s). However, and as Waever notes, it is difficult for the 
conception of identity in many of the essays in Katzenstein's volume 'to 
explain in a systematic way -beyond historical narrative- why the same 
cultural and historical background (of a state) can sustain highly 
contradictory foreign policies' (Wwver 2002: 22). That is, the concept of 
identity appears to reflect a common sense (western) understanding of 
particular cultures, rather than the examination of the identity construction 
within the state(s) in question. 
" More broadly this reflects the so-called 'levels of analysis problem' in IR drawing on the 
separation of domestic and international spheres of politics. Whereas 
in political science a 
state can be viewed to constitute some of the structures of a given society, 
in IR the states 
are pre-dominantly seen as the agents (reflecting 
different degrees of agency) operating in 
the anarchical system often understood as the structure 
(Waltz 1979; Wendt 1992). 
Therefore, in the IR the state is often approached as a unitary actor. That is, a 'pre-social' 
and 'exogenously given' political entity with a coherent 
identity. (Smith, S. 2000: 160-162) 
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2.1.3 Poststructuralism and Identity 
There is no shortage of poststructuralist approaches within the study of IR. 
Moreover, the issues of the European foreign and security policy/ies 
(Wxver 1993; Neumann and Waever 1996; Larsen 1997; Diez 2001; Fierke 
and Wiener 2001; Joenniemi 2001; Wxver 2002; Howorth 2004) and some 
aspects of European integration (Rosamond 2001; Howarth and Torfing 
2005) have been approached by these scholars. However, the majority of the 
poststructuralist writing in IR (Campbell 1993; Doty 1993; Weber 1995; 
Doty 1996; Weldes 1996; Campbell 1998; Weldes 2001) has been 
predominantly focused on the US foreign policy (Christiansen, Jorgensen et 
al. 2001). It is crucial to note that even if all of these approaches operate 
from poststructuralist premises, some significant differences remain. Indeed, 
poststructuralists themselves disagree on many issues. These discussions 
and debates have, however, been largely invisible under the mainstream 
analysts' fierce critique of poststructuralism often reduced to a particularly 
selective reading(s) of some postmodern texts reflecting relativist 
epistemology. 
This has clearly been puzzling (and annoying) the poststructural theorists 
beyond the boundaries of IR. For instance, Mouffe, in her analysis of 
postmodernism and essentialism in feminism, argues that the critique of 
universalism, humanism, and rationalism has come from many different 
locations and it cannot be limited to the authors called 'poststructuralists' or 
'postmodernists" (Mouffe 1995: 315). Relatedly, the critique of a specific 
thesis Propelling utmost relativism has led to generalizing conclusions about 
postmodernism, which then includes all the authors loosely connected with 
poststructuralism. As Mouffe argues, this 'type of amalgamation is 
completely unhelpful when not clearly disingenuous' (Mouffe 1995: 316). 
Therefore, it is important 'to recognize that there is no such a thing as 
4postmodernism' understood as a coherent theoretical approach and that the 
frequent assimilation between poststructuralism and postmodernism can 
only lead to confusion' (Butler 1991; Mouffe 1995: 316). 
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Once the diversity of postmodemisms and poststructuralisms has been 
acknowledged, some space is created for the discussions of the different 
poststructuralist approaches. An interesting controversy has surrounded the 
question of political agency in poststructuralist foreign policy theories. For 
example, Weldes' approach to foreign policy and her empirical case study 
of Cuban Missile Crisis (Weldes 1996) points out that alternative 
constructions of missiles in Cuba were possible and that these constructions 
were not acted upon by the US foreign policy makers. In so doing, Weldes 
retains and highlights the political agency possessed by foreign policy 
makers. As Weldes argues: 
Drawing on a wide array of already available cultural and linguistic resources, 
state officials create representations which serve, first, to populate the world with a 
variety of objects, including both the self (i. e. state in question) and others. 
(Weldes 1996: 281) 
This is consequential with Weldes' aspiration to develop a post-Marxist 
foreign policy analysis by applying and developing Althusser's concepts of 
articulation and interpellation. In this sense, Weldes has some empathy for 
structural analysis, but the reputed determinism embedded in Althusser is re- 
thought. 
David Campbell's critique of critical social constructivism -a position further 
articulated in Weldes et al. volume Cultures of Insecurity: States 
Communities and the Production of Danger (1999) - argues that the focus of 
the approach on foreign policy-makers and the state level is problematic. 
Campbell suggest that this can lead to a 'high politics' focus of the 
conventional IR FPA and hence miss out some other crucial cites for the (re-) 
production of the state identity through foreign policy (Campbell 1998: 224). 
In turn, the critical social constructivists argue that Campbell's account 
obscures the crucial role played by the foreign policy-makers and the 
institutions they are embedded in for the formulation of foreign policy. In 
short, it is argued that political agency is missing in Campbell's approach. 
As Mark Laffey notes, 'despite occasional reference to various institutions 
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and apparatuses, they are not integrated into Campbell's analysis in any 
systematic way' (Laffey 2000: 441). In so doing, Campbell's account seen 
ill-suited to elucidate the 'ways in which particular subjects are 
differentially empowered in relation to one and another' (Laffey 2000: 441). 
Tuathail share similar concern. He notes that a general avenue of scepticism 
in Campbell's account concerns the relative evisceration of agency resulting 
from 'neglect of intention and agency brought about by the retreat from 
44material causes"' (Tuathail 1996: 651). 
This debate is most helpful for the purposes of this chapter in order to define 
what I mean by the mutual constitution of structure and agency. Most 
certainly intentional agency can be identified and located in the process of 
foreign policy-making. Moreover, some agents have more influence over 
foreign policy outcomes than do others. It follows that the focus on the 
officials and institutions of a state is relevant. However, political agency is 
always located within the political process itself - it is a constitutive 
element of foreign policy; and the process itself is a constitutive element of 
political agency. 
Moreover, this is exactly how I read the performative identity construction 
as articulated by Butler (1990) and applied to the analysis of foreign policy 
and state action by Campbell (1998) and Weber (1995), for example. What 
these scholars seek to do with the notion of performative identity, are to tie 
together discourses - understood as structures of meaning - and subjects 
with agency. Importantly, identity, then, does not indicate a fixed status of 
being, instead it is understood in terms of doing (practice) (Weber 1995; 
Campbell 1998; Weber 1998). However, and as Weber notes performative 
identity should not be read to imply a voluntary performance or freedom of 
choice (Weber 1998: 8 1). Conversely, performativity highlights that the re- 
production of identities is constrained with dominant discourses. However, 
due to agency embedded in the subjects in the processes of identity 
formation, the subject's identity is not merely determined by discursive 
context(s). Rather, the very identity of the agent is (re-)produced by the 
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'reiterative and citational practice by which the discourse produces the 
effects it names' (Butler 1990: 2). 
2.1.4 Foreign and Policy and Re-Production ofState Identity 
In moving from a somewhat fixed conceptualization of identity, which is 
taken as given and is determined by either an international structure or 
cultural and historical factors to a contingent conceptualisation, the 
discussion easily turns toward poststructuralism. Here the question of 
structure and agency is predominantly dissolved in an understanding that (a 
state's) identity is continuously re-produced (by agents operating within 
social structures). Accordingly, the focus of the analysis shifts from the 
grand narratives of culture and history towards political processes within 
which the identity of a state is continuously being re-constituted. Moreover, 
critical IR scholars have demonstrated that foreign and security policy is 
central for the re-production of the state identity (Doty 1996; Campbell 
1998; Neumann 1998). 
Campbell's reasoning on foreign policy is helpful in order to lay out the 
conceptualisation of foreign policy deployed in this study. As he argues: 
Foreign policy (conventionally understood as the external orientation of 
preestablished states with secure identities) is thus to be retheorized as one of the 
boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the 
identity in whose name it operates. (Campbell 1998: 68) 
Campbell also reminds us that foreign policy relates to the identity of a 
certain kind of political community. That is, the modem state which 
emerged in the late eighteen or early nineteenth centuries when the certain 
state practices associated with a policy field of 'foreign' or 'external' were 
consolidated (Campbell 1998: 68). 
33 Whereas in conventional analysis state 
is treated as a natural fact, here, we move towards a conceptualisation of 
state as a human-made political entity. In this process of 'making' and 're- 
33 Campbell notes that it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when 
these state practices took the forin of large bureaucracies with global scope. For instance, 
British Foreign Office can be dated back to 1780s. By the 1853 it had a staff of thirty, and 
this was to increase by only additional ten in the subsequent fifty years. (Campbell 1998: 
68, endnote 64). Moreover, the discipline of international relations and the study of 
foreign 
policy as a distinct from studies of government and politics is often dated 
back to the early 
twentieth century when the first chair of international politics was founded at Aberystwyth, 
Wales. 
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making' of the state, the foreign and security policy is given a central role. 
Significantly, the foreign and security policy resonates with statehood. It 
distinguishes the state from other kinds of political communities such as 
ethnic communities or international organisations. 
However, the production and re-production of state identity is not to be 
reduced to foreign policy. Rather it overlaps with the other central 
dimension of a state identity such as nationhood. 34 In this sense, Campbell 
distinguishes between 'foreign policy' and 'Foreign Policy'. The former 
relates to all practices of differentiation or modes of exclusion of a given 
political community, and the latter to the conventional understandings of 
foreign policy as a particular state-led political practice. In constituting an 
identity, then, 'foreign policy' applies to various sites such as ethnicity, 
race, class, gender, sexuality or geography in which the self is constructed in 
relation to other(s). On the other hand, 'Foreign Policy' is understood as a 
state-based practice through which a particular state identity is re-produced 
(Campbell 1998-69). As Campbell indicates, the second view is thus 'not as 
equally implicated in the constitution of identity as the first understanding. 
Rather, 'Foreign Policy' serves to reproduce the constitution of identity 
made possible by 'foreign policy'... ' (Campbell 1998: 69, emphasis in 
original). 35 
This does not imply, however, that foreign policy understood as state-based 
practice would be a less important site of analysis. Conversely, the 
relationship of the foreign policy of a state with its political identity should 
not be underestimated. Foreign policy constitutes a powerful discourse 
which is significant for the interpretations of the pre-eminent dangers to our 
society and ourselves (Wxver 1995; Campbell 1998: 69-70; Weldes, Laffey 
34 Anderson argues that nationalist discourses produce 'imagined communities' (Anderson 
1991) ostensibly unified by blood, language and culture. However, and as Weldes et. al. 
notes, 'these imagined communities are not always wells synchronized with state 
boundaries - as in the case of contemporary Kurds or Basques, for example' (Weldes, 
Laffey et al. 1999: 15). 
35 To establish some analytical clarity, terms constitution and re- constitution are used in 
conjunction of this broader understanding of foreign policy constitutive of state identity. On 
the other hand, terms production and re-production are applied in relation to foreign policy 
as state-based practice which re-produces aspects of state (external) identity. 
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et al. 1999). 36 Here, the development of a modem (Westphalian) state and 
the articulation of its insecurities are central. The foreign and security 
policy, in historical terms, is 'the field where states threaten each others, 
challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, 
defend their independence, and so on' (Wxver 1995: 50). It is in and 
through this struggle for recognition that states establish their identity as 
states (Wxver 1995: 54) in the field of foreign and security PoliCY. 37 
In sum, the identity approach of this dissertation suggests that the state has 
ýno ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality' 
(see also, Butler 1990: 173; Campbell 1998: 10; Weber 1998). The foreign 
and security policy forms an important 'set of acts' (i. e. practice) for the 
formulation of a state's identity. When applied to the European foreign 
policy making and, in particular, to the relationship between the European 
Union and the member states, the identity approach opens up an analytical 
horizon within which the assumed constitutive aspects of the relationship 
between the two levels can be registered and analyzed. That is, the 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy is, then, constituted by the 
political process of interacting member states and the interaction is 
increasingly shaped by the EU institutions. However, this interaction in not 
merely based on cooperation in which the identities of the cooperative units 
largely remain untouched (as the majority of conventional approaches 
assume). The increasing Europeanisation suggests that EU level political 
practices are increasingly contributing to the construction of identities of the 
member states. Moreover, there is clearly a political agency at work within 
this frame of state identity. Moreover, it is imperative to examine how each 
state constructs their identity in the field of foreign and security policy. 
36 The privileged status of foreign policy is related to the conventional (Westphalian) 
understanding of the state where sovereignty is guaranteed in the policy areas of security 
and defence reflected in 'high politics' and 'low politics' distinction. Whereas policies 
related to states security and defence are mostly seen as matters of first priority (high 
politics), other policy areas such as welfare and health come second (low politics). 
37 This does not mean that a narrow understanding of security would be sufficient to secure 
the state or other political community. As critics point out, policy-makers and academics 
have seen it imperative to broaden the scope of security and critical analysis have asked a 
question whose security is valued over others. Weldes et. al. notes that the security of many 
political groups and individuals is often antithetical to those of the state(s) in which they 
live (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999: 15). 
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However, the states do not operate outside, behind or beyond the political 
process of integration. 
2.2 The Methodological Framework: Discourse Analysis with a 
Comparative Element 
In analysing identity/ies poststructural scholars have turned to the concept 
of discourse. Indeed, the concept of discourse appears to be integral for the 
development of the poststructural scholarly tradition. In short, 
poststructuralists have attempted to move beyond the deterministic character 
of structuralism associated (more or less correctly) with the concept of 
ideology (Purvis and Hunt 1993; Torfing 2005: 10-11). That is, the identity 
of a subject of a social inquiry is not determined by a dominant ideology 
(reflecting the material world) rather it is constructed in a discursive field. 38 
The concept of discourse is suggestive of a particular research method(s) 
and design. However, in IR there has been very little discussion of the 
appropriate methods and criteria for the discourse analytical approach 
(Milliken 1999: 226). This is hardly due to the limited amount of discourse 
research undertaken. As suggested above, the amount of poststructuralist 
research is substantial. Rather the refusal to define a fixed methodology is 
indicative of discourse analysis theoretical commitments and disciplinary 
politics. As Milliken argues, there is no common understanding of how to 
study discourse (Milliken 1999: 226). This, in turn, reflects both the 
theoretical differences among discourse scholars and their desire to 
challenge the 'scientism' embraced by the mainstream IR. Namely, the 
search for scientific theories and laws in terms of quantitative method as the 
key rationale of a quality research (Hollis and Smith 1990). 
39 
38 Hunt and Purvis argue that these two terms reflect distinct theoretical traditions which, 
while they can be separated, they can both be made good use of In so doing, they 
indicate 
that the rupture between discourse and ideology is not the only analytical move available 
for the analysts dealing with problems of structuralism. They favor a Gramscian position 
espoused by Stuart Hall that retains the concept of ideology while 
benefiting from the 
advances secured by discourse theory (Purvis and Hunt 1993). 
39 For an exemplar, see a well cited volume by King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (King, Keohane et al. 1994). 
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However, the argument developed here is that discourse approaches operate 
through highly sophisticated methodologies and that discourse scholars 
share some common commitments. 40 Moreover, methodological plurality is 
sensible because many discourse scholars reject the search for the ultimate 
method or the most adequate methodology (Torfing 1999). On the other 
hand, scholars have highlighted the flexibility of discourse analysis as an 
analytical strength in examining complex social phenomena and processes 
(Milliken 1999). 1 suggest that it can deepen our understanding of the 
foreign and security policy governance in contemporary Europe. The 
purpose of this section is to elucidate the methodology of the discourse 
analytic approach deployed in this study, and to discuss how it relates to the 
comparative element of the study. 
2.2.1 Genealogical Frame: Discursive and Discourse(s) 
This study operates within the genealogical frame of theory (Squires 1999: 
87). Within this frame, meaning is not a simple reflection of ideas or things: 
the meaning of words does not correspond in a transparent fashion to 
something external; it is acquired through specific, mutable social processes 
(Squires 1999: 87). Following an anti-essentialist ontology and anti- 
foundationalist epistemology (Laclau and Mouffe 1987: 80; Hacking 1999; 
Torfing 2005: 13), the study assumes that the European foreign and security 
policy/ies exists through human agreement and social interaction, and not 
independently of our knowledge and conceptions of it. In other words, the 
meaning given to suggested Europeanisation of the foreign and security 
40 Milliken sums up these commitments arguing that scholars tend to focus upon discourses, 
first as systems of signification, second as being productive and third as constituting the 
play of practice. Discourses as a system of signification 
draws researchers towards the 
analysis of language practices. Derrida's suggestion that 'there 
is nothing outside of text' is 
understood broadly. The reality is mediated through systems of significations 
(i. e. 
language, symbols etc. ). Focus on discourse productivity makes it 
important to explain how 
discourse (re)produces the reality. How the process of production is selective and privileges 
some discourses over others. This aspect of discourse analysis also 
has a clear political and 
ethical significance. It enables the critical stance of 
discourse approaches by analysing, for 
example, the production of naturalised 'common sense(s)'. 
Discourses as the play of 
practice emphasise the open-endness and instability of 
discourses -the reality needs to be 
produced and re-produced. Crucially, it is within the process 
if (re-)production where the 
change and continuity occur. It is significant to note that many of 
the methods employed in 
discourse approaches are often combined and they overlap. Moreover, they are 
based on 
empirical analysis and evidence. (Milliken 1999) 
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policy is relational to the established system(s) of meaning manifested 
within the discursive field of the European foreign and security policy/ies). 
However, a discourse analytic approach does not imply scepticism about the 
existence of the 'reality'. The 'reality/ies' certainly exists, but not 
independently of our knowledge of it. Laclau and Mouffe's reasoning is 
illustrative. They argue: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition. An earthquake or falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in 
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their 
specificity as objects is constructed in tenns of 'natural phenomena' or 
'expressions of the wrath of 'God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive 
field. What is denied in not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the 
rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside 
any discursive conditions of emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108) 
In this sense, this study agrees that, while the world exists out there, truth 
does not. This means that the institutional and material social conditions and 
practices interrelate with discursive practices. Further, it is their meaning, 
not existence, what is at stake in this study. Whilst the relationship between 
discursive action and political and institutional structures and policies is 
reciprocal, this study focuses on the level of discourse constitutive of state 
identities. 41 
Nevertheless, the reciprocal relationship between discourse(s) and 
institutionalised political practices is important for the research design of 
this study. Namely, it underpins the focus on official documentation and 
policy-makers. I suggest that some institutionalised practices are more 
important in processes of the re-articulation of foreign and security policy 
discourses. In other words, they constitute a privilege site of re-articulation. 
In the field of foreign and security policy, state agencies and officials 
41 1 acknowledge the importance of the aim of some discourse approaches to make the 
relationship between discourses and institution and political practices transparent(Wodak 
1999: 4ý 9). In terns of Europeanisation, the discourse analytic approach can therefore 
contribute, for instance, to the explanations of institutional change 
in EU member states. 
However, this is not the key question addressed in this study. Hence, the analysis stays on 
the level of discourse(s), which is seen as constitutive of state identities. 
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occupy a central place in generating meaningful articulations. However, and 
as Weldes argues, this Position does not lay outside the discursive context, 
rather it is discursively constructed (Weldes 1996). 
Four key arguments are central for the discourse analytic approach of this 
study. First, the methodology applied in this dissertation builds on 
Foucault's definition of discourse(s) as those 'practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault 1972: 49). As such, 
discourse(s) are understood as 'concrete systems of social relations and 
practices' (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 4); they reflect and re-produce 
structure(s) of meaning (Weldes 1996; Torfing 1999; Wxver 2002) 
constitutive of particular identities. While discourses organise knowledge 
systematically, they also set up the 'boundaries' or 'terms' of the debate(s). 
Discourses define what can be intelligibly said and what not (Wxver 2002: 
29). In other words, they set up the rules governing sensible (foreign and 
security policy) statements in a certain juncture of time. 
Second, the discourse and identity formation is relational and contextual 
(Torfing 2005: 14). That is, identities do not occur independently of other 
meaningful subjects and object is constructed in the discourse(s). Rather, 
their existence is relational, and thus context specific (rather than universal). 
Moreover, the formative order of a discourse is not a stable self-re- 
producing structure, but a precarious system, which is constantly subjected 
to political attempts to undermine and/or re-structure the discursive context 
(Torfing 2005: 14). Accordingly, the examination of the re-production of 
state identities accounts and analyses the change and the continuity of these 
relationships. 
Third, and relatedly, an identity is re-produced in and through hegemonic 
struggles in the discursive field. The discourse analytic approach argues, 
with Derrida, that there is no pre-given, self-determining essence that is 
capable of deten-nining and ultimately fixing all other identities within a 
stable and totalizing structure (Torfing 2005: 13). In this study this means 
that there is no essence of statehood reflecting ideas of sovereignty or 
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security and resulting in an anarchic system. Because of its contingent 
nature, the discourse(s) needs to be continuously re-articulated. In this 
process, some articulations gain dominance and some are marginalised. A 
discourse can gain a hegemonic status when it manages 'to provide a 
credible principle upon which read the past, present, and the future events, 
and capture people's hearts and minds... ' (Torfing 2005: 15). In so doing, 
hegemonic discourse(s) establishes common senses and, at times, 
naturalised truths. As Squires points out, within a genealogical frame of 
theory, 'while all meaning is a contextual construction, some meanings gain 
the status of objective truths' (Squires 1999: 97). 
The (re-) articulation of a foreign and security policy discourse and the re- 
production of state identity, are intrinsically linked to the construction of 
social antagonisms, which involves the exclusion of a series of identities 
and meanings (other subjects) that are articulated in terms of equivalence 
and difference. In the discourse analysis, social antagonisms are manifested 
in and through the production of political frontiers, which often invoke 
stereotyped representations of friends and enemies, for instance (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Torfing 2005: 15-16). 
Moreover, the struggle over what and who are included and excluded from 
the hegemonic discourse is a significant political act and in the focus of the 
discourse analytical approach. 
Finally, we are left with the question of dislocation of a hegemonic 
discourse. Most discourses are flexible and capable of integrating new 
elements, which reflect political developments, to their existing structure of 
meaning and symbolic order. A hegemonic discourse is dislocated when it 
fails to explain, represent, or in other ways to domesticate new events 
(Torfing 2005: 16). That is, the rules structuring the meaning are disturbed. 
When dislocation of a hegemonic discourse occurs, a new terrain for 
political struggles is opened up. The participants of the debate are assigned 
different degrees of authority depending on their discursively constructed 
position in the system. Over time, the debate is likely to 
lead to emergence 
of consensus, that is, a new hegemonic discourse. Because the purpose of 
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this study is to examine the re-production of the state identity through the 
re-articulation of hegemonic national foreign and security discourses in the 
face of increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, it also 
deals with the question of whether the national discourses have been 
dislocated in this process. 
2.2.2 Discourse Analytic Methods 
After discussing the theoretical and methodological framework in a rather 
abstract meta-theoretical fashion, I will now turn to its practical impact on the 
research design and methods employed. I first outline the tools (i. e., methods) 
to be used in the discourse analysis. Second, I map out the overall research 
design and clarify the comparative elements of it. 
Discourse analysis forms the core of the empirical analysis conducted in this 
study. My aim here is to analyse what impact, if any, the increasing 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy has had on state identities in 
Finland and Britain. Given the theoretical frame of this dissertation, I do so 
by focusing on the developments in the official foreign and security policy 
discourse. The most important and general method of discourse analytical 
approach applied, interpretation, is mostly taken for granted. In so doing, it 
is not often discussed in terms of methodology. However, I suggest that it is 
analytically imperative to clarify what kind of interpretation any particular 
analysis is based on. 
In this study, the analysis of the relationship between the European Union 
and the Finnish and British foreign and security policies is based on an 
interpretative document analysis. This study is not purely a 'mechanical' 
analysis of discourses, for instance, in terms of their frequency, function and 
shape in the selected material. Yet this will form a part of the research. 
What is at stake in this study is the interpretation of discourses based on a 
dialogue between the analyst and the selected empirical material 
(documents). For this reason, the context within which the interpretation 
takes place is of key importance not only in terms of the (re)production of 
discourses but also in terms of situated analysts. 
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The analysis of discourses in Finland and Britain takes place within the 
framework illustrated in figure 2.1. Because discourses are understood to be 
open-ended and changeable, the concepts of articulation and interpellation 
will highlight the continuous need for reproduction (Weldes 1996; Weldes 
1999; Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). With the concept of articulation, the 
study addresses the contingent and contextually specific representations of 
the world that produces meanings that come to seem natural and accurate 
descriptions of reality. That is, for instance, the call for for the CFSP and the 
ESDP in, or the problematic nature of these twin policies for, Finland and 
Britain. The need for re-articulation also enables the contestation, 
transformation or dislocation of the foreign and security policy discourse. 
Hence, the study will also examine whether the (re-) articulations of the 
discourse(s) interpellate the state officials and the publics and become 
accepted as natural and accurate. In other words, whether the discourse 
become hegemonic. The practical analysis is based on two major phases. 
The context 
within which Foreign and Security 
the Policy Discourse: Re- 
Europeanisatio Articulation 











Broad focus upon various sites with in which 
the re-production of state identity takes 
place. 
Narrow focus upon the re-articulation of 
foreign and security policy discourse(s) 
Whether the (re-) articulation 
of the foreign and security 
policy discourse became 
hegemonic 
Figure 2.1.: Re-Production of state identity in the field of foreign and security policy 
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Articulation 
Official foreign and security policy discourse(s) in Finland and Britain are 
approached by focusing on the process of (re-) articulation of the discourse 
outlined in figure 2.2. The purpose of the analysis of articulation is to 
generate a portrait of the discourse in question. In methodological terms, the 
analysis is based on the retroduction of a discourse through the empirical 
analysis of its realization in political and social practices (Laffey and 
Weldes 2004: 28). That is, the analysis reasons backward to establish the 
discourse from its empirical manifestations such as the representations 
generated in the official documents. The process of (re-) articulation is 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
The analysis begins by examining the representation articulated in the 
discourse (discursive construction as noun) and then the process of 
articulation in which the representations are re-produced, transformed or 
dismantled (discursive construction as a verb). To do so, I utilise the 
methods of predication, presupposition and subject positioning. Whereas 
predication relates the examination of the articulated representations, the 
presupposition and subject positioning relate to the process of articulation. 
Although these tools are analytically separable, in practice they are 
interrelated. The purpose of analysing them in turns reflects the aim to break 
down the common sense representation generated in the discourse and to 
examine how they are arrived at. 
Predication is used for two purposes. To identify the subjects and objects 
constructed and to examine the representation of these subjects and objects 
in the discourse. The latter is arrived at through the analysis of the usage of 
predicates, adverbs and adjectives in conjunction with particular subjects 
and objects (Doty 1993; Weldes 1996). In so doing, predication enables 
analysis of the kind of subject constructed in the discourse, as well as what 
is included in, and excluded from, the discourse. 
On the other hand, presupposition is used to analyse the background 
knowledge of the discourse. That is, in order to explain the past, present 
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and future developments in the Finnish and British foreign and security 
policy a certain world is assumed, and in so doing, constructed in the 
discourse. The construction of knowledge through presupposition operates 
through implicitly and explicitly articulated binary oppositions. Binary 
oppositions structure the meaning given to the subjects and objects and 
simultaneously position them vis-a-vis each other. In the light of the 
centrality of social antagonism for a discourse, the relationships among the 
subjects and objects are largely constructed in terms of similarity, 
complementary and difference (Doty 1993: 306-308; Torfing 2005: 14). 
Finally, subjects are assigned with various degrees of agency. This is 
achieved by constructing certain subject positions available for the subjects. 
Predication and presupposition, in turn, structure the availability of a 
particular subject position for a certain subject (Doty 1993) and the subject 
position available for the central subject in the discourse - that is, the state 
in question - is relational to the other sub ects positioned in the discourse. j 
The break down of the discourse, manifested in the representation generated 
in the official foreign and security policy discourse, enables the analysis of 
change and continuity in the discourse in the light of the increasing 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. 
Representation: Method of Predication 
(Discursive Construction as Noun) 
Process of (Re-) Articulation: 
Methods of Presupposition and Subject 
Positioning 
(Discursive Construction as a Verb) 
Discourse: Structure of Meaning Which Set up the Rules for 
Representations 
Figure 2.2: Representation(s), tne rrocess oi tKe-) articuiatiun anu "nowurwkno) 
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Interpellation 
To examine whether a (re-) articulation of the traditional foreign and 
security policy discourse or the articulation of a novel discourse become 
hegemonic, I draw on the concept of interpellation. That is, I examine 
whether the decision-makers were interpellated, or hailed into the discourse 
(Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). Interpellation suggests that, first, specific 
identities are created through social interaction and the articulation and re- 
articulation of discourses. Second, in a successful interpellation individuals 
such as decision-makers come to identify themselves with the subject 
positions entailed by the discourse. As a result, the political struggle, such as 
the articulation of competing views that reflects alternative discourses or 
different re-articulations of the official discourse, fades away. As a result, 
the representations generated in the hegemonic discourse appear 
commonsensial and to reflect the way the world really is (Laffey and 
Weldes 2004: 28) The analysis of interpellation deployed here 
systematically examines the representations that are generated by the 
decisions-makers in the official documents and, for instance, in debates over 
these documents. In so doing, it seeks to account to the change and 
continuity in the re-production of state identity. 
223 The Comparative Element 
Interestingly, in the late 1990s Britain and Finland have both taken a more 
constructive role in the development of the CFSP. The joint Anglo-French 
declaration in St. Malo (1998) launched a strong initiative aimed at building 
(common) European security and defence. This is often viewed as a change 
in the British policy, which enabled European Union's decision to develop 
independent military capabilities. The decision was made under the 
coordination and support of the Finnish EU presidency in 1999. This is 
often perceived as a change in the Finnish foreign and security policy. 
In constructing a framework for the comparison, several routes are possible. 
A comparison can be based on the 'most similar system design' that seeks to 
compare those political systems that share several similar features in an 
effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others (Van Evera 
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1997; Landman 2000: 27). Drawing on J. S. Mill's 'method of difference' 
presented in 1843, the purpose of this design is to identify the key features 
that are different among similar states and which account for the observed 
political outcome(s). This research design is argued to be well suited 
especially for area studies (Landman 2000). Indeed, the intellectual and 
theoretical justification for area studies is that there is something inherently 
similar about the countries that make up a particular geographical region of 
the world, such as Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America (Landman 2000: 
28). The assumed similarities, in turn, make the comparison sensible. 
In terms of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policies in Britain 
and Finland, a comparative framework, then, could be constructed around 
the 'fact' that the foreign policy system's of the both states share similar 
features: democratic control over the foreign policy actors and bureaucracies 
resulting in, if not identical, at least comparable foreign policy decision- 
making systems. Moreover, Britain and Finland have increasingly 
comparable foreign and security policy agendas which addresses the so- 
called 'new security' threats in the post Cold War Europe such as the ethnic 
conflicts, transnational crime, mass migration and environmental issues. The 
interest of both counties in the process of European integration has 
increased. On the other hand, Britain and Finland are both, in a sense, 
peripheral in terms of their geographical location in the rim of Europe. 
As a consequence, the possible variation in the policy outcomes of these 
states might be explained by variables that differentiate these states. For 
instance, Britain and Finland are unequal in terms of their resources and 
capabilities. Britain has a more independent role in the international Politics. 
It is a founding member of NATO, whereas Finland's defense policy is 
based on independent defense and the policy of military nonalignment 
(previously neutrality). Britain has a long-term membership in the EU (since 
1973), while Finland is one of the most recent members (since 1995). And 
even though both member-states are in a sense peripheral, Finland's 
70 
geopolitical location in the North, between the cultural spheres of the 'East' 
and the 'West', is different from that of Britain. 42 
However, in terms of social scientific methodology, the low number of 
countries compared in this study causes some problems for the comparative 
framework. In short, the number of 'variables' or 'inferences' accounting 
for the political outcome(s) can turn out to be greater than countries or 
observations. 43 More generally, it can be asked whether a comparison 
between two very different member states is sensible in the first place 
(Groom cited in Manners and Whitman 2000: 6). 
The research strategy of this study will not proceed by generating testable 
hypothesis or by the isolation of 'variables' in the manner of conventional 
social scientific epistemology and methodology. The research addresses a 
different set of questions than the more conventional theories of foreign 
policy. The purpose is not to ask 'why questions' in order to discover the 
causes for certain political outcomes, such as the Finnish and British policy 
in the EU context. The purpose of this research is to examine how the 
Europeanisation is discursively constructed in two preferably different 
states; and to explicate what the comparison of the findings generated in 
answering this 'how possible' question (Doty 1993; Weldes 1996) tells us 
about the relationship between the European Union and member state 
foreign and security policies. 
Accordingly, the similarities and differences of Britain and Finland are not 
to be taken as given facts, nor do they simply reflect the 'reality' on which 
42 Because of the differences, a comparative framework could also be based on the 'method 
of agreement' (Landman 2000). The comparison, then, would be designed around the 'most 
different system design', highlighting that Britain and Finland do not share similar features 
in the field of security and defense apart from the particular policy outcome to be 
explained. 
43 The 'problem' that there are too many variables and not enough countries based on the 
principle that the number of inferences must be less than the number of observations (King, 
Keohane et al. 1994) can be, however, 'solved' by raising the number of observations to 
allow greater variation of the key factors of the study. This does not necessarily mean 
increasing the number of case studies. For instance, this study will compare the CFSP 
discourses in Britain and Finland also over time. Hence the number of observations is 
substantial. The number of factors influencing policy outcomes, then, is less that the 
observations (King, Keohane et al. 1994: 119-122; Landman 2000: 3 7-4 1). 
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the research design is construed. What is at stake in this study is how these 
'facts' are socially constructed. Hence, the convergences and divergences of 
Finland and Britain are part of the research outcomes and not the point of 
departure of the study. The research will also move away from any notion of 
inherent similarities and differences between the British and Finnish states. 
In this study the key concepts from IR theory like 'national interest' are 
understood as to be a point of contestation rather than given prior to 
discursive and political processes (Weldes 1996). In so doing, the study will 
not compare the British and Finnish states as such. Instead the comparison 
will deal with the political debates surrounding the CFSP in Britain and 
Finland. Moreover, these debates are not seen to draw on any given interests 
in these states. Rather, the states themselves are partly constituted by these 
debates dealing with their existence in Europe and beyond. 
To summarise, the chosen comparative approach is based on strong 
theoretical justifications. The number of cases is limited in order to produce 
a comprehensive study of the research topic that is rich and complex 
(Titscher 2000: 43). The study has two comparative elements. First, in order 
to examine the impact of the Europeanisation on the foreign and security 
policies of Britain and Finland, the study will examine the re-articulation of 
foreign and security policy discourses in these states over time. Second, in 
order to elucidate the relationship between the European Union and the 
member states' foreign and security policies, the research compares the 
findings of the discourse analyses over space. 
23 Data Collection an dAn alysis: Primary an d Secon dary So urces 
This section introduces the process of data selection for the actual discourse 
analysis. My purpose here is to elucidate how my thinking of the 
methodology developed while undertaking the empirical analysis. In so 
doing, this section discusses the selected materials and what the chosen 
material could tell us about the Finnish and British foreign and security 
policies in the face of increasing foreign policy integration. The aim is to 
make the research practice more visible for others. I first discuss the purpose 
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of this section, I then focus on the selection of the secondary and primary 
material. 
2.3.1 The Process ofMaterial Selection 
As my research question suggests, I focus on the way in which state 
officials 44 made the European foreign and security policy meaningful in 
Finland and Britain in 1990s. In short, I examine how they (re-) articulate 
the official foreign and security policy discourse in the light of increasing 
integration in this area. As the methodological discussion indicates, the 
discourse is approached by examining the representations generated in the 
official documents and/or used by the decision-makers when they write and 
talk about the foreign and security policy. 45 In doing so, my aim is to 
elucidate the discourse(s) constitutive of a state identity that these 
representations constructed. 
The central qualitative criterion that I use in selecting the empirical material 
for the case studies is its relevance in answering these research aims. I 
considered different sources of the Finnish and British foreign, security and 
defence policies well as the European policies in the 1990s. Due to 
analytical reasons I focused on material available in the public domain. The 
archives including policy-making documents of the Finnish and British 
foreign policies in 1990s are largely closed for years to come. Although 
history writing will shed new light to the British and Finnish foreign policy 
in 1990s, this is not a major concern for this study because the aim of this 
research is not to discover hidden policy agendas or concealed preferences 
of the decision makers. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the 
impact of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy on the official 
and publicly articulated discourses in Finland and Britain. Moreover, the 
public availability of the empirical material is important in terms of the 
44 As my theoretical framework suggests, state officials occupy a central place in 
constructing a state's identity. In short, they create representations of the world which 
establish the state in relation to other actors and guide its actions. 
451-lowever, I must emphasise that my purpose is not to examine what the state officials 
really' think, for instance, about the EU's foreign and security policy. Rather, I am 
interested in knowing how they talk and write about it on official occasions; and what 
impact their statements have on the re-articulation of the Finnish and British foreign and 
security policy discourse. 
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quality of this research in terms of the accessibility of this material for other 
researchers in this way enabling evaluation and critique. 
Secondary sources 
Secondary sources that address the case studies are used in several stages of 
the study. However, most of them were read after I had familiarised myself 
with the empirical material. Rather than framing the analysis in terms of 
what other researchers had found significant, I wanted to let the empirical 
material guide me and find out what issues and questions emerge from it 
(Kantola 2002). This, however, does not reflect any empiricist or objectivist 
desire. 46 
Moreover, the secondary material is not seen as factual historical sources. 
Rather it is approached as interpretations of the actual events (Wodak 1999; 
Hay 2002; Kantola 2002). It is used as supportive material to elucidate the 
Finnish and British historical contexts in which the EU' foreign and security 
policy was made meaningful in 1990s and early 2000s. The secondary 
material is helpful in analysing how the foreign and security policy was 
discussed in Finland and Britain: what issue areas were attached to it and 
what kind of political debates it generated (Kantola 2002) Whether the 
secondary sources are 'correct' interpretations of the foreign and security 
policy in Finland and Britain is not a central question in my research. 
Rather, I am interested in knowing how the assumed Europeanisation was 
addressed and framed in Finland and Britain in 1990s and early 2000s. 
Primary Material 
In searching for suitable primary material, I focused first on the recorded 
public statements of the foreign and security policies. I contacted 
governmental agencies in Finland and Britain in order to obtain foreign and 
security policy documentation such as public reports, memos and white 
papers. I found out that the empirical material available was substantial and 
interesting. It clearly established the Finnish and British states' as certain 
46 On empiricism see (Hay 2002). For further discussion, see the section on primary 
material below. 
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kinds of political entities with particular kinds of interests. The subjects and 
objects articulated in these texts 'hang together' in a certain way and the 
relationships among them appeared logical and uncontroversial. These 
documents constructed a particular kind of foreign and security policy 
ýreality' within which the state action appeared 'sensible'. Moreover, 
several of them addressed a topical issue of the European Union's 
developing security dimension, the CFSP, the ESDP, or the EU foreign and 
security policy. As such, these documents proved to be suitable as the core 
material for the analysis. They made it possible to investigate the discourse 
that was manifested in the state officials' representations. 
However, and as my theoretical framework suggests, I am also interested in 
knowing how these particular representations were arrive at. Rather than 
explicitly or implicitly assuming that the representations reflect given and 
unquestioned interests - that is conceptualising state interests as a given 
prior to discursive and political processes -I approach them as potential 
points of contestation (Weldes 1996; Hansen 2002). Consequently, the 
empirical material of the study should enable analysis of alternative and 
competing representations. 
I first considered undertaking interviews in order to find out whether any 
competing representations of the issues I am interested in existed. However, 
the interviews proved to be difficult for two reasons. First, they were 
problematic in terms of the comparative element of my research. While in 
Finland the policy makers could be approached and interviewed, in Britain, 
they were largely unavailable for interviews. As such, the British data would 
not have been parallel with the Finnish data. Second, I learnt that the 
interviews were problematic due to the temporal aspect. The data collected 
in early 2000 would have formed a collection of policy makers' memoirs of 
the issues and events in the 1990s (Kantola 2002). As such, interviews 
would not generate a kind of 'raw material' I was searching for. 
Second, I considered the media coverage of the Finnish and British foreign 
policy as a possible source. In particular, I looked for the competing 
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articulations of the EU foreign and security policy. I utilised different media 
search engines in the World Wide Web as well as library and information 
centre catalogues, and I found out that the amount of this kind of material 
was substantial. Decision makers were quoted and referred to in news, 
reports, columns, editorials etc. The state officials' statements were put 
under a close scrutiny, and competing views of the CFSP and the ESDP 
were publicly articulated. However, after my initial analysis some problems 
occurred. Crucially, I found it difficult to distinguish between the state 
officials' texts and journalistic text. The official statements and documents 
were edited and formulated by the editorial staff. Even direct quotations, 
which could be regarded as policy makers' 'own words', were inserted into 
edited j ournalistic texts and hence mediated through the j ournalists (Kantola 
2002). Even if these texts formed a highly interesting set of empirical 
material which could have been used for analysis, I wanted to stick with the 
actual statements of the policy makers. This is because my main focus lay 
within the decision makers' representations of the EU foreign and security 
policy. As suggested, they are the most central actors in the process of (re-) 
articulation of a particular foreign and security policy discourse. 47 
After this I turned towards parliamentary debates. In both cases, the material 
available was substantial and it appeared appropriate for my research. In the 
minutes I looked at, the foreign policy leaderships' articulations were 
discussed, debated and challenged. The MPs agreed or disagreed with the 
government's proposals and they also searched for compromises and 
consensus. Accordingly, competing views of EU foreign and security policy 
was articulated at a state level. In addition, the parliamentary debates 
supplemented the official foreign policy articulations. In defending its 
policy, the government ministers provided deeper and more detailed insights 
into the official foreign policy articulations. 
47 This is not to suggest that analysis focusing on, for instance, media coverage would not 
be valuable. On the contrary, I suggest that they can deepen our understanding of state 
identity and foreign and security policy. However, in the light of the research questions of 
this dissertation the focus on state officials is justified. The documents and statements 
generated by the state officials form a substantial and manageable set of empirical material 
in the light of the discourse analysis and comparison of this study. 
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However, while reading through the material, the need for some further 
qualifications became apparent. The number of texts relating to the 
European Union, the CFSP, the ESDP and the Finnish and British foreign, 
security and defence policies were simply too extensive for a detailed 
documentary analysis. To overcome this problem, I decided to limit my 
focus on the key debates. That is, to the debates in which change and 
continuity of the foreign and security policy in the face of Europeanisation 
was clearly present. In Finland, the key debates were the 1995 debate over 
the Government's foreign and security policy report and the subsequent 
debates in 1997 and 2001 over the Government's report on security and 
defence policy. In Britain these were the debates related to the Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) in 1998, the Defence White Paper in 1999 and the 
Policy Paper on European Defence in 2001. 
Importantly, the parliamentary debates in Finland and Britain also formed a 
material that could be compared and contrasted. Notwithstanding some 
important differences, such as different electoral systems that reflect distinct 
political traditions resulting in different political systems, the similarities in 
the field of foreign policy-making were striking. In both cases, the 
governments constructed policy documents which were then given to the 
parliament to be debated. Further, in Finnish and British cases the real 
constitutional power of the parliaments over the foreign and security policy 
of the governments was significantly limited. Yet the parliaments had a 
particular political significance in terms of the political legitimacy of these 
governments. 
Conclusion 
This chapter suggests that poststructuralist theories utilising the concept of 
discourse can be helpful in understanding the Europeanisation of foreign 
and security policy. I have suggested that the methodological move in which 
the question of structure and agency is dissolved rather than solved has 
particular value for the analysis of the complex relationships among the 
different levels of policy-making. Accordingly, it is plausible to examine the 
Europeanisation of state identities in the field of foreign and security policy. 
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To do so, this dissertation deploys methods associated with the discourse 
analytic approach with a comparative element. 
78 
Chapter 3 
The Europeanisation of Finnish Foreign and Security Policy 
Discourse: From Neutrality to Alignment 
Introduction 
For almost half of the century Finland adopted a unique position within 
European politics. Although in the context of the Cold War confrontation 
between the East and the West Finland claimed a neutral status since the late 
1950s, Finland was the only neutral country that had a security arrangement 
with the Soviet Union. 48 In this context, the policy of neutrality was seen as 
of key importance for Finland. It set up limits for the Soviet Union's 
involvement in the Finnish politics. Notably, neutrality denoted no further 
military co-operation with the Soviet Union (Arter 1996: 614). On the other 
hand, and significantly for this study, it also limited Finland's participation 
in western European integration. Closer involvement in the western 
economic and political organisations was widely construed to undermine the 
neutrality and good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. In Finland, 
neutrality, then, was construed as a pragmatic policy aimed to mediate 
between the East and the West. 
48 The arrangement was based on the 1948 Treaty for Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union which specified that 'in the event of Finland, or 
the Soviet Union through Finland, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany, or 
any other state allied with the latter, Finland will... fight to repel the attack independently 
or with assistance provided by the Soviet Union' ('Sopimus Ystdvyydesta, 
Yhteistoiminnasta Ja KeskindisestA Avunannosta' 1948, my translation). 
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A major shift in Finnish foreign and security policy took place when 
Finland, in 1992, applied, and, in 1995, joined, the European Union. During 
this process the security arrangements with the Soviet Union and its 
successor, the Russian Federation, were dissolved and Finland joined the 
European Union as a previously neutral 'militarily non-aligned' state which 
had 'credible independent defence capability' (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 59). Moreover, Finland argued that the development of the 
CFSP and prospect of the ESDP would not constitute a problem for 
previously neutral Finland. Instead, the foreign policy leadership argued that 
4membership of the European Union will reinforce the foundations of 
Finnish security ... '(Report by the Council of State 1995: 5). 
This case study considers the role of the EU foreign and security policy in the 
process of re-producing the Finnish state identity in the post Cold War 
Europe. To do this, I concentrate on the official Finnish foreign and security 
policy discourse(s). I analyse the key foreign and security policy documents 
generated in the 1990s and early 2000s as well as associated parliamentary 
debates. The findings suggest that in mid 1990s a significant turn took place 
in the official Finnish discourse. Drawing on historical discourses of the 
Finnish nation and state, and contemporary discourses of the post-Cold War 
Europe and the developing foreign and security policy of the European 
Union, a new radically different foreign and security policy discourse was 
articulated. Instead of neutrality, this discourse was symptomatic of 
alignment. Further, and although initially resisted, this discourse became 
hegemonic by the early 2000s. The study suggests that the Europeanisation of 
foreign and security policy was central for the re-production of state identity 
in Finland. 
This chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first part I focus on the 
traditional neutrality discourse. I situate the discourse with a brief review of 
literature on neutrality policies and I then analyse the articulation of the 
discourse within a discourse analytic frame. In the second section I situate the 
suggested alignment discourse in relation to Finland's foreign and security 
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policy in the light of the post-Cold War world. I then examine the articulation 
of the new discourse. Finally, I analyse whether the alignment discourse 
became hegemonic via a systematic investigation of the representation 
generated in the key documents and the associated parliamentary debates. 
3.1 Finnish Neutrality Discourse: Limited Participation with the West and 
the East 
This section maps out the key discourse(s) that structured the 
representations of Finnish state identity re-articulated in the realm of the 
foreign and security policy, that is, the discursive context, in which the EU 
foreign and security policy was first raised. I suggest that in the early 1990s 
a hegemonic foreign and security policy discourse existed in Finland. I label 
this discourse 'neutrality' discourse. The main signifying elements of the 
neutrality discourse were the construction of Finland as a small state, which 
was located in a geopolitically challenging environment. Within this 
understanding of Finland's place in the world a particular kind of identity 
emerged. Three factors were central for the Finnish neutrality identity: (i) 
Finland was a relatively powerless actor; (ii) Finland had to adapt to the 
external environment; and (iii) Finland was not in a position to address 
moral questions in international politics. 
To explicate this discourse I first situate the discourse in terms of the Cold 
War neutrality literature. I examine the articulation and the re-articulation of 
the neutrality discourse. Finally, I discuss the hegemony of the neutrality 
discourse. The detailed analysis of the neutrality discourse enables the 
consequent analysis of change and continuity in the Finnish foreign and 
security policy discourse in the light of the Europeanisation of foreign and 
security policy. 
3. LI Situating Neutrality Discourse: Cold War, European Security and 
Finland 
The initial survey of the empirical material suggested that the dominant 
theme in the Finnish foreign and security policy debates prior to the EU 
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membership in 1995 and beyond was Finland's neutrality. 49 The documents 
I looked at highlighted Finland's aspirations to retain its neutral status in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Although the analysis of the primary 
material forms the core of the subsequent sections of this case study, the 
purpose of this section is to situate the discourse(s) by reviewing the 
scholarly literature. Still, the empirical survey guided the examination of 
these secondary sources 
The concept of neutrality has been widely used in the scholarly literature of 
IR. The term is closely related to modem states and the relations among 
them and the concept draws on centuries of European military and political 
affairs history (Goetschel 1999: 118) . 
50 Legal codes of neutrality are usually 
traced back to the Hague Conventions of 1907 (0janen, Herolf et al. 2000: 
11). In these conventions on sea and land war, neutrality was defined mainly 
in military terms. The code suggests that neutral states cannot participate in 
wars directly or indirectly. Neither should they support or favour war parties 
militarily or make their territory available for them, supply them with 
weapons or credits, or restrict private weapon exports in a one-sided way. 
Neutrals were also required to defend themselves against violations of their 
neutrality. 
Although the term neutrality and the idea of neutral states feature in the 
historical accounts of western diplomacy and the major wars, the scholarly 
understandings of the concept in the study of IR mainly relate to the Cold 
49The empirical material included Parliamentary Defence Policy Committee's Estimate on 
developments on European Security (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen 
Neuvottelukunta 1990); Report by the Council of State to the Parliament on Foreign and 
Security Policy (Report by the Council of State 1995); two Reports by the Council of State 
to the Parliament on Security and Defence Policy (Report by the Council of State 1997; 
Report by the Council of State 2001); and the Parliamentary debates over these policy 
documents ('Valtiopaivdasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995; 'Valtiopqivqasiakirjat, 
L, qhetekeskustelu' 1995; 'Valtiopqivqasiakirjat, Ldhetekeskustelu' 1997; Macleod 1997; 
'Valtiopaivaasiakirjat, Lahetekeskustelu' 2001,; 'Valtiopdivdasiakii-jat, Palautekeskustelu' 
2001) 
50 Although the concept of neutrality is likely to have been present ever since relations 
among political communities were established in human history, its scholarly meaning 
refers to the emergence of states. The concept, as we know it, relates to sovereignty and 
dates back to the late medieval times when the authority of the Church began to fade. The 
development of the modem states and international law codified neutrality in legal terms 
(Goetschel 1999: 119). 
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War. That is, the concept of neutrality was an intrinsic part of the policy 
makers and IR scholars' security discourse(s) in the East and the West. As 
such, neutrality was understood as a neutral position towards the two 
superpowers and their alliances. In the Cold War discourses of foreign and 
security policy, neutrality was closely related to military and defence issues. 
Yet, the concept had a clear political and economic dimension as well. 
In Finland, it was only after mid 1950s that the foreign policy leadership 
articulated Finnish foreign and security policy in terms of neutrality. 
According to the prominent foreign policy observers and policy makers, the 
immediate post-war years were characterised by appeasement of the Soviet 
Union (Kalela and Turtola 1975; Apunen 1977; Mbtt6ld 1993: 67-69). The 
result of building mutual trust, it was suggested, consolidated Finland's 
status as an independent state. 51 This, in turn, enabled the initial articulation 
of the Finnish position in terms of 'a particular kind of neutrality' (Jakobson 
1968) or 'coloured neutrality' (Apunen 1977, my translation) during the 
deterioration of the East-West relations. 52 
Interestingly, in the light of the above mentioned legal codes of the Hague 
Conventions neutrality and its Cold War connotations, Finland's neutrality 
appears to be rather spurious. As Hdiki6 argues, Finland had been neutral 
only for a five months period of its post war history. Finland's neutrality 
lasted from January 1992, when the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union 
including military articles lapsed, to June 1992 when Finland became an 
51 After President Paasikivi's retirement Kekkonen was elected President in 1955. He 
stayed in office for twenty-six years. Whereas Paasikivi is often cited as the President who 
laid down the foundations of the Finnish post-war foreign and security policy (Kekkonen 
1957; Apunen 1977), neutrality is seen as Kekkonen's life long vocation (Lipponen 1990). 
Paasikivi's policy, it is argued, was based on appeasement with the Soviet Union and 
establishment of good neighbour relations. Kekkonen, in turn, 
is predominantly viewed as 
the safe guardian of these good relations, and the President who promoted, consolidated 
and then institutionalised Finnish neutrality. The Finnish post-war 
foreign and security 
policy is therefore labelled the 'Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
line' (Apunen 1977, my translation). 
52 The terms 'particular kind of neutrality' and 'coloured neutrality' suggested that Finnish 
neutrality was spurious. That is, the most 
important aim of Finnish foreign policy was to 
prevent Soviet military and political interventions rather 
than acquire a neutral position in 
world politics. 
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associate member of the NATO led North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) (Hdiki6 cited in Arter 1996: 615). 53 
Nevertheless, the concept of neutrality is central for the Finnish post-war 
foreign and security policy discourse. Indeed, the Finns themselves suggest 
that both the Cold War division of Europe and the concept of neutrality 
were consolidated in Finland at the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. As Fierke and Wiener (2001) point 
out, prior to the period of ditente in Europe there was some hope that the 
two Germanys could be reunified. However, the Helsinki Final Act, signed 
by the states both from the East and the West, established the common 
principles for the peaceful co-existence of the East and the West in Europe. 
In doing so, it consolidated the division of Europe. That is, the West 
recognised the communist regimes of the East and granted them legitimacy 
they had not previously enjoyed (Fierke and Wiener 2001: 126-127). 
Significantly, the status of the European neutral states was also recognised 
and legitimised in Helsinki in 1975. As Nolan notes, the three main parties 
of the Final Act were the NATO states, the Neutral and Non-Aligned states, 
and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (or the Soviet bloc) states (Nolan 
2001: 300). 
The neutral and non-aligned states, however, adopted neutrality in a 
different way. For instance, Switzerland followed a strict non-participatory 
policy and enhanced neutrality in a pure sense of not taking part in the 
world politics. On the other hand, Sweden adopted a highly constructive 
neutrality policy and actively engaged in world politics (Wahlbdck 1982-25; 
Carlsnaes 1993: 71,77). In Finland, it is argued, neutrality proved beneficial 
to mediate in the geopolitically challenging location between the East and 
the West. As Arter suggests: 
53 The FCMA treaty constituted the basis of the Finnish post-war foreign policy (Kekkonen 
1982; Vayrynen 1993). It included a security article and established a collective security 
guarantee between Finland and the Soviet Union. The treaty stated that if Finland was 
invaded and/or its territory was to be used to attack the Soviet Union, Finland would defend 
its territory with all means available, if needed, with Soviet assistance or together with the 
Soviet Union ('Sopimus Ystgvyydestq, Yhteistoiminnasta Ja KeskindisestA Avunannosta' 
1948). 
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It [Finnish neutrality] was a Cold War phenomenon of the strictly functional 
variety. Indeed, where as for Sweden neutrality became synonymous with welfare 
and prosperity, and Austrian neutrality represented a guarantee to the Soviet Union 
of no future Anschluss with Germany, for Finland, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, neutrality denoted no military co-operation with Russia... it was a 
code word for independence (Arter 1996: 614, emphasis in original). 
As such neutrality had a pragmatic or instrumental value for Finland. 
Further, the concept strongly connoted with independence, a central concept 
for Finnish state identity. (M6tt6ld 1990: 134; see also, Ojanen, Herolf et al. 
2000: 89) 
To establish conceptual clarity, some scholars have found it useful to 
distinguish between permanent and temporary neutrality, also referred to as 
dejure and defacto neutrality (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 12). Whereas the 
permanent or de jure neutrality is based on binding law or treaty as in the 
cases of Austria or Switzerland, the temporary or defacto neutrality refers 
to the political practices of countries such as Ireland, Finland and Sweden 
(see also, Luif 1995; Cramer 1998; Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 12). These 
states have claimed or sought a neutral status. The assumption 
underpinning this distinction is that within the permanently neutral states, 
neutrality is often extended to other areas of (foreign) policy beyond 
military and defence (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000: 11-12), such as 
participation in inclusive and non-military international organisations. 
However, in practice this distinction has proven problematic. For instance, 
and against the logic of permanent and temporary neutrality, both the de 
jure neutral Finland's, and de facto neutral Austria's, general foreign policy 
has been equated with 'an "activist" neutral policy' (Carlsnaes 1993: 77). 
That is, a broad policy aimed at maintaining or changing the given structural 
and operational principles of the larger regional or world system in order to 
lessen international tension (Carlsnaes 1993: 77). Moreover, and even if this 
dichotomous conceptualisation of neutrality would indicate opposite, the 
permanently neutral Austria has participated in the Western economic 
organisations, such as the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) prior to the 
end of East-West confrontation and the temporarily neutral 
Finland has 
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adopted a very cautious policy towards the western European economic 
integration. 54 
Because of the elusive nature of neutrality, some scholars have noted that 
there are as many 'neutralities' as there are states claiming neutral status and 
that any adequate understanding of neutrality must be able to account 
4variations of the theme' in different national contexts (0janen, Herolf et al. 
2000: 10). Neutrality has also been linked to context specific political 
analysis and the meaning of language has been emphasised. As Vdyrynen 
argues: 
Defining neutrality is often a linguistic matter: A state is viewed as neutral, 
because it says that it is neutral. It is not an easy task to find a general and 
independent criterion for the neutrality because neutrality is rarely an abstract 
issue. Rather, it gains its meaning within certain political context. (Vayrynen 
1990: 13, my translation) 
To elucidate the meaning given to neutrality - the central concept 
underpinning Finnish state identity in the realm of foreign and security 
policy in the early 1990s when the issue of the CFSP and the ESDP were 
first raised in Finland -I now move on to discourse analytic analysiS. 55 
3.1.2 Re-articulating Neutrality Discourse in Finland 
I have suggested that Finnish neutrality made sense broadly within the Cold 
War understanding of a divided Europe. I now analyse the initial 
articulation and the continuous re-articulation of the neutrality discourse in 
the official foreign and security policy documents during the Cold War and 
its immediate aftermaths. Through examination of the representations 
generated in policy papers, speeches and memoirs, I seek to produce a 
54 Finland's international activity is often highlighted in the foreign policy discourse. 
However, since 1950s the foreign policy leadership have indicated that Finland could not 
take part in Western European economic integration due to Soviet pressure. More recent 
and critical literature, however, has suggested that Finnish policy makers were highly self- 
conscious and self-restricting. On the other hand, Finland put forward two major 
international security initiatives during the Cold War. The first one was the CSCE and the 
other one the nuclear weapons free zone in the Northern Europe. Whereas the CSCE has 
been widely viewed as the greatest achievement of the post war Finnish foreign policy, the 
nuclear free zone proved to be difficult for the Nordic countries who were NATO members. 
55 Although, the CFSP, the ESDP or European Political Cooperation, the predecessor of 
these policies, do not feature in the texts I examine, it is imperative to establish the 
discursive context within which these policies were first addressed in 1990s. 
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portrait of the Finnish neutrality discourse constitutive of Finnish state 
identity. A discourse analytic frame of predication, presupposition and 
subject positioning is applied. 
Predication 
I begun the analysis by identifying the main subjects and objects of the texts 
I looked at. 56 1 then investigated the qualities attached (i. e. predication) to 
the key subjects. These are listed in table 3.1. The numbers in the brackets 
refer to the source document. These documents are listed in Appendix 1. 
Two significant findings are based on the research presented in the above 
table (Table 3.1). First, there exists a dominant discourse. While the 
numerous representations of each subject are not identical across the 
columns, there is evidence of certain coherence among them. That is, the 
predicates, adverbs and adjectives (i. e. predication) linked to particular 
subjects and objects in the texts 'hang together' in a certain way (Doty 
1993: 310). None of the representations generated seem radically out of 
place, rather there exists a 'family resemblance' (Doty 1993: 310). For 
example, representations of Finland as 'a small state'. 'a relatively 
powerless country' and 'a builder of international understanding' (Table 
3.1. ), are arrived at by articulating nouns such as 'state' and 'country', 
adjectives like 'small' and 'powerless', attributes such as 'relatively' and 
adverbs like 'builder' in a certain meaningful way. The aim of the discourse 
analysis is to map out the certain structure governing the articulation of 
these contextually specific representations (Weldes 1996: 280). Second, 
particular kind of subjects and objects were constructed within this 
discourse. Apart from Finland itself, the important ones for my research 
were the Soviet Union and the other eastern European states, the Nordic 
countries, the western European states, Europe and some international 
organisations such as the CSCE and the United Nations (Table 3.1. ). 
56 These included President Kekkonen's major foreign and security policy speeches from 
1943 to 1969 (Kekkonen 1970), his major monograph laying out the Finnish policy of 
neutrality (Kekkonen 1982) and a Report by especially appointed Parliamentary Defence 
Policy Committee (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen Neuvottelukunta 1990). Whereas 
Kekkonen's speeches and his volume were translated and published in English, the report 
was only available in Finnish. 
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Through predication, Finland was construed as a small state with a 
geopolitically challenging location in the rim of Europe. Finland had limited 
resources and, as a small state, it was a relatively powerless subject. As such 
it had to take into account the political and security interests of the great 
powers. Several other representations of Finland were generated in the texts. 
Finland was a 'democracy' and it had 'market economy' (Table 3.1). 
Finland was also a 'northern' and 'western European country', yet it had 
some ties with the eastern cultures as well (Table 3.1). Finland was also 
attached qualities of an 'international broker' and 'builder of mutual 
understanding' which could reduce tension between the East and the West 
(Table 3.1). This, in turn, was constructed to enhanced Finnish security and 
its international position. 
The Nordic countries were assigned largely the same textual qualifiers as 
those attributed to Finland. The predication of the discourse also construed 
them as 'small states', 'democratic states' and 'strategically important for 
the superpowers' (Table 3.1). A quote taken from President Kekkonen's 
memoirs is illustrative. He wrote: 
Social scientists speak of the reference groups to which the individual belongs and 
to which, indeed, he must belong. Peoples also have their reference groups. To us, 
the Nordic countries are one such group. 
Being Nordic is more than a matter of will to us: it is an inseparable part 
of our history, our background, our culture, our social and economic system, our 
customs, our laws and our religion. It used to be customary to say that we Finns 
were linked to the other Nordic countries by our shared conception of freedom. 
Now I understand that the ties that bind us are stronger than that. 
It is a question of the whole profound nature of being. (Kekkonen 1982: 
82) 
However, a representation that marked a difference among the Nordic 
countries was their 'basic arrangement for security'. Whereas Finland and 
Sweden adopted neutrality, Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO. In 
neutrality discourse, however, their difference in the field of foreign and 
security policy was explicable. It related to the small state character of these 
states and their different geopolitical locations in the bi-polar world. 
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The representations of the West shared significant similarities and 
dissimilarities with Finland. The similar aspect included predication of the 
western powers as 'democratic' states 'with a political tradition based on 
parliamentarism' and 'market economy' (Table 3.1. ). On the other hand, the 
differences related to the construction of the key western powers such as the 
United States and Britain as 'great powers' (Table 3.1) with significant 
military might. These subjects and objects were made more meaningful by 
presupposing certain kind of knowledge about the world out there 
elucidated below. However, and interestingly the major Western subject, the 
United States, is rather seldom explicitly addressed in the texts I looked at 
and NATO was straightforwardly constructed as the western 'military 
alliance' with 'automatic defence guarantees' (Table 3.1). As such, 
Finland's relationship with it was constructed in terms of opposition. 
Neither the western organisations, such as the European Community and the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) occupy a central place in the texts. The 
predication assigned them economic importance, and Finland's loose 
relations with the Community and membership in EFTA were constructed 
to 'support the neutrality policy' (Table 3.1. ). However, the full membership 
in the European Community was constructed as impossible and unfeasible. 
While the main subject within the East, the Soviet Union, shared the great 
power representation with the key Western powers, several other 
representations highlighted the difference of the eastern subjects with the 
West, the North and Finland. The predication of the eastern subjects 
constructed them to have 'a different cultural heritage and social system' 
than the western states (Table 3.1). Moreover, predication generated 
representations of the Soviet Union as a 'suspicious' subject which could 
use coercive measures and its 'military might' in its search for security in 
bi-polar world. In so doing, the representation of gaining the Soviet 'trust' 
was central in constructing Finland's relationship with the East. The East 
had political and security interests in Finland but, as a result of the trust and 
good neighbour relations, Finland was not forced to adopt the communist 
system. Rather, the Soviet Union pursued 'a 
friendly and understanding 
policy towards Finland' (Table 3.1. ). The predication of 
Finland as having 
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links with 'Occidental cultures' was important for the construction of the 
Soviet trust. Although Finland was constructed as a different kind of 
subject, it had the ability to understand the Eastern concerns and mentality. 
The FCMA Treaty, which represented friendship and mutual trust with the 
East, was the symbol of the Soviet trust in the field of foreign and security 
policy. 
Presupposition 
The foreign and security policy texts and statements rarely speak for 
themselves. Rather, they are loaded with different kind of presuppositions. 
One way of examining the assumptions made within a discourse is to 
concentrate on binary oppositions (Doty 1993: 312; Torfing 2005). The core 
opposition that structures the construction of subjects/objects in the 
neutrality discourse in 1995 and thus establishes background knowledge is 
minor-Igreat powers. Several other binaries, such as peripherylcentre, 
steadfastnesslfeebleness and cleverlstupid can be subsumed under this core 
opposition. The background knowledge and the binary oppositions establish 
a certain geopolitical understanding within which the representations of 
Finland, the East and the West, created by the neutrality discourse, appear 
logical and true. 
Minorlgreat powers. The neutrality discourse presupposes certain kind of 
subjects in the world politics, straightforwardly, minor- and great powers. 
This presupposition is manifested, for instance, in the representations of the 
Finnish wars and the events leading to these wars. 57 These representations, 
in turn, are central for the neutrality discourse because the discourse 
emerged after the war in conjunction with the appeasement of the Soviet 
Union. This great-/minor opposition is clearly present, for instance, in Prime 
Minister CaJander's speech in 1939. He said: 
57 In November 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Finland. This led to the so called Winter 
War which ended in a truce after three and half months. As a result Finland had to cede 
10% of its territory. In 1941, Finland supported by Germany, invaded the Soviet Union. 
This so-called Continuation War ended in June, 1944. As a result, the 1940 borders were 
restored. Further, Finland lost its land link to the Barents Sea and it agreed a Soviet military 
base next to Helsinki. Finland also agreed to force out the remaining German troops, which 
led to the third Finnish war, the so-called War in Lapland against Germany in 1944. (Brady 
n. d. ) 
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It is hardly a wrong conclusion if one, trying to interpret the present flow of events 
around the world, sees it as an expansionist tendency of the great powers, a 
constant and understandable phenomenon in world history irrespective of whether 
you consider itjustified or not (Cajander 1939) 
On the other hand, Finland's smallness is explicitly noted, for instance, in 
the letter sent by President Mannerheim to Hitler in August 1944 when 
Finland - supported by Germany - sought to withdraw from Second World 
War. 'Germany is such a mighty nation, Mannerheim wrote, that it shall live 
on even if it loses the war. Finland, however, is such a small nation that it 
could be evicted from its dwelling place and destroyed. ' (Mannerheim cited 
in Jakobson 1968, my translation). Accordingly, the minor-/great power 
opposition establishes particular kind of subjects in a certain kind of 
international system. In this system, order is achieved through mechanisms 
of power defined as resources and capabilities. In this Realist view of world 
politics, Finland is construed as a small state which is subject to great power 
politics. 
In the neutrality discourse the Soviet aggression against Finland in 1939 is 
explicitly articulated in relation to the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 
1939. In the Pact the Soviet Union and Germany ensured that neither would 
attack the other. However, its secret protocols, which were published after 
the war, divided Europe into Soviet and German spheres of influence. 
Finland, alongside with Estonia and Latvia, for instance, was left in the 
Soviet realm. Poland, in turn, was divided between Germany and the Soviet 
Union (Jakobson 1968; Vihavainen 2001). In so doing, Finland was 
construed to be 'trapped between two superpowers', Germany and the 
Soviet Union (Jakobson 1968). 
During the Cold War this representation was re-articulated in terms of the 
bi-polar world order. As the 1990 security and defence paper notes: 'after 
the Second World War the international system has been characterized by 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as military 
alliance, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, confrontation and 
power political rivalry' (Parlamentaarinen 
Puolustuspoliittinen 
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Neuvottelukunta 1990: 5, my translation). Accordingly, during the Cold 
War Finland was trapped between the superpowers of the Soviet Union and 
the United States. The common sensibility of this representation is clearly 
present in the neutrality discourse. In 1982 Kekkonen wrote: 
During his term as Prime Minister after the war, Paasikivi had to endure a speech 
in which a certain Member of Parliament sharply criticized the Government's 
foreign policy. When Paasikivi managed to get a word in, he urged the deputy to 
go home, take out a map and look where Finland was situated. That advice 
remains useful to one and all this very day. 
The characteristic feature of our county throughout the ages has been its 
location on the borderline between the Eastern and Western cultural spheres. 
(Kekkonen 1982: 16-17) 
As the analysis of predication in the neutrality discourse suggests, the 
cultural differences of the West and the East do not occupy a central place 
in the discourse. Indeed, allowing cultural or ideological difference, namely 
communi st- socialist or liberal-capitalist during the Cold War, to influence 
foreign and security policy is seen dangerous. In 1980 Kekkonen argued: 
Since the task of a foreign policy should be to cherish and promote, by all means 
available, the interests of the country in question, there is no justification for 
allowing ideological likes or dislikes to influence the general guidelines which this 
foreign policy follows - nor can this be afforded. A small country, in particular, 
must observe this rule, because the stances it takes and their reflection in the 
country's foreign policy will assuredly not count for very much in world history, 
stamped as it is by the major nations' struggle for power. By contrast, inestimable 
harm could be caused... (Kekkonen 1982: 20-21) 
Notwithstanding the importance of culture for the state identity, the key to 
understanding how Finland is positioned in the neutrality discourse is a 
certain geopolitical wisdom. In this geopolitical world, inhabited by minor 
and great powers, Finland's position is structured by the peripherylcentre 
opposition. That is, the presupposition of different kind of geopolitical 
spaces is not based on communism or capitalism. Rather, it reflects the 
periphery and centre opposition. Further, in the bi-polar world there are two 
centres by definition. As several of the above extracts indicate, in the 
neutrality discourse Finland is located and 'trapped' in between these 
centres. That is, Finland is presupposed to be located in the north-eastem 
peripheral comer of Europe. 
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However, and in military terms, the periphery/centre opposition constructed 
Finland as more important for the East than the West. Here, the knowledge 
established in the re-articulations of the Soviet aggression against Finland in 
1939 is imperative. First, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts secret protocols 
indicated Finland's greater importance for the Soviet Union in the East than 
for the Germany in the West. This construction was further consolidated in 
1939 when the Soviet Union invaded Finland and the other western powers 
did not intervene in the conflict. As Jutikkala argues: 
Help for Finland in the Winter War came in the form of a few foreign volunteers, a 
slightly greater number of weapons, of which the artillery and the air force in 
particular suffered shortages, and a proftision of sympathy. How many divisions 
does the Pope have, was Stalin's now-famous retort to western officials who had 
referred to the feelings of the Vatican. Sympathy strengthened fighting morale but it 
was no substitute for divisions. (Jutikkala 2001) 
The representation of 'being left alone' during the Winter War undermined 
the western lack of interest and eastern interests in Finland. The catchphrases 
of the foreign policy leadership, typical for the neutrality discourse, such as 
'there is nothing we can do about our geographical location' and 'we must 
accept the realities' presupposed a certain kind of geopolitical world view 
within which Finland could only rely on to self-help. As the 1990 security 
and defence review concluded: 'To guarantee Finland's security and to be 
able to defend the whole country, adequate defence capability must be 
maintained'(Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen Neuvottelukunta 1990: 23, 
my translation). Moreover, any discussion of defence guarantees, based on a 
membership in military alliances, remained outside the boundaries of this 
discourse. 
Steadfastnesslfeebleness and cleverlstupid Standing alone in the 
geopolitically challenging enviromnent presupposed a certain kind of 
Finnish statehood and nationhood. The experienced insecurity and 
difficulties of the war and the reconstruction constructed the nation and the 
state in tenns of steadfastness. As Kekkonen argued in 1952: 
When the war was over, there were many who lost courage and did not believe in 
our ability to live under the new conditions. They were wrong. 
The Finnish people 
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did not stand to look back. They set their hands to the plough to draw a new 
ftirrow in a new strip of land. (Kekkonen 1952: 58) 
The representation of steadfast Finland in the discourse was arrived at by re- 
articulating the perseverance of the Finnish people in building their nation 
and state - to turn the northern marshlands into fields - in opposition to 
feebleness. On the other hand, the opposition of clever/stupid established a 
knowledge which highlighted the enlighten character of a small state and its 
political leaders. As Kekkonen suggested: '... in order to save its position a 
small people must be able to produce clever initiatives to ward off dangers 
before they become too great' (Kekkonen 1982: 20). In the neutrality 
discourse the representation of the consolidation of the Finnish 
independency and its international position in the deteriorating East-West 
relations is constructed by presupposing a steadfast and strong Finnish 
statehood and clevemess. 
Subject Positioning 
The predication and the presupposition, discussed above simultaneously 
established particular subject-positions. The availability of a subject position 
for a particular subject or object reflects the degree of agency assigned to 
them in the hierarchical arrangement(s) of the discourse. In the neutrality 
discourse this arrangement is the bi-polar world order. Two subject 
positions are of particular importance for this study. These include: (i) small 
and relatively powerless peripheral state(s) (in the North); and (ii) powerful 
and central power(s) (in the West and the East). 
The central subject position created in any foreign and security policy 
discourse is that of the relevant state itself (Weldes 1996: 287). As the 
above analysis of predication and presupposition suggests, this specific 
subject-position was arrived at by positioning Finland 
in relation to other 
major subjects made meaningful within the neutrality 
discourse. In the 
discourse, the Soviet Union and the major western powers were endowed 
with significant degrees of agency. 
The representations of the East and the 
West constructed them as subjects with significant security 
interests. They 
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had political will and capabilities to influence the world politics, and to 
interfere it also militarily if needed. 
On the other hand, the subject-position available for Finland - that of a 
small and relatively powerless peripheral state - assigned it a significantly 
limited degree of agency. As Kekkonen writes: 
One of the lessons which history teaches us is that a small people like the Finns 
can not coerce its neighbours into the kind of settlements which it would like. Our 
own resources are not adequate for that and relying on outside support would 
mean throwing oneself on the mercy of the unknown as well as sowing the seeds 
of discord. (Kekkonen 1982: 17-18). 
Due to its limited capabilities Finland was subject to great power politics 
and because of its peripheral location it could only trust on self-help. In so 
doing, Finland had to adapt to the external environment and follow a 
cautious foreign and security policy. As Kekkonen continued: 'caution has 
been and will always be the essence of the Finnish foreign policy' 
(Kekkonen 1982: 19). Relatedly, neutrality discourse suggested that Finland 
was not in a position to address normative questions or follow a value-based 
foreign policy. Kekkonen argued: 
if we look around us, we can see in every quarter things which ought to be 
protested at in the name of humanity. But we do not do it... Here, too, our 
conduct is dictated by our policy of neutrality. There is a great difference between 
it and a policy of protest. (Kekkonen 1982: 20-21) 
In the Cold War world's ideological confrontation between the East and the 
West, Finland took a neutral position. Here the 'physician or judge' 
metaphor is illustrative. Kekkonen argued in 1961: 'We see ourselves as 
physicians rather than judges; it is not for us to pass judgement nor to 
condemn, it is rather to diagnose and to try to cure' (Kekkonen 1961: 94). 
The hierarchical arrangement of the bi-polar world granted Finland a 
significantly limited degree of agency in international affairs. Hence, self- 
help, even when it might have been morally wrong in terms of western 
values of the Finnish state, was a justified line of action. Indeed, 
letting 
moral judgements affect the foreign and security policy was constructed as a 
privilege of the great powers and the more secure states. 
For Finland it 
could cause serious damage. 
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However, and importantly, Finland was not constructed merely as the bearer 
of international structures. It had some statutory rights based on its status as 
a sovereign state and the high international status associated with the Nordic 
countries. The official discourse highlighted neutrality as sensible and even 
ýnatural' option for, rather than a policy imposed upon Finland. Kekkonen 
argued in a speech given at the National Press Club in Washington in 196 1: 
I have heard it said that neutrality has been imposed upon us. This is not so. It is a 
way of solving our problem of security that has its roots in our history, and it 
reflects, I believe, a realistic appraisal of our national interests and possibilities 
and a true understanding of our position in the world today. (Kekkonen 1961: 87) 
Importantly, the construction of Finland's need to adapt to the international 
environment indicates, by definition, a degree of agency. This, in turn, 
implied a complex state identity. For instance, in the judge-physician 
metaphor, illustrative of neutrality discourse, Finland emerges as a potential 
initiator of action, a formulator of policies, and an assessor of situations. 
Specifically, it could build mutual trust among the superpowers. However, 
Finland's subject position in the neutrality discourse also constituted 
boundaries for what could be intelligibly said about Finnish foreign policy 
and well as limits for state action. As Kekkonen wrote: 
As far as I remember, a certain philosopher of history has pointed out that any 
given moment each state has only one best line of action... In our case, what has 
crystallized into this optimal line in the course of the years in our policy of 
neutrality, which has sprung from Finnish soil and is based on purely Finnish 
solutions. (Kekkonen 1982: 13) 
Accordingly, and as suggested a membership in the military alliance was 
not an option in the neutrality discourse. Significantly for this study, when 
the question of the EC membership, which signified participation in the 
developing European Community's foreign and security policy, was first 
raised after the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy 
leadership 
constructed the membership as completely incompatible with the 
Finnish 
state identity based on neutrality. 
3.1.3 Hegemony of the Neutrality Discourse, End of the Cold War and the 
European Integration 
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I suggest that in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the representations of the 
world created by the Finnish foreign and security policy makers were largely 
accepted as adequate reflections of the 'real' world. That is, key foreign and 
security policy-makers identified themselves and their state with the subject- 
position(s) entailed by the neutrality discourse. 58 In so doing, they were 
largely 'hailed into' or, interpellated by, the discourse. Although identities are 
always open-ended and complete interpellation is merely a theoretical 
possibility, in Finland, neutrality discourse temporarily fixed the state identity 
(in the realm of Finnish foreign and security policy). 
The neutrality discourse was structuring the Finnish foreign policy 
leadership's and scholars' responses to the ongoing transformations in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. For instance, amid the changing external 
environment, the security and defence policy white paper published in 1990 
emphasised several continuities in the Finnish security environment and 
policy. The paper concluded: 
Finland' security policy position is stable. Through independent foreign policy, 
systematically adopted neutrality policy and active participation, for instance, 
Finland's participation in the CSCE has had a positive influence to the security 
environment in the North as well as more broadly in Europe. The Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance have had, and it continues to have, a 
positive impact on the stability in the North. 
.. the neutrality of 
Finland and Sweden and the credible independent 
defence capability of these states has been widely seen to enhance stability in the 
North. ... It 
is important that in the changing international environment Finland's 
defence policy remains predictable. (Parlamentaarinen Puolustuspoliittinen 
Neuvottelukunta 1990: 24, my translation) 
Given the end of the Cold War, the (discursive) responses to the ongoing 
economic, political and military changes in Europe created representations of 
Finland, security and the European Community compatible with the bi-polar 
world. In so doing, the neutrality discourse was clearly structuring of the 
meaning of the official representations of the economic and political 
integration in western Europe. Prime Minister Harri Holkeri's argumentation 
58 The analysis also suggests that Finnish neutrality serves as a school 
book example of the 
articulation of a radically new 
discourse in the aftermath of the Second Word War which 
over time interpellated the policymakers and 
became hegemonic. 
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is illustrative. In 1990 he said: 'Finland's neutrality constitutes the comer 
stone in the protection of our living, our independence, our sovereignty and 
our national existence' (cited in Joenniemi 2001: 183). He continued: 
'Submitting to the EC's foreign policy and giving in to the demands of a joint 
defence would imply that Finland voluntarily abandons its independence and 
becomes part of a major power' (cited in Joenniemi 2001: 183). 
Holkeri also deployed a metaphor of 'squaring the circle' (Ojanen, Herolf et 
al. 2000: 95) and, in so doing, re-articulated the representation of the total 
incommensurability of the EU membership and policy of neutrality. 59 
Significantly, the greatest obstacle for the membership, it was argued, was the 
European Community's developing foreign and security policy dimension 
which was to be re-formulated in Maastricht in 1991 (0janen, Herolf et al. 
2000: 86) . 
60 Accordingly, the EC membership was constructed as impossible 
in Finland. That is, for the policy makers neutrality provided the structure of 
meaning in which the possible and feasible policies could be articulated. The 
construction of total incongruity and unfeasibility, I suggest, is indicative of a 
hegemonic discourse and the common sensibility of Finland's neutrality. 
Further, neutrality policy also dominated the foreign and security policy 
research agendas during the 1980s and early 1990s. Significantly, the 
neutrality discourse constituted a dominant structure of meaning within 
scholarly debates. The literature can be divided in two broad categories. First, 
scholars attempted to explain Finnish neutrality policy and claimed a neutral 
position in world politics. Whereas some explanations drew from systemic 
theories of IR and emphasised Finland's relatively powerless position as a 
small state located next to a super power in the bi-polar world (Vdyrynen 
'9 Constructing a square equal in area to a circle using only a straightedge and compass was 
one of the three geometric problems of antiquity. It was finally proved to be an impossible 
problem when pi was proven to be transcendental in 1882. (Weisstein) 
60 in Finland the term European Community (or Communities) referred to the three original 
European communities of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ, the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euraton), and the European Economic Community (EEC). In 
1967, the institutions of the three were merged and since then it has become common to 
talk of the European Community. After Maastricht Treaty was agreed in 1992 the term 
European Union quickly replaced the term European Community. However, the latter term 
is still used in some specific legal and administrative discourses dealing with, for instance, 
the EU institutions and legislation of the first pillar. 
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1988; Knudsen 1992), some explanations highlighted the importance of 
political agency embedded in policy-makers. Here the two post-war 
Presidents', Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, role was underlined for the 
61 Finnish neutrality (Apunen 1977). Second, as early as the 1960s onwards 
for some scholars' neutrality was also doing the explaining (Hakovirta 1975; 
see, for instance, Hakovirta 1976; Hakovirta 1990; Iloniemi 1990). These 
scholars viewed neutrality as a rather permanent condition and, as such, it 
became the central factor explaining the Finnish foreign policy (Forsberg and 
Vaahtoranta 1993: 20). 1 suggest that the research tradition in which 
neutrality was doing the explaining, is indicative of the successful 
interpellation of the neutrality discourse. 
3.2 Articulation of EU Foreign and Security Policy: Alignment or Non- 
Alignment? 
Whereas the first section of this case study discussed the hegemonic 
eminence of the neutrality discourse in Finland in the early 1990s, the 
purpose of this second part is to analyse the articulation of the EU foreign and 
security policy in the official foreign and security policy discourse. I suggest 
that in conjunction with the Finnish EU membership, the Finnish foreign and 
security policy discourse was re-articulated radically differently in 1995. That 
is, the key elements of the discourse and its structuring of meaning were 
transformed. Significantly for this dissertation, the so-called 'European 
Union's security dimension' had a major role in the re-articulation of the 
discourse. Again, I first situate the new articulation of Finland's place in the 
world by describing the changing discourse. I then deploy the discourse 
analytic tools of predication, presupposition and subject-positioning in order 
to analyse the new discourse and role of the EU foreign and security policy in 
it. 
61 Given the consensus, some disagreements also emerged. Accordingly (M6tt6la 1993: 
65), a significant one was related to the weight given for neutrality policy and the 
FCMA 
treaty. Some members of the policy elite wondered about whether the emphasis on 
neutrality could harm Finland's good neighbour relations with the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, 
from 1960s onwards some aspects of the IR scholarly debate between idealism and realism 
fed into Finnish debates (MM615 1993: 65). The key question was, to what extent, if at all, 
Finland should attempt to influence to the bi-polar international system after 
it had 
consolidated its own position. A particular, 
disagreement concerned Finland's engagements 
with the Third World issues, international 
development and world peace (M6tt6ld 1993). 
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3.2.1 Situating the Articulation of Alignment Discourse: Post-Cold World 
Europe and the EU membership 
When the Cold War system broke down it was natural that Finland's foreign policy 
changed (Forsberg and Vogt 2003, my translation). 
In Finland the EU membership largely represents a break with the past in 
tenns of the official foreign and security policy discourse. Prior to the 
membership negotiations, which started in 1992 Finland was seen as a 
neutral state. However, in 1995 Finland joined the European Union as a 
previously neutral state. Although Finland remained militarily non-aligned 
(Report by the Council of State 1995: 58-59) Finland was seen to side with 
the western Europe both economically and politically. 
The rapid and unexpected change in the state officials' articulations of 
Finland's place in the world was made within the context of two 
simultaneous processes of large scale political, social and economic change: 
the disintegration of eastern Europe and the integration of western Europe. 
As a response to these external changes, Finnish foreign policy leadership 
argued that Finland's foreign and security policy also had to change. 
In 1990, after the re-unification of Germany, Finland unilaterally announced 
that the military restrictions (with the exception of nuclear weapons ban) of 
the Paris Peace Treaty, signed in 1948, were not applicable anymore. 62 At 
the same time the military articles included in the bilateral treaty for 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet 
Union were 'reconsidered'. In January 1992, after the break up of the Soviet 
Union, Finnish foreign policy leadership announced that the FCMA treaty 
was terminated. A new treaty governing relations between Finland and the 
62 The 1948 Paris Peace Treaty included several military and weapons restrictions. Part 111, 
Articles 13 - 22, limited the future troop strength to 34,400 soldiers, the navy to 
4,500 
individuals, and the air force to 3,000. There were also exclusions of equipment of an 
offensive nature, such as bombers, missiles, and submarines. Warships could not exceed a 
combined total of 10,000 tons. The air force could acquire up to sixty combat planes, 
but 
they were not to include bombers or fighter bombers. None of the services was allowed to 
construct, to procure, or to test nuclear weapons ('Suomen Rauhansopimus' 
1947) 
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Russian Federation was signed soon after. The treaty text excluded military 
issues. In 1992 Finland joined NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) and in 1993 Finland became member of NATO's Partnership for 
Peace programme (PfP). 
However, for many it was the decision to apply for EU membership in 1992 
which represented a sudden and profound change in the Finnish post-war 
foreign policy. 63 Although the foreign policy leadership emphasised several 
continuities and later argued that the membership was a logical continuation 
of the Finnish neutrality policy (Report by the Council of State 1995) for 
political reasons, it did not deny the fundamental transformation of Finland 
and it's position in the world. Even if the more recent scholarly literature 
has also dealt with some continuity in the Finnish policy (Tiilikainen 2001: 
68), the analysis published around the membership mainly dealt with the 
change. 64 
Importantly for this study, the foreign policy leadership suggested that 
4security policy considerations were the most important factors behind 
Finland's membership and that the economic factors were, after all, 
secondary' (Koivisto 1995: 554, my translation). The same conclusion has 
been reached by several scholars. Even if for some policy makers and 
scholars the rationale for the membership was economic (Redmond 1997; 
Ingebritsen 1998), the debate over the membership was about security 
(Arter 1995; Tiilikainen 1998) and identity (Arter 1995; Tiilikainen 1998; 
Browning 1999; Joenniemi 2001; Browning 2003; Moisio 2003). Moisio 
63 During the EEA negotiations the foreign policy leadership had constantly argued that the 
EEA was sufficient enough for Finland and that there was no need to discuss the EC/EU 
membership. Suddenly, when the EEA treaty was going through the ratification process in 
the Finnish Parliament, the Government announced that the treaty was not enough to secure 
Finnish long term trade interests since Sweden (1990) and Austria (1989) had both applied 
ftill membership in the EC (Rehn 1993: 205-207). 
64 The terms deployed to capture the period of so-called 'rapid re-orientation' (Joenniemi 
200 1) are illustrative. It was called as 'westemisation' or 'Europeanisation' of the Finnish 
policy, and described as a move 'from Moscow to Brussels', 'from neutrality to alignment' 
(Forsberg and Vogt 2003, my translation). Notwithstanding the differences among these 
scholars, they broadly agreed that the importance of the East and neutrality in the Finnish 
foreign policy diminished. In contrast, the significance of the West, mainly through economic 
integration and the EU's foreign, security and defence policies as well as NATO's 
partnership for peace program (PfP), increased. 
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argues that given the 'massive economic decline in the early 1990s with 
increasing unemployment rates, degreasing GDP, collapsing financial 
markets, the crisis of the welfare state and rising social insecurity' one 
would have expected that the EU membership debate would have been 
about rational economic argumentations (Moisio 2003: 13). However, and 
as Moisio suggests, although this economic dimension existed, it was 
overshadowed by the seemingly 'irrational' argumentation related to the 
Finnish identity, geopolitics and security (Moisio 2003). 
Although, EU membership was generally understood as a foreign and 
security policy question, the European Union's developing foreign and 
security policy had a particularly strong impact on the Finnish official 
discourse. In 1992 the EC Commission explicitly expressed its concern 
about the level of Finland's commitment towards the CFSP and, in 
65 particular, the ESDP. The Commission highlighted, for instance, that the 
European military alliance, Western European Union (WEU), had broader 
political aspirations than the crisis management tasks welcomed by the 
Finnish Government (Rehn 1993: 208). Accordingly the CFSP and the 
EDSP entered the official Finnish foreign policy discourse in 1992. 
Consequently, the foreign policy leadership re-articulated the Finnish 
foreign and security policy. In 1992 Koivisto indicated that 'he did not have 
anything against re-defining neutrality in terms of non-alignment and 
independent defence' (Koivisto 1995: 548, my translation). In 1994 
membership negotiations with the EU were closed and on I January 1995 
Finland became a full member of the EU. At the same time it became an 
observer member in the WEU. In June 1995 the government's report re- 
articulated and clarified the new Finnish foreign and security policy. 
Crucially, the paper argued that neutrality was no longer an option. The 
report said: 
Since the end of the East-West division, the policy of neutrality that Finland 
followed in the Cold War is no longer a viable line of action. During the Cold 
65 In 1995 the foreign policy leadership indicated that it was privately pushed to clarify 
Finnish position in several high level meetings during membership negotiations (Koivisto 
1995: 548,550). 
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War, Finland tried to avoid making political, and especially military, commitments 
that might have drawn it into conflicts between the great powers. In the new 
situation, Finland's strategy is an active participation in international political and 
security cooperation fro prevention and resolution of security problems. 
In acceding to the Union, Finland has not made any security policy 
reservations concerning its obligations under its founding treaties or the Maastricht 
Treaty. Finland has joined the Union as a militarily non-aligned country which 
wishes to play an active and constructive role in creating and implementing a 
common foreign and security policy. A capable EU in Finland's interests (Report 
by the Council of State 1995: 58). 
Moreover, whereas in 1990 the code word for independence was neutrality 
and the membership in the European Community was seen to endanger 
Finnish independence, the 1995 report argued that 'membership of the 
European Union (EU) will reinforce the foundations of Finnish security and 
provide a significant channel through which Finland can pursue its interests 
and carry its responsibility in international relations (Report by the Council 
of State 1995: 5). Accordingly, alignment (with the European Union) 
became a new code word for Finland's security. 
The 1995 Report by the Council ofState to the Parliament 
The 1995 report of Finland's security policy addressed a wide range of 
security questions. 66 The report was based on a 'broad' or 'comprehensive 
conceptualisation of security' which highlighted the so-called 'new' and 
4soft' security issues such as development, economic cooperation and 
environmental degradation (Report by the Council of State 1995). 
66 The 1995 report is a 78-page long document supplemented with maps and annexes. It was 
published in Finnish and translated in to English. The analysis of the White Paper 
is based on 
the English version of the report. The documentation of the parliamentary hearings 
concerning the report were in Finnish and the translations are mine. The Report 
had two main 
sections: (i) The International Security Environment and Finland 
(pp. 11-56); and (ii) 
Development of Finland's Security Policy (pp. 63-69). The first section - some three quarters 
of the document - established what existed 
in terms of Finland's foreign and security policy 
and clarified Finland's position and policies towards 
its external environment. The second 
part of the Report, a seven page conclusive section, outlined 
the development of the Finnish 
security policy in the near future. 
Significantly, the 1995 White Paper informed the subsequent security and defence 
policy reports in 1997 and 2001. Accordingly, the 
1995 white paper articulated a 'security 
environment' in which Finland 
found itself during the 1990s and beyond. Hence the 1995 
white paper is the key foreign, security and 
defence policy document of the 1990s. It 
addressed the changed external environment and clarified 
Finland's changed position. As 
such the 1995 White Paper 
is an appropriate starting point for the analysis of the new Finnish 
security discourse. (Report 
by the Council of State 1995). 
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Importantly, the report was explicitly tied to Finland's EU membership and, 
in particular, to the European Union's developing security dimension, the 
CFSP and the ESDP (Report by the Council of State 1995: 5-6,9-10,58-62). 
As Ms 0. Ojala, a senior MP of the Left Alliance, suggested: 
These issues [of the white paper] are particularly related to the development of the 
European Union's common foreign, security and defence policy... we are here to 
discuss how the decision accepted by the Finnish people to join the European 
Union will affect Finland's security policy ('Valtiopaivdasiakirjat, 
Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation). 
The report also addressed the approaching EU Council meeting in 
Amsterdam in 1996. The Amsterdam Treaty clarified the future development 
and decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 61-62). 
Although the large-scale social, political and economic transformation set up 
the wider context in which Finland's new position in the world was made 
meaningful, the EU and its 'developing security dimension' were central for 
the re-articulation of the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse, that is, 
for the articulation of a radically different discourse than before. 
3.2.2 Europeanisation of Foreign and security Policy Discourse: 
Articulation of the Alignment Discourse 
The 1995 report re-articulated Finland and its position in the world 
differently in comparison with the neutrality discourse. That is, the 
predication, presupposition and subject positioning of the major subjects 
and objects in the 1995 report were significantly different from the earlier 
re-articulations. Accordingly, a new discourse was articulated. I call this 
discourse as the alignment discourse. The expression illustrates the key 
feature of this discourse: economic and political alignment and military non- 
alignment with the West. In terms of official foreign and security discourse, 
the former represented continuity and the latter signifies change. 
importantly, the emerging EU foreign and security policy played a key role 
in the hegemonic struggle between the discourses. The state officials 
constructed it as a middle way between neutrality and full alignment. 
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The main subjects and objects as well as their predication in the 1995 report 
are presented in the Table 3.2. Whilst some of the representations generated 
in the texts hang together in a familiar way, others form a novel and distinct 
story line. I suggest that the table is indicative of two discourses. Moreover, 
in the 1995 report the Finnish state identity emerged in the intersection of 
the two discourses reflecting continuity (neutrality) and change (alignment). 
In the table, some of the important representations of Finland clearly 
indicate continuity of the neutrality discourse. For instanceý in 1995 Finland 
was seen as a 'small' and 'militarily non-aligned state' which 'has to adapt 
to international changes' (Table 3.2). On the other hand, the predication 
suggests that the geopolitical location of Finland had changed. Finland was 
4no longer located between the East and the West' and Finland had become 
a member in the 'core group of European democracies' (Table 3.2). 
Moreover, although Finland was still identified as a Nordic country and 
member of the Nordic community, the explicit predication of Finland as a 
welfare state, with respect of human rights, is also somewhat different from 
the neutrality discourse. Moreover, whilst in the neutrality discourse 
normative aspects of foreign and security policy were marginal, in 1995 
several international organisations such as the United Nation, the OSCE and 
the Council of Europe (CoE) were constructed as organisations which could 
enhance 'human rights', 'democracy and freedom' and 'shared rules' (Table 
3.2). Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that the predication of the West 
changed most. 
In relation to the representations of the West, the role of the European 
Union became dominant and the western European states were increasingly 
made meaningful within this context. Several attributes that were 
previously associated with western states, such as democracy, 
influence in 
world politics and international 'security', were now explicitly attached to 
the European Union. Through predication, the European Union emerged as 
a 'developing organisation', 'a union of 
independent democratic states', 'a 
major market area', and 'a major political actor 
in international politics' 
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(Table 3.2). As such, it had a crucial role in European and international 
security. The European Union could 'promote stability' and Finnish national 
interests (Table 3.2), for instance. On the other hand, the number of 
representations of particular western states, such as Britain, decreased. 
Significantly, and contrary to the neutrality discourse, the relationship 
between Finland and the West with reference to the European Union was 
based on similar and complementary aspects. As the report argued, the 
membership in the European Union 're-enforced the foundations of Finnish 
security' and it offered 'a channel for influence' to enhance Finnish interests 
in world politics (Table 3.2). Within the West, NATO's role for European 
security was also highlighted, for instance, in relation to 'crisis 
management' (Table 3.2). Whereas in the neutrality discourse, NATO was 
constructed in terms of difference and otherness (Table 3.1), in the 
alignment discourse a more positive relationship with it is established 
(Table 3.2). Accordingly, the previously unimaginable NATO membership 
became an option, which could be discussed. 
The representations of the East changed significantly as well. Whereas the 
Soviet Union largely disappeared from the discourse, Russia inherited some 
of its great power status and characters. In addition, the predication of the 
eastern subjects changed. Whilst in the neutrality discourse they were 
simply construed as great powers, their allies or satellites with distinct 
values and norms reflected the economic political systems of these states, in 
the alignment discourse the eastern subjects were seen as transforming 
towards western values and systems. However, and in so doing, they were 
construed as unstable and as a source of insecurity. The representations of 
the East highlighted 'political instability', 'poverty', 'uncontrollable 
migratory movements' and 'regional and internal 
disputes' as well as 
4nationality conflicts' (Table 3.2). Whereas the West was constructed as a 
source of security, the East was rendered a source of 
insecurity. 
Accordingly, Finland's oppositional features with the East increased. 
Presupposition 
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Presupposition that establishes a particular kind of knowledge about the 
world out there and, in so doing, constitutes the operational logic of a 
67 discourse, changed in Finland in 1995. The analysis suggests that although 
the minor1great opposition retained some of its importance, a new core 
opposition of unstablelstable underpinned the re-articulation of Finnish 




presupposition of the 
Finland found itself. 
this core opposition. These include 
Itic, economically developedlunderdeveloped, 
orderldisorder. These oppositions infonned the 
radically different 'security environment' in which 
Unstablelstable. This core opposition was clearly stated in several parts of 
the 1995 report. For instance, the section describing European security order 
argued: 
Managing stability has come to be the main task of security policy for Europe. If the 
opportunity of change is to be seized, every state in Europe must be involved. The 
challenge facing European security policy is to support both change promoting 
stability and balanced development simultaneously, and to manage the new kinds of 
conflict. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 19) 
Accordingly, stability policy was articulated as the underlining feature of the 
Finnish foreign and security policy. The report argued: 'Finland's central 
goal in the post-Cold War situation has been to maintain and strengthen the 
stability that has long existed in northern Europe' (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 65). Importantly, the EU was given a key role in the field of 
stability policy. The Report argued: 
In the area of stability policy, Finland is broadly committed to international 
cooperation and has plenty of institutional channels for exerting influence. ... 
The primary channel for Finland's stability policy is to exert effective 
influence on the European Union's common foreign and security policy. (Report 
by the Council of State 1995: 68) 
However, the articulation associated with managing instability and creating 
stability presupposed a certain world. In this world, Russia and the former 
communist states were articulated as fundamentally different from the 
67 By operational logic I mean a structure in which the things are given meaning and 
simultaneously positioned vis-A-vis other subjects and objects 
(see, Doty 1993). 
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western European states. The markers of difference were the binary 
oppositions of democratic/undemocratic, developed/undeveloped, 
rational/irrational and order/disorder. 
Democraticlundemocratic and developedlunderdeveloped. Within the official 
discourse, the Eastern state identities were characterised by non-democratic 
or quasi-democratic regimes and underdeveloped economies and poverty. The 
predication of the subjects was embedded in the large scale political, 
economic and social transition from communism and command economy to 
liberal democracy and market economy. However, the process of transition 
was in its early stages and the democratic political systems as well as the 
market economy in these states were, at best, developing. Importantly, in the 
1995 report the conception of transfon-nation and development was extended 
to other former communist states in Finland's near abroad and beyond. An 
extract taken from the government's report is illustrative: 
The transition to democracy and a market economy has advanced farthest in Central 
Europe, including the Baltic countries. Profound social and economic change is also 
under way in Russia and the other countries of the Commonwealth of the 
Independent States (CIS), and in parts of the former Yugoslavia ... (Report by the 
Council of State 1995: 18) 
The process of transition also presupposed insecurity. That is, the process of 
change was so magnificent and rapid that it could resort to worsening living 
conditions, disputes and violence. The report argues: 
Political and economic reform is uncertain, irregular sequence of events over a long 
period. Change since the end of the Cold War has brought with it several new 
problems: political instability, regional and internal disputes, uncontrollable 
migratory movements, nationality disputes and other problems. At worst these 
escalate in to armed conflict and subsequently streams of refugees. (Report by the 
Council of State 1995: 18) 
Relatedly, the unstable/stable core opposition drew on the binaries of 
violencelhon-violence and orderldisorder. The period of transition, as 
articulated above, was characterised by potential conflicts. 
Violence was 
argued to be an 'everyday reality in today's world' 
(Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 14). The report suggested: 
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The number of armed conflicts has not decreased, and they are increasingly 
connected with internal or historical ethnic or religious disputes or nationality 
issues. Conflicts sometimes lead to collapse of state structures, making it even more 
difficult for the international community to help manage and resolve them. The 
forms violence takes include violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes and terrorism. The result of conflicts is often a wave of refugees in nearby 
regions and elsewhere. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 14) 
Another opposition encompassed in the above extract is order/disorder. This 
binary opposition presupposed a particular kind of western identity. The West 
was an orderly space based on democratic political systems with functioning 
economies that can deliver welfare. The poor and undemocratic or quasi- 
democratic states of the East, with internal problems that may lead to violence 
could, in turn, collapse and lead to chaos. 
This presupposition of the East and the West and Finland's location in 
between resonates with the historical constructions predating, but 
significantly shaped by, the communist revolution in Russia in 1917. As 
Harle and Moisio notes, the Finnish geopolitical reasoning traditionally 
includes two directions of the world's political map, the East and the West. 
Historically, both have been given rather different political meanings (Harle 
and Moisio 2000; Moisio 2003). In the historical discourses, the East is 
typically reduced to Russia, which functioned mostly as the negative other 
in Finnish identity politics. Russia represents difference in terms of culture 
and political tradition. Moreover, Russia constitutes the 'hereditary enemy' 
of Finland (Kekkonen 1943; Harle and Moisio 2000; Moisio 2003), the 
Finnish nation and people, their society and the state. It signifies a clear 
threat to the very existence of Finland. 
Conversely, the West, in particular the Nordic countries as well as the 
western Europe, is represented as a highly valued societal, political and 
economic space. In the historical discourses, the 
West functions as the 
ideological 'home' (Browning 1999) and a model for development. It 
represents the political, economic, societal and cultural values 
that Finland 
and Finns wants to be identified with 
(Harle and Moisio 2000; Browning 
III 
2003; Moisio 2003). Notwithstanding, periods of anxiety, the West is 
largely constructed as a friend rather than a foe. 68 
Significantly, the core opposition underpinning the construction of the East 
and the West in the 1995 report is significantly different than in the 
neutrality discourse. Whereas the neutrality discourse construed a specific 
eastern and western identity in terms of minor/great power and 
periphery/centre oppositions in the bi-polar world, and downplayed cultural 
and ideological difference in the superpower confrontation, the 1995 
discourse articulated the eastern and western subjects in terms of instability 
in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, cultural differences of the East and 
the West (re-) gained dominance in the official Finnish foreign and security 
policy discourse. In so doing, the East was constituted as a source of 
insecurity and the West as a source of security. 
Subject Positioning 
The major subject-positions of the 1995 re-articulation of the Finnish foreign 
and security policy discourse positioned Finland differently in relation to the 
East and the West than the neutrality discourse. The subject-positions 
constructed in 1995 included: (i) a stable, developed and potentially 
influential Finland; (ii) a stable, developed and powerful West; and (iii) an 
unstable, developing and potentially powerful East. The analysis suggests that 
a significant factor that postulates the change is the articulation of Finland's 
relationship with the European Union and, in particular, with its developing 
foreign and security policy. The initial phases of the CFSP and the ESDP 
were constructed as complementary and in terms of similarity in the Finnish 
discourse. 
61 This polarised view of the East and the West in debating Finnish 
foreign policy and 
security is, of course, oversimplified. The representations of the 
East and the West are more 
multifaceted and their meaning has never been 
fully fixed. For instance, during the time of 
autonomy (1809-1917) and the 'national awakening' several competing political 
opinions 
emerged. Whereas parts of elite were 
favourable for Russia, some wanted to re-gain 
Finland's historical position as a part of Sweden; the ideas of national self-determination also 
ran high in both camps and some prominent 
figures were openly hostile towards Russia 
(Harle and Moisio 2000: 72-82). 
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Whilst the representations of Finland still reflected a small state identity 
Finland's potential to shape its external environment increased. In 1995 
Finland is constructed as a more pro-active, 'responsible' and 'influential' 
subject. Moreover, and significantly, Finland 'had broken free from its Cold 
War international position' (Table 3.2). It was no longer located between the 
East and the West and it is a member in an 'influential core group of 
European democratic states' (Table 3.2). As such, Finland could influence 
more the 'arrangements concerning its international standing and national 
security' (Table 3.2) 
Whereas in the neutrality discourse, Finnish subject-position was arrived at 
positioning it in relation of two rather similar, although ideologically 
different great power subjects, in the East and the West, in the 1995 
discourse Finland was positioned in relation to significantly different eastern 
and western identities. Despite the significant degree of agency attributed to 
Russia, its internal problems rendered it as a developing subject. Although 
all the states in the new Europe were argued to be committed to the shared 
values of 'democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, minority 
rights, the rule of law, social justice, as well as economic liberty and 
responsibility for the environment' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 
10), some states were constructed as more advanced in practising these 
ideals. As the 1995 report argues: 'Since the end of the division of Europe, 
Finland is no longer placed between East and West ... In terms of security 
policy the world and Europe are living through the post-Cold War era, a 
period that can be described as a new transition' (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 65). On the other hand, the paper argued: 'Developments in 
Russia have a major impact on Finnish security ... Finland will support 
democratic reform in Russia and its commitment to European unification 
and compliance with international norms' (Report by the Council of State 
1995: 6). 
In addition to the neutrality discourse's linkage with realist 
ideas of world 
politics reflected in minor/great power opposition, the new security 
discourse correlated with liberal ideas of a modem state and development 
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manifested in unstable/stable binary. That is, while the representation of the 
East in the neutrality discourse highlighted the insecurities related to the 
possible superpower conflict and their strategic interests, the new 
representations drew from different premises of insecurity. The insecurity 
was based on problems associated with the 'political instability' and 
underdevelopment constitutive of 'new security issues' such as 'regional 
and internal disputes, uncontrollable migratory movements, nationality 
disputes' and 'environmental problems' and alike (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 18). However, the internal disputes could escalate to regional 
conflicts which, in turn, could develop to great power conflicts. 
By contrast, the subject position available for the West and the EU was 
characterised by increasing influence and fully developed political and 
economic systems. The West and the European Union implied an extensive 
and complex identity and they were endowed with a significant degree of 
agency. As the 1995 report argues: 'The EU is a key force for change and 
stability in the new Europe. It is also a global actor with evolving economic 
and political relationships of cooperation with states and groups of states on 
all continents' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). Finland's 
relationship with the West, and Finland's subject position, was constructed as 
similar and complementary with the West and the European Union. For 
Finland, the West and the European Union constituted a highly valued 
political space and was providing Finland with opportunities and influence. 
Moreover, the European Union was seen to empower Finland as a small state. 
The report stated: 
Membership in the European Union (EU) has clarified and strengthened Finland's 
international position. Finland has joined a community of similar democratic 
states. Finland's foreign and security policy rests on a national security assessment 
and decision making. Membership in the EU gives the change to pursue 
Finland's 
aims as a member of an influential and evolutionary association of states. 
Membership in the EU has become part of Finland's international identity. 
EU membership has increased Finland's possibilities for 
influencing 
arrangements concerning its international standing and national security. 
It also 
faces Finland with more responsibility for European security and the 
future of the 
whole world (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 10) 
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Accordingly, in the 1995 discourse Finland was positioned differently in 
relation to the East and the West than within the neutrality discourse. The 
discourse assigned Finland a considerably greater degree of agency. Finland 
possessed a more complex and wide-ranging identity than before. It was a 
more powerful initiator of action, formulator of Europe wide policies, and 
assessor of the European security environment. Whereas the neutrality 
discourse positioned Finland with a significantly limited ability to influence 
its environment and to take part in international cooperation, the 1995 
discourse re-articulated Finnish identity as an influential and pro-active actor 
in Europe and beyond. The Report stated: 
Ever since its independence, Finland has believed that effective international 
collaboration on the basis of equality promotes the security of small states. Finland 
has played and active role in the work of international organizations, seeking in 
particular opportunities for influence through cooperation with the other Nordic 
countries; this has shaped Finland's international identity. (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 9) 
Significantly, the European Union's developing foreign and security policy 
was argued to reflect Finnish and Nordic values and norms. The 
government's report stated that the values of democracy, human rights and 
the rule of law which have 'already long cherished in Nordic countries' were 
the 'foundation for the common foreign and security policy of the European 
Union' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). Taken together both the 
empowering aspects of Finland's relationship with the European Union, as 
well as the construction of similarity and commensurability of the EU foreign 
and security policy with the Finnish foreign and security policy, enabled a 
radically different re-articulation of Finnish foreign and security policy 
discourse. That is, the 'membership in the European Union (EU) will 
reinforce the foundations of Finnish security... ' (Report by the Council of 
State 1995: 5). 
I suggest that the re-articulation of the Finnish foreign and security policy 
discourse and the articulation of the European Union and its foreign and 
security policy were central for the emergence of a new 
discourse in Finland 
in 1995. This new discourse highlighted alignment rather than non-alignment 
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with the West in the post-Cold War world. In the remainder of this case study 
the new discourse is referred as the alignment discourse. 
3.2.3 Interpellation of the Alignment Discourse: The 1995 Parliamentary 
Debate 
In the 1995 parliamentary debate over the government's report, the 
alignment discourse clearly structured several representations generated in 
the speeches, questions, remarks and proposals (hereafter remarks) made by 
the Members of the Parliament (MP). On the other hand, some documents 
as well as several remarks were governed by the neutrality discourse and 
many included elements of both discourses. In short, notwithstanding the 
importance of the alignment discourse, it was put under scrutiny by the MPs 
and competing views on Finland's place in the world and the CFSP and the 
ESDP were articulated. 
The analysis of the debate is based on an examination of the representations 
which were generated in the remarks made by the MPs in the hearings. The 
official records of the debate were read through with an eye on the 
predication of the subjects and objects featuring in the texts, presupposition 
of certain kind of knowledge, and subject positions available. Through 
careful analysis, I determined whether a particular remark made in the 
debate was governed by the alignment discourse, the neutrality, both 
discourses or some other discourse. 69 The data collected is presented in 
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1. 
Remarks and Neutrality Neutrality Alignment n/a Total 
speeches discourse and discourse 
alignment 
discourse 
First Hearing 44 12 31 4 91 
Second 68 73 36 7 184 
Hearing 
Overall 108 84 67 11 270 
Debate 
Table 3.3: Neutrality ana angnment uiscuursus III tilt; 1770 X 41 11"Im-11mcglij JL. F%, R,.., 
69 This research design is detailed in chapter 2. 
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The data suggests that although a new discourse was clearly articulated in 
1995, it had not become hegemonic. Rather, competing views largely 
drawing on the traditional neutrality discourse were articulated. Moreover, 
the remarks introducing and defending the government's report and the 
(non-) alignment discourse included representations structured by the 
neutrality discourse. 
Prime Minister Lipponen's opening speech on the parliamentary hearings 
over the report serves as an example. He suggested: 
In a world of rapid changes, security policy must be coherent and flexible. It must 
keep up with the change. We Finns are accustomed to the idea that Finland's 
basic 
line of policy is adaptation to the international environment. This 
is a natural 
approach for a small state with a challenging geopolitical position. 
('Valtiopaivdasiakirjat, Lahetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation) 
This excerpt creates several representations typical 
for the neutrality 
discourse. The predication constructed Finland as a small state, which was 
located next to a great power. This presupposed a realist world-view 
highlighting great power interests and also Finland's peripheral existence. 
The subject-position available for Finland 
is characterised by a significantly 
limited degree of agency. Adaptation was articulated as a 
key feature of the 
Finnish identity. However, PM Lipponen continued: 
Since the end of the Cold War conditions [of Finnish security] 
have changed in 
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Figure 3.1: Neutrality and Alignment Discourses in the 1995 Parliamentary Debate 
many ways. The international field has opened up and agendas have broadened. 
Security is no longer seen merely in political or military terms but as a 
comprehensive and broad question. Security is improved when human rights are 
respected and democracy strengthened. International crime, environmental crisis 
and uncontrollable population movements requires closer international 
cooperation. 
Membership in the European Union enhances the foundations of 
Finland's security. It offers an effective channel of influence to advance Finland's 
interests and fulfils its international responsibilities. European Union's 
membership has brought Finland into a union of states, which has a central role in 
international relations. ('Valtiopaivqasiakirjat, Lahetekeskustelu' 1995, my 
translation) 
The alignment discourse clearly governed the representations articulated in 
this extract. For instance, through predication the object of Finland's 
actions, security, is seen as a broad concept. The presupposed world-view 
was very different from that of the previous extract. Moreover, the 
membership in the European Union was seen to empower Finland. The new 
Finnish subject position assigned Finland more influence, but also more 
responsibilities. Both are suggestive of an increased degree of agency. In the 
remarks that were made during the 1995 parliamentary hearings, both of 
these different representations indicative of different discourses were often 
identifiable. As Prime Minister said: 'At the same time when we, as a small 
state, have to adapt, we also want to have influence. That is the core 
question fo r today's security policy' (Taltioptlivdasiakirjat, 
Ldhetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation). 
Also, the key issues of the 1995 debate can be portrayed in terms of these two 
main discourses. That is, the representations related to the debate were mostly 
structured by the neutrality discourse or the alignment discourse. The 
government's initiative to establish the Rapid Deployment Force in 
conjunction with the Finnish Defence Forces (Report by the Council of State 
1995) was the most debated issue in the 1995 parliament hearings over the 
report. Relatedly, the Report was interpreted as a blue print to amend the 
Finnish Peacekeeping Act to allow more extensive engagement in crisis 
management. These initiatives, in turn were closely related to the 
development of the CFSP and the ESDP. As the report argued: 
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The main emphasis [in European Union's security and defence issues] will be on 
developing the Union's own capabilities, and combined capabilities of the Union 
and the WEU, in humanitarian and other peacekeeping operations in the field of 
crisis management. Finland supports consolidation of the European Union's crisis 
management capacity. (Report by the Council of State 1995: 62) 
The majority of the representations generated in the remarks opposing the 
government's plans drew from the neutrality discourse. As MP Midridinen 
representing the main opposition party argued: 
While reading the report one is inevitably left with an impression that its content is 
structured mainly to promote and explain one issue: establishing Rapid Deployment 
Force ... 
The difference between traditional peacekeeping and development and 
deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force is a not a minor, but a fundamental 
question. If the troops are created, we have to be ready to take a new kind of 
responsibility and accept unfortunate consequences. Depending on the mission, 
casualties are possible. These would be given for another purpose than defending 
Finland's independence. Are the Finnish people and the parliament ready for this? 
('Valtiopaivaasiakirjat, Lahetekeskustelu' 1995, my translation) 
In the Second Hearing, MP Aho, clarified this position. He said: 
The fact that the responsibility in crisis management is different is self-evident. We 
cannot be asked to fulfil the same requirements as countries belonging to a military 
alliance... Our basic starting point is that a country which is member of a military 
alliance has a different responsibility than a non-aligned country. 
('Valtioptiivdasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation) 
Although the opposition highlighted that Finnish peacekeeping capabilities 
should be strengthened, it emphasised that Finland did not have the same 
moral obligations, responsibilities or resources to take part in crisis 
management than major powers and other more secure states. The 
representations created in these statements clearly drew on the neutrality 
discourse. However, the representations generated in the government's 
defence were mainly structured by the alignment discourse. As the Prime 
Minister responded: 
MP Aho said that we do not have the same responsibility as others. Yes we do. In 
participating in peacekeeping missions we have responsibility for the whole mission. 
We only limit our engagement to a suitable level, which reflects our foreign policy 
line and our resources. (TaltiopdMiasiakirjat, Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my 
translation) 
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MP Paasio explicitly highlighted the moral dimension of the initiative. He 
said: the committee suggests that there are no reasons why Finland should not 
carry out its international responsibilities' ('Valtiopdivdasiakirjat, 
Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation). Moreover, the foreign minister 
explicitly noted that Finland could be marginalised if it did not carry out its 
international responsibilities. She said: 
It is possible that Finland could be involved in Bosnia [peacekeeping mission] if the 
mandate, peace accord, and all the other requirements have been fulfilled. It is 
obvious that it is not a problem to find enough troops for Bosnia without Finland 
being involved. It is possible that the Polish troops can replace the Finnish troops in 
the lively discussed Nordic group [battalion] ('ValtiopAivdasiakirjat, 
Palautekeskustelu' 1995, my translation) 
The representations generated in these articulations were clearly governed by 
the alignment discourse. Finland had responsibilities and it was in a position 
to address normative questions. Moreover, the Finnish state identity in the 
realm of foreign and security policy was increasingly constructed in terms of 
similarity with the other Nordic countries. In the neutrality discourse Nordic 
countries had different geopolitical security interests. Moreover, Finland's 
new position in the North and the West could be potentially challenged by 
other nations, more willing to engage with the crisis management. 
The empirical analysis of the 1995 parliamentary debate, based on the 
detailed discourse analysis of the previous sections and careful examination 
of the representations generated in the MPs remarks made in the debated, 
suggests that in 1995 the alignment discourse was clearly articulated. 
However, this discourse was not hegemonic. That is, the decision makers 
were not interpellated by the Alignment discourse. Rather, they responded to 
it by questioning the representations of the world articulated and the warrants 
of action indicated by the foreign policy leadership. In so doing, competing 
views emerged. These articulations were largely structured 
by the traditional 
neutrality discourse. 
3.3 Re-Articulation the Finnish Foreign and Security Policy Discourse 
After 1995 
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The purpose of this section is to examine the role of the European Uniongs 
developing foreign and security policy in the light of the alignment 
discourse. In particular, I am interested in knowing how the construction of 
the CFSP and the ESDP developed in the official discourse and whether or 
not the alignment discourse become hegemonic. To do that, I first analyse 
the security and defence policy reports published in 1997 and 2001 and then 
the parliamentary debates over the 1997 and 2001 documents. I conclude 
that the alignment discourse had become hegemonic by 2001. Moreover, the 
role of the EU foreign and security policy amplified in the discourse. 
Moreover, towards the end of the 1990s, traditional military aspects related 
to these developments of the ESDP and NATO enlargement re-gained 
importance in the Finnish debates. In terms of Finnish state identity, I 
suggest that the CFSP and the ESDP had a central role in the transition from 
neutrality to aligmuent identity. 
3.3.1 Situating the Discourse: The CFSP and the ESDP in Finnish Foreign 
and Security policy 
The aim of the 1997 and 2001 security and defence reports was to review the 
development of the Finnish foreign and security policy in the light of the 
1995 report, which laid out a 'broad and sturdy foundation for the 
development of a comprehensive security policy' (Report by the Council of 
State 1997: 6). Although the 1997 and 2001 reports centre more on the 
defence and military issues, both included comprehensive (re)assessment of 
the developments in Finland's external security environment after the 
publication of the 1995 report. 70 Therefore, these reports and the 
parliamentary debates over them constitute analytically interesting empirical 
material for an analysis of the development and impact of the 1995 
'0 The 1997 White Paper, The European Security Development and Finnish Defence, and 
the 2001 paper, The Finnish Security and Defence Policy, are both hundred pages long 
supplemented with annexes. The 1997 report is divided in two main sections: European 
Security Development and Finland; and Development of Finland's Defence. Whereas the 
first section (42 pages) articulated the environment within which Finland found itself in 
terms of security and defence, the second section (45 pages) laid out the main guidelines to 
develop the Finnish defence. The 2001 paper included four main sections. Again the first 
section on 'the Security Environment and Finland's Policy (43 pages), formed the context 
in which the Finnish policy was then outlined in subsequent sections on Developing 
Finland's Defence (22 pages), International Crisis Management (I I pages) and 
Precautionary Measures and Combating Threats to Society (10 pages). (Report by the 
Council of State 1997; Report by the Council of State 200 1). 
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articulation of the alignment discourse in which the European Union and its 
developing foreign and security policy had a central position. 
The introductory sections of both reports tackled the changes 'put in motion 
after the end of the Cold War are both profound and lasting' (Report by the 
Council of State 1997: 8; Report by the Council of State 2001: 7). Relatedly, 
they suggested that the European security arrangements were under a 
4constant change' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 11; Report by the 
Council of State 2001: 6-7). Both reports re-articulated the representations 
of the insecurities created in the 1995. The 1997 paper noted that a threat of 
large-scale military conflict in Europe remained low. On the other hand, 
Finland was facing new kinds of security threats such as 4political 
instability, regional and international conflicts, ethnic disputes and other 
security problems which can erupt as armed conflicts and associated refugee 
flows' as well as extensive 'envirom-nental problems' (Report by the 
Council of State 1997: 8; see also, Report by the Council of State 2001: 7). 
In the 2001 report these security issues are supplemented with the threats 
and risks including human rights violations, damage to infrastructure, 
information threats, disasters, terrorism, international crime and epidemics 
(Report by the Council of State 2001: 17). The proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and uncontrolled spread and use of conventional weapons 
were also explicitly mentioned in both reports (Report by the Council of 
State 1997: 17; Report by the Council of State 2001: 17). 
Significantly for this study, both reports highlighted the increasing 
importance of the European Union as a security actor (Report by the 
Council of State 1997: 18-19; Report by the Council of State 2001: 22). The 
2001 report declared: 
The importance of the European Union in relation to Finland's security interests 
and goals has continued to increase. A strong Union based on solidarity will 
enhance security, prevent crisis from emerging and improve Finland's ability to 
cope with such situations should they arise' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 
8). 
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Finland's first European Union initiative, the European Union's Northern 
Dimension, aiming to increase regional stability in the North of Europe, is 
important for the construction of Finland's increased international influence 
as an EU member. 71 The 2001 report notes that the 'implementation of the 
European Union's common policy on the Northern Dimension will provide 
a long-ten-n approach for promoting sustainable development' (Report by 
the Council of State 2001). Indeed, with the initiative of the Northern 
Dimension, Finland emerges as a regional security provider. Significantly, 
for the Finns the Northern Dimension also indicates that a small member 
state of the European Union can play an important and constructive role in 
shaping the Union's policies (Arter 2000). 
The development of the CFSP and specifically the ESDP was also 
highlighted in both reports. In the 1997 paper, the meaning of the 
approaching European Union's IGC in Amsterdam was explicitly addressed 
in the report (Report by the Council of State 1997: 19). It suggested that the 
'EU has a central task in countering the security problems arising form 
economic and societal instability in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 13). Significantly, in the 
2001 report, European Union's responsibility was highlighted in the field of 
crisis management and the importance of its military capabilities was 
underlined. The 2001 paper argues: 
The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999, has 
made EU decision-making more effective and given it new tools for pursuing its 
common foreign and security policy. The Treaty expanded the scope of the EU's 
common foreign and security policy by adding crisis management to the EU 
competence. ' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 22) 
Moreover, the 2001 paper affirmed that a further 'improvement in the 
European Union's ability to take action will remain a fundamental principle 
of Finland's policy on Europe (Report by the Council of State 2001: 8). 
71 The initiative was launched in 1997 by the Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, This 
initiative excluded traditional 'hard' security policy issues, and 
instead promoted 'soft' 
security issues, advocating strategies associated with economics, 
the environment and 
nuclear safety (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 
2000). By including non-EU member states, the 
initiative had implications for EU's external relations and it has been linked to the EU's 
emerging foreign and security policy. 
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The subsequent sections of both reports outlined the development of 
Finland's defence policy and Defence Forces in the near future. In both 
Reports, Finland's defence was developed according to the policies of 
military non-alignment and credible independent defence (Report by the 
Council of State 1997: 54; Report by the Council of State 2001: 47). That is, 
Finland stayed outside the military alliances and the Finnish defence was 
based on a territorial defence system. This system was anchored in general 
conscription, which was seen as necessary to ensure the capacity to defend 
the entire country (Report by the Council of State 1997: 59; Report by the 
Council of State 2001: 47). 
To keep the defence 'up-to-date', the Government introduced several 
structural changes for the Defence Forces to 'meet the demands of the early 
parts of the next millennium' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 54). 
These were largely based on the new perceptions of warfare and strategy, 
suggesting that the defence of the core areas of the country had to be 
strengthened (Report by the Council of State 1997: 71; Report by the 
Council of State 2001: 45-46). Another key theme of the White Papers was 
the development of the interoperability of the Finnish troops with 
international force, mainly through NATO's PfP program and the 
participation in the European Union's developing military structures (Report 
by the Council of State 1997: 65-66; 'European Decence - Minitry of 
Defence Policy Paper' 2001,69-81). This was seen to serve both Finland's 
Defence Forces and Finland's international crisis management capabilities. 
The development of crisis management troops and Finland's defence were 
constructed to be 'mutually beneficial' (Report by the Council of State 
1997: 52; Report by the Council of State 2001: 46,69). 
In short, the European Union's foreign and security policy 
largely 
constituted the rational of these reviews. In so 
doing, the CFSP and the 
ESDP played a key role in the re-articulation the Finnish state 
identity in the 
realm of foreign and security policy 
in 1997 and 2001. However, although 
the security was defined broadly, aspects relating 
to military and defence 
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issues re-gained importance in the light of developing European Union's 
military crisis management capabilities. 
3.3.2 Re-articulation of the (Non-) Alignment Discourse in the Light of the 
CFSP and the ESDP 
I suggest that the representations of the world created in the security and 
defence reports in 1997 and 2001 were progressively structured by the 
aligm-nent discourse. The predication of the subjects, the knowledge 
presupposed and the subject positions available for the subjects of the official 
discourse increasingly reflected the alignment discourse. On the other hand, 
and although still identifiable, the neutrality discourse was clearly fading 
away. This is a significant finding since the 1997 and 2001 reports explicitly 
dealt with the traditional 'hard security' question of military and defence in 
which the legacy of neutrality has been argued to prevail. 
In the 1997 and 2001 reports, the main subjects established were broadly the 
same as in the 1995 report. However, the West was increasingly constructed 
in terms of the European Union and NATO and the East was increasingly 
reduced to Russia. The 1997 paper argued: 'From the perspective of Finland, 
the European Union, Russia and NATO are the most central actors in the 
security development in Europe. ' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 6)The 
meaning of the North was, however, still important, yet it was increasingly 
addressed in relation to the European Union. For instance, the reports 
explicitly refer to the joint Finnish-Swedish proposal in 1997 related to the 
European Union's defence dimension (Report by the Council of State 1997: 
19). 
Significantly, in both reports, Finland's relations with the rest of the world 
are increasingly discussed in terms of the European Union. In particular, 
Finland's role is highlighted in its relations with the East and Russia (Report 
by the Council of State 1997: 23; Report by the Council of State 2001: 31- 
32) and NATO (Report by the Council of State 1997: 22-23; Report 
by the 
Council of State 2001: 23-24,41), and with West and the United States 
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(Report by the Council of State 1997: 25; Report by the Council of State 
2001: 41). 
The West, the North and Finland: The European Union, the CFSP, Crisis 
Management and NATO 
As suggested, the main theme of the 1997 report was the changing European 
security arrangements. The report argued that the European security was 
'seeking a shape', it was 'in a state of flux' and the institutions were 
'adjusting to new challenges' (Report by the Council of State 1997: 11). 
Significantly, the western identity was changing and its role in the 
construction of Finland's place in the world was increasing. Whereas in the 
1995 report, the CFSP is constructed as a developing policy, in 1997 paper 
it is construed as pivotal in the European security. As the 1997 report 
suggests: 
The EU's importance as a player in the field of security will grow as integration 
proceeds. The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, which entered in 
to force in 1993) broadened the scope of the Union's competence to encompass 
the development and implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). The Maastricht Treaty provides for a security and defence dimension to 
be part of development of the CFSP. This dimension includes the eventual framing 
of common defence. (Report by the Council of State 1997: 18) 
Moreover, whereas, in 1995, the link between the CFSP and national 
defence policies was seen insignificant, in 1997 the government articulated 
a relationship between the two. Moreover, Finland's engagement in military 
crisis management was re-articulated as non-contradictory with the policy of 
military non-alignment and independent defence with reference to a another 
Nordic and previously neutral country, Sweden. As the 1997 paper agues: 
The joint Finnish-Swedish proposal was made on the basis of the defence dimension 
provided in the Maastricht Treaty ... Under the proposal, 
humanitarian and crisis- 
management tasks involving the use of military organisations would be included in the 
Union's competence ... The proposal would 
ftulher provide for all EU member states 
contributing to crisis-management operations, including those not participating 
in 
military alliances, to have an equal opportunity to take part 
in planning and decision 
making within the WEU in relation to those operations. ' 
(Report by the Council of 
State 1997: 19) 
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Significantly, it is not the participation in the military missions but the 
exclusion from these missions which constituted a problem in 1997 for 
militarily non-aligned Finland. This type of reasoning related to the new 
Finnish subject position established by the alignment discourse. That is, the 
European Union provided Finland with influence. 
The participation in crisis management is seen as politically significant. This 
representation relates to the increasing importance given to the European 
Union in the realm of foreign and security policy and Finland's overall 
European policy to be in the 'core' of the European Union, where decisions 
affecting Finland are made. As Prime Minister Lipponen argues, after 
deciding to join in the European Union the best way forward is to 'be, as 
much as possible, within the circles in which the future of the union is 
decided' (Lipponen 1990: 166). Hence, through participation Finland 
guarantees 'the effectiveness of its foreign and security policy' (Report by 
the Council of State 2001: 7) and impact on the EU policy. As such, the 
closer integration with reference to the ESDP is constructed as 
complementary to Finnish defence. The 2001 report argues: 
By improving its security cooperation and operational capacity in line with UN 
and OSCE principles within the EU, within NATO Partnership Cooperation and 
with other Nordic countries in international crisis management, Finland will 
improve its own capacity to manage crisis and threats affecting the country. 
Engaging in international cooperation also supports Finland's precautionary 
measures aimed at securing key ftinctions in society in times of exceptional 
circumstances. (Report by the Council of State 2001: 39) 
Importantly, Finnish Defence Forces credibility is here linked with the 
forces 'interoperability' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 73) abroad. 
Relatedly, NATO clearly gained more weight in the re-articulation of the 
non-aligm-nent discourse in 1997 and 2001 reports. I suggest, 
however, that 
the European Union, the CFSP and the ESDP were constitutive for the 
construction of NATO in the reports. That is, NATO was 
largely discussed 
in relation to the European Union and crisis management 
in terms of the 
'EU access to NATO resources and military 
infrastructure in EU-led crisis 
management' (Report by the Council of 
State 2001: 23). NATO was also 
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discussed due to the enlargement of the alliance (Report by the Council of 
State 1997: 6; Report by the Council of State 2001: 16). Also the NATO 
enlargement was linked to the European Union, specifically to the EU 
enlargement. As the 1997 report argued: 
Although the EU and NATO enlargements are independent of each other and 
apply to different spheres, they are m utually- influencing because they are parallel 
and both have security linkages. The significance for stability of the EU 
enlargement may be accentuated as NATO gradually expands. Several EU 
members states would like all of the other members to be in both the WEU and 
NATO before long. (Report by the Council of State 1997: 20-2 1, my emphasis) 
Whereas in the 1995 report the representation of NATO as a military 
alliance established a clear distinction between NATO and the CFSP and the 
ESDP, in 2001 NATO and the European Union were articulated in relation 
to complementary and similar features. In so doing, the question of 
Finland's relationship with NATO became more topical. 
The 2001 report also emphasised the importance of NATO's 'open door 
policy' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 24) and re-articulated the 
policy of militarily non-alignment as non-alignment 'under prevailing 
conditions' (Report by the Council of State 2001: 7). This re-articulation of 
Finland's policy in 2001 known also as the 'NATO option policy', is 
suggestive of the increasing role of the (non-)alignment discourse in official 
documents. In other words, the neutrality discourse is largely dismantled. 
The East: Russia, the Former Soviet Republics and the Eastern European 
States 
The East retained its importance for construction of the Finland's foreign 
and security policy environment in the 1997 and 2001 reports. Although the 
eastern subjects were moving towards the West in terms of their developing 
western political and economic values and norms, they were still important 
markers of difference in the alignment discourse. First, the East constituted 
significant insecurities in terms of both the traditional and the new and 
broader conceptualisations of security. For instance, the 2001 paper 
suggested that 'Russia was continuing its transition toward 
democracy, rule 
of law and a functioning market economy. 
However, there were still 
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uncertainties surrounding the country's future development. ' (Report by the 
Council of State 2001: 3 1) These included political and economic instability 
and adjustment to Russian declined international position (Report by the 
Council of State 2001: 16-19,31-32). Accordingly, the background 
knowledge in which the representations of Finland's place in the world were 
largely generated was based in the unstable/stable core opposition. 
Importantly, the role of the European Union in Finland's relations with the 
East increased in 1997 and 2001 reports. The 2001 report argued: 
The importance of cooperation between the EU and Russia for the future of 
Europe is continually growing Security in the Baltic Sea region will improve as a 
result of regional cooperation within Europe. This will be shaped by the 
enlargement of the EU and of NATO and developments in relations between 
Russia and the Baltic States. (Report by the Council of State 2001: 7) 
Moreover, Finland's EU membership and full participation in the CFSP and 
the ESDP were noted in this respect: 'The key aim of the political and 
economic integration process that begun in Western Europe is to improve 
the European stability, security and prosperity' (Report by the Council of 
State 2001: 22). The report also argued that 'although the EU is primarily a 
political and economic entity, its Member States have wished to strengthen 
their ability to manage crisis in Europe and its environs by including 
military means, following experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo' (Report by 
the Council of State 2001: 23). Here, the presupposition of unstable East 
and stable West is taken as given and the European Union is imperative in 
the constitution of the specific kind of East in the Finnish foreign and 
security policy discourse. 
Moreover, and according to the alignment discourse Finland was not facing 
the Eastern threats alone. In the 1995 some aspects of the neutrality 
discourse were still clearly governing some representations generated in the 
report such as the notion that 'Finland has never enjoyed protected security 
status' and 'neither will it have a privileged status amid the present changes 
in Europe, or in the conceivable future' (Report by the Council of State 
1995: 66). However, the remnants of the neutrality discourse were clearly 
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fading away in 1997. The report in 1997 declared: 'membership of the 
European Union has added clarity and strengthened Finland's international 
position. Although membership does not entail security guarantees, it does 
include the protection that is founded on mutual solidarity" (Report by the 
Council of State 1997: 6). The 2001 paper went further and argued: 
A strong Union based on solidarity will also benefit Finland's security situation and 
help to prevent the eruption of crises that may affect Finland, as well as improve 
Finland's ability to deal with such crises. Strengthening the effectiveness of the EU 
remains firm basis for Finland's policy on Europe. As an EU member Finland plays a 
role in promoting the stable development and security of its neighbouring areas and 
Europe as a whole. (Report by the Council of State 2001: 40) 
Accordingly, the alignment discourse was increasingly structuring the 
construction of Finland's geopolitical position. Finland was no longer 
located alone between the East and the West. Rather, Finland was located 
firmly in the West. 
3.3.3 Interpellation of the Alignment Discourse: The Parliamentary Debates 
in 199 7 and 2001 
The examination of the parliamentary debates over the 1997 and 2001 
security and defence policy reports supports the claims made above. The 
number of remarks that were structured by the neutrality discourse decreased 
in 1997 and 2001 parliamentary hearings. This suggested that over time the 
policy makers were increasingly interpellated by the alignment discourse. 
That is, the representations created by the government and increasingly 
drawing on the alignment discourse are largely accepted as adequate and true 
reflections of reality (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 29). The data collected 
through a careful reading and analysis of the 1997 and 2001 parliamentary 
debates is presented in the Tables 3.4 and 3.5 and Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
Whereas in 1995, several of the remarks made by the government's 
ministers, MPs representing the parties in the government and opposition 
mainly drew from both the neutrality and alignment 
discourses, in 1997 the 
remarks were increasingly structured by the alignment 
discourse. In 2001, 
they were predominantly governed by the alignment 
discourse. 
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Remarks and Neutrality Neutrality and Alignment n/a Total 
speeches discourse alignment discourse 
discourse 
First Hearing 20 18 51 15 104 
Second 7 30 55 56 148 
Hearing 
Overall 27 48 106 71 252 
Debate 
vable 3.4: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 1997 Parliamentary Debate 
0% lo% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Remarks and Neutrality Neutrality and Alignment n/a Total 
speeches discourse alignment discourse 
discourse 
First Hearing 9 5 101 26 141 
Second 4 6 100 65 175 
Hearing 
Overall 13 11 201 91 316 
Debate 
Table 3.5: Neutrality and alignment aiscourse in tne zuui irai nainummy 
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Figure 3.2: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 1997 Parliamentary Debate 
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Figure 3.3: Neutrality and alignment discourse in the 2001 Parliamentary Debate 
Prime Minister Lipponen's opening speeches in 1995 and 1997 serve as 
examples. In 1995 PM Lipponen argued that the adaptation to the external 
environment was natural for a small state like Finland. However,, he also 
noted that Finland also wanted to have influence ('Valtiopdivdasiakirjat, 
Ldhetekeskustelu' 1995). In 1997, Lipponen argued: 
The EU membership is of key importance in Finland's overall security policy. The 
membership has stabilised Finland's position in the new Europe and in so doing, it 
has security value for our country. In the Union, we carry joint responsibility and 
we influence to the strengthening of security ('Valtiopaivaasiakirjat, 
Lahetekeskustelu' 1997, my translation) 
Here, the Prime Minister created representations in which Finland could 
decide how to adapt to the external enviromnent. Accordingly, the increased 
Finnish influence was largely taken as given. 
Whereas in 1995 the issues and remarks made in argumentation reflected 
both the neutrality and alignment discourses, in 1997 and 2001 the issues 
changed accordingly to the growing importance of the alignment discourse. 
These were, for instance, Finland's participation in the military crisis 
management and peacekeeping operations and military alignment. 
The 
majority of the competing views drew from the neutrality 
discourse. 
However, some representations generated were indicative of military 
alignment, rather than non-alignment. 
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The competing view that questioned the increasing Finnish participation in 
the European Union's military crisis management operations explicitly 
reflected the neutrality discourse. In 1997 MP Aho argued: 
We have not opposed to Finland's participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping 
operation at any stage. However, we have underlined that it is not wise to place 
peacekeeping training and Rapid Deployment Force designed for peacekeeping 
operations, under the Defence Forces peacetime organisation. 
('Valtiopdivdasiakirjat, Ldhetekeskustelu' 1997, my translation) 
The logic governing this remark relates to the special character of the 
Finnish Defence Forces in the neutrality discourse. In this discourse, the 
credibility of Finland's independent defence is largely based on the 
willingness of the Finnish people to defend their country. Central for the 
construction of the 'strong will' is the defensive character of the Defence 
Forces whose purpose is spatially defined to operate within the borders of 
the Finnish state. As MP Aho continues, 'Finland's strength lies in our 
strong will to defend our country. This can only last if the citizens have a 
clear vision of the country's policy and the tasks of the Defence Forces'. 
Moreover, Aho indicated that it is important that each Finn can relate to the 
Defence Forces and, 'if needed, is willing to participate in defending our 
country' ('Valtiopdivdasiakirjat, Ldhetekeskustelu' 1997, my translation). 
Relatedly, Finland's possible NATO membership was explicitly raised in 
the both parliamentary debates. Significantly, the analysis suggests that the 
EU foreign and security policy had a central role in these debates. Although 
the government clearly stated that Finland remained militarily non-allied, 
some MPs argued that increased interoperability of the Finnish troops with 
EU and NATO forces was a preamble for NATO membership. As MP 
Vistbacka argued: '... we cannot accept the hidden agenda of the report 
aiming to subsume Finland in NATO' ('Valtiopdivdasiakirjat, 
Ldhetekeskustelu' 2001, my translation). Vistbacka noted that the same 
'slow but sure strategy', which was used to take Finland in the European 
Union, has been applied again to take Finland in NATO 
('Valtiopdivdasiakirj at, Ldhetekeskustelu'2001, my translation). 
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On the other hand, the remarks defending the government's view suggested 
that, the developmnet of national defence capabilities and the European 
Union's military crisis management ability were not mutually exclusive. As 
MP Kekkonen argued: 'Quite the opposite! Finland's military contribution 
to the international peacekeeping operations is based on troops which main 
task is national defence' ('ValtiopdivdasiakirJ at, Ldhetekeskustelu' 2001 , my 
translation). However, within this context the membership in a military 
alliance become an increasingly feasible option and subject of increasing 
discussion. 
Crucially, the analysis suggests that the EU membership and the EU foreign 
and security policy were significant for the emerging consensus among the 
majority of parliamentarians. More specifically, in the 1997 and 2001 the 
European Union's developing crisis management capabilities which Finland 
had been 'planning and building' ('Valtiopalvdasiakirjat, Ldhetekeskustelu' 
2001, my translation) constituted a key rationale for the Europeanisation of 
foreign and security policy discourse in Finland. The increasing 
participation in the European Union's crisis management also highlighted 
Finland's relationship with NATO. In so doing, it enabled increasing 
discussion concerning military alignment. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy 
discourse in Finland. The analysis has suggested that European Union 
membership and the European Union's developing foreign and security 
policy have had a significant impact upon the Finnish official 
discourse. 
They had a major role in the re-articulation of the official 
discourse in the 
post-Cold War in terms of alignment rather than neutrality. 
Moreover, the 
development of the EU foreign and security policy, specifically the creation 
of European Union's crisis management capabilities, was central 
for the 
subsequent re-articulations of the official 
discourse and successful 
interpellation. The EU membership and the participation 
in the CFSP and 
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the ESDP enabled the transition from neutrality to alignment in the realm of 
foreign and security policy and shaped the state identity of Finland. 
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Chapter 4 
Europeanisation of British Foreign and Security Policy 
Discourse(s): Re-Articulating Great Power Identity 
Introduction 
Throughout the 1990s Britain was widely viewed to have a problematic 
relationship with the European integration project. This common sense view 
drew from several historical representations which constructed Britain as a 
great power in decline. After the refusal to participate in the initial phases of 
the European integration in the 1950s Britain decided to join it in the1960s 
largely due to the worsening economic conditions. However, Britain's entry 
72 in the European Community was blocked by France until 1971. As a 
member, Britain was soon constructed as an reluctant and 'awkward 
partner' both in Europe and in Britain (Allen 1988: 171; Wallace 1992; 
Forster 1998; George 1998; White 2001). Britain was seen to oppose any 
development whieh eould undermine its autonomy or sovereignty. In Britain 
72 In the British case the terminology used to refer to the institutional aspects and 
development of the European integration is assorted. The terms such as 'European 
Community', 'European Communities' and 'European Economic Communities (EEQ' are 
often used to refer to the same political entity known as the European Union (EU) since the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992. Originally, there were three Communities: the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euraton), and 
the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967 the institutions of the three were 
merged and since then it has become common to talk of the European Community. 
As George suggest, the British usage of Communities or EEC is an example of 
6awkwardness' (George 1998: 2). Moreover, the expression of '(European) Common 
Market' used in Britain and the United States indicates a degree of exceptionality (George 
1998: 2; see also, Diez 2001). In this dissertation, the term European Community and its 
abbreviation EC were used prior to 1992 and the European Union and its abbreviation EU 
thereafter except where the reference is specifically to one of the three Communities, or to 
the period prior to the merger in 1967, or where other writers or policy makers are being 
quoted. 
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as well as in the other member states, Britain was largely considered a 
difficult state to work with. As such, it was seen to hold back the 
development of the European Community. 
Scholars and observers have noted that there was strikingly little debate 
among the British policy-makers concerning the significant changes related 
to the large-scale political, economic and social change in Europe and 
beyond. As Forster suggests, the most remarkable aspect of the British 
foreign policy debate in the 1990s was how little it appeared to be affected 
by the transformation of the international system. Relatedly, the debate over 
the Europeanisation of foreign and security policies in wake of the CFSP 
and the ESDP stimulated very modest debate until the late 1990s. 
Accordingly, the debate about Britain's place in the world continued along 
the familiar lines (Forster 2000: 47). 
However, this changed in the late 1990s. The Labour party's entry to the 
government in 1997 and the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) followed by 
the joint British-French declaration on European defence at St. Malo in 
December 1998, stirred a significant debate concerning Britain's place in 
the world. The government argued that Britain needed a fresh start with 
Europe and a more engaging policy towards the European Union. 
Importantly, the major factor propelling the change was the European 
Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
The aim of this case study is to establish what impact, if any, the EU foreign 
and defence policies have on the seemingly rigid foreign and security policy 
discourse(s) in Britain. 73 To do that, I first analyse the foreign and security 
policy documentation in Britain in the 1990s prior to the publication of the 
SDR. This analysis of the official documentation suggests that there existed 
a dominant discourse in which the CFSP and the ESDP had a marginal role. 
73 As in the previous case, here too, I underline that instead of examining change and 
continuity in the British foreign and security policy, my purpose 
in this chapter is to analyse 
the effect of the CFSP and the ESDP in the official 
foreign and security policy discourse. 
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Second, to determine the impact of the increasing weight given to the CFSP 
and the ESDP in the official foreign and security policy discourse, I 
examine the foreign, security and defence policy documents and the 
parliamentary debates around the joint British-French declaration on 
European defence in St. Malo in 1998. My analysis indicates that the 
increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policies was important in 
the 1998 re-articulation(s) of the British foreign and security policy 
discourse. However, this re-articulation represented a twist rather than a turn 
in the discourse. That is, the key elements of the discourse largely remained 
the same. Finally, to examine how this re-articulation developed in the light 
of the intensifying Europeanisation, I analyse the subsequent white papers 
and the parliamentary debates over these documents in the House of 
Commons. I suggest that in this documentation, as well as in the 
parliamentary debates, the traditional British great power identity was 
largely re-produced. 
4.1 British Great Power Discourse 
This section lays out the discursive context within which the EU foreign and 
security policy were first articulated and made meaningful. To do that, I 
map out the dominant foreign and security policy discourse(s) in Britain 
until 1998, when a turn in discourse in relation to the CFSP and the ESDP 
became evident in the empirical material. I suggest that the dominant 
discourse in which these policies were made meaningful was the traditional 
British great power discourse. The main elements of this discourse were: (i) 
Britain as a great power with a global reach; (ii) Britain as a leading 
member of several international organisations: most importantly the (iii) 
European Union, and (iv) NATO, in which Britain emerged as the (v) 
closest ally to the United States. To elucidate the great power discourse, I 
first situate the discourse by a brief descriptive discussion based on the 
scholarly literature of Britain's foreign and security policy. I then analyse 
the official foreign and security policy discourse from 1989 to 1997.1 
deploy a discourse analytic approach to analyse the status and re-articulation 
of the great power discourse in the light of the increasing Europeanisation of 
foreign and security policy. 
138 
4.1.1 Situating Discourses: Traditional Understandings of Britain in the 
World 
An initial survey of the empirical material suggested that the dominant 
theme in the official foreign and security policy debates in the 1990s was 
74 Britain's place and influence in the world . The documents I looked at 
highlighted Britain's aspirations to retain and increase its influence in the 
world economy, international institutions and military affairs in the post 
Cold War world. In short, the British foreign and security policy was 
debated in terms of capabilities, influence and leadership. Although the 
analysis of the primary material fonns the core of the subsequent sections of 
this case study, the purpose of this section is to place the material in a 
broader historical context by reviewing some of the relevant scholarly 
literature. In the scholarly literature, two themes appear to be central for the 
claims concerning the Europeanisation of the British foreign policy. These 
are the 'three circle' doctrine and Britain's decline in the world politics. 
In a conventional study of the perceptions of Britain's foreign policy role 
from 1989 to 1993, Macleod suggests that three themes dominated the 
academic debates over the British foreign policy in the post-war era. These 
were: (i) the nature of Britain's position in the world; (ii) the relevance of 
the special relationship with the US; and (iii) Britain's link with Europe ( 
see also Hill 1988; Smith, Smith et al. 1988; Macleod 1997: 165). 
Macleod's findings indicated a continuing salience of the so-called 'three 
circles' doctrine in the British foreign policy documentation. This doctrine 
74 This material included six Statements on Defence Estimates (SDEs) from 1990 to 
1996 
produced by the Ministry of Defence (Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1990; Statement 
on the Defence Estimates 1991; Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1992; Statement on 
the Defence Estimates 1993; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994; Statement on the 
Defence Estimates 1995; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996); the Strategic Defence 
Review ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998); the 1999 Defence White Paper ('Defence White 
Paper' 1999); the 2001 Ministry of Defence Policy Paper on European Defence 
('European 
Decence - Minitry of Defence 
Policy Paper' 2001); a 1992 Conservative Party Election 
Manifesto (Conservative Party General Election Manifestation 1992), ten 
UK Prime 
Ministers' speeches addressing the British foreign and security policy and 
the developing 
CFSP and the ESDP (Thatcher 1989; Thatcher 
1990; Major 1994; Major 1994; Blair 1997; 
Blair 1997; Blair 1998; Blair 1998; Blair 1998; Blair 
1998), Joint British-French 
declaration of European Defence in St. Malo 
(Rutten 2001); and parliamentary debates 
relating to SDR, the 1999 Defence 
White Paper and the 2001 European Defence Paper in 
the House of Commons ('Commons Hansard'2000; 
'Commons Hansard'2000; 'Commons 
Hansard'2001) 
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was initially articulated by Churchill in the Conservative Party Conference 
in 1948. In his speech, Churchill located Britain at the intersection of three 
spheres of influence embracing the Commonwealth, the United States and 
Europe. 
A review of other sources suggests that the 'three circles' doctrine 
constitutes 'a most significant conceptual framework to have influenced the 
making of the post-war British foreign policy' (see also, Allen 1988: 169; 
Hill 1988: 44; Tugendhat and Wallace 1988: 13-14; White 2001: 120). As 
such, it is integral for the British state identity in this policy field. Within the 
three circles doctrine a particular kind of identity emerges. That is, a great 
power identity. White's analysis of the three key assumptions of the 'three 
circles' doctrine is illustrative. First, the doctrine portrays Britain as a global 
power with global interests rather than a middle-range state pursuing mostly 
regional interests. Second, it raises pragmatism and flexibility as key 
principles of the British foreign policy aimed to play a leading role in all 
three dimensions and not to become committed to any particular 'circle' in 
the expense of the others. Consequently, and third, Britain is seen as a 
central and powerful player. As White suggests: 'Churchill's notion that the 
British 'have the opportunity of joining them [the three circles] all together' 
provided a rationale for the 'bridge-builder's' role for Britain, which has 
continued to be a powerful self-image throughout the post-war period' (see 
also, Macleod 1997: 165-7; White 2001: 120). 
Another common theme related to the literature dealing with the 
Europeanisation of Britain's foreign and security policy is Britain's 
declining international status. 75 Several accounts argue that latest by the 
Suez Crisis in 1956 Britain had lost its dominant position in world politics. 76 
75 The notion of decline underpins for instance the well established volume on the British 
foreign policy edited by M. Smith, S. Smith and B. White's (Smith, Smith et al. 1988; see 
also, Macleod 1997; White 2001). For instance, Allen notes that 
'implicit in many of the 
chapters in this book is the argument that Britain 
has ceased to be a global power with 
global interests. 
76 The failed Franco-British intervention in 1956 in Suez due to Egypt's decision to 
nationalise Anglo-French Suez Canal Company 
is often seen as an important watershed in 
Britain's post-war history. For instance, Sanders suggest that although 
British power in the 
world had declined prior to the Suez 
Crisis, it is seen, however, as a prelude to the large- 
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This argument is linked to the end of the British Empire and, more recently, 
to the diminishing role of the Commonwealth. However, several other 
international and domestic developments are also noted in the literature. 
Macleod's account is illustrative. He argues: 
The rise of the two superpowers, the loss of empire, and the birth of a European 
Common Market, to which it [Britain] was forced to apply three times before 
being finally admitted, were in themselves enough to shake that country's self- 
confidence in its international status. But Britain has also had to contend with 
domestic decline, in particular in the economy, which saw this country gradually 
fall behind its two major West European rivals, France and Germany. This loss of 
capacity and influence, in terms of political, economic, technological, and military 
power, which could only be fleetingly masked by the Falklands adventure, has 
been accompanied by a crisis of national identity and status as Britain has striven 
to define its place in Europe and adjust to qualitative change in its 'special 
relationship' with the United States. (Macleod 1997: 161) 
Central for the decline theme is the representation of Britain as a state which 
is searching for a new international identity. As Dean Acheson put it in 
1962, 'Britain had lost an empire but had not yet found a role' (cited in 
Macleod 1997: 16 1). 
Alternative analyses render some of the decline arguments as an 
overstatement. For instance, Hill suggests that one of the 'apparent 
geohistorical continuities' or 'givens' in the British foreign policy has been 
its global reach which should not be underestimated 'in the closing years of 
the twentieth century' (Hill 1988: 31-32). Hill argues that British diplomatic 
influence is still considerable and certainly beyond its economic ranking. He 
also pointed out that British culture was capable of exerting a formative 
influence on millions of people in many different kinds of societies, 
independent of the British military capability, and in the latter field Britain 
had maintained a formal nuclear weapon status. Moreover, 
in the 1980s, 
Margaret Thatcher's assertive foreign and security policy rhetoric inspired 
some scholars to conclude that Britain's influence 
in the world is increasing 
rather than diminishing. In these accounts, 
Britain is seen as one of the most 
scale withdrawal from the Empire and 
the shift towards Europe which occurred after the 
1960s. (Sanders 1990: 88-89) 
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influential states in the Cold War world. As the closest US ally, it had a key 
role also in the post Cold War world (Macleod 1997: 165). 
Nevertheless, there exists a broad scholarly consensus which suggests that 
although Thatcher restored a certain sense of national self-assurance 
jugendhat and Wallace 1988: 22), her time in office does not indicate a 
return of the British dominance in the world politics (Sanders 1990: 291- 
294; Macleod 1997: 165). Moreover, Macleod notes that, instead of 
increased British influence, the collapse of communism aggravated Britain's 
identity crisis by removing the foundations of one of the vital pillars of its 
special place in the world; namely, its contribution to the Western defence 
network. Britain's influential identity 'could no longer depend on being 
perceived as one of the principal European ideological and military 
bulwarks against any possible show of the Soviet strength' (Macleod 1997: 
162). 
The decline thesis and the 'three circles' doctrine are both central for the 
scholarly understanding(s) of the Europeanisation of foreign and security 
policy in Britain. For instance, Britain is widely seen to have valued the 
special relationship with the United States over the participation in the 
western European integration (Sanders 1990; George 1998; White 2001). In 
the 1950s, Britain endorsed the transatlantic defence cooperation over the 
European cooperation and highlighted NATO's role in European defence. 
British policy makers' explicit aim was to safeguard the United States 
commitment in the post-war European security and defence. On the other 
hand, Britain's decision to opt out from the initial stages of the economic 
integration signals an autonomous or detached relationship with Europe 
(Sanders 1990; George 1998; White 2001). 
The reconsideration of this decision in the 1960s can be 
interpreted to 
reflect British pragmatism in terms of rational calculations of the economic 
costs of the detachment. Accordingly, and as scholars 
have noted the 
membership application did not represent any special commitment 
to the 
western European integration. (Larsen 
1997: 53; Duff 1998; George 1998- 
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40; White 2001: 121). Rather, Britain aimed to consolidate its special 
relationship with the United States (Sanders 1990) and safeguard its trade 
interests in Europe and, in so doing, to retain some of its international 
ranking given the end of the Empire. After the eventual entry in the EEC in 
1973, Britain quickly gained its reputation as a reluctant partner. For 
observers, the British claims to renegotiate its entry and to retain full 
autonomy in several policy areas signalled a continuing salience of the three 
circles doctrine. In the 1970s, Jenkins defined Britain's relationship with 
Europe in terms of 'semi-detachment' from the Community (White 2001: 
121). By the late 1980s, George suggested that Britain had become 'an 
awkward partner' (George 1998). 
However, and as White notes, in the 1990s, the Major and Blair 
governments increasingly argued that they were committed to 'locate 
Britain in the heart of Europe' (White 2001: 121). Nevertheless, the 
empirical material of this study, as well as the scholarly literature, suggest 
that the Britain was still seen as a reluctant partner. The series of successive 
negative descriptions of Britain's relationship with Europe such as detached, 
semi-detached and awkward still underpinned the policy statements of these 
govenu, nents. Importantly for this study, Forster suggests that the political 
'symbolism' related to British autonomy and the reluctance to integrate has 
obscured important concessions on substance, including the incremental 
introduction of majority voting and developing linkage between the 
community and intergovernmental pillars. In scholarly literature this so- 
called 'ratchet effect' indicates that Britain has been drawn into integration 
in foreign and security policy without ever 'admitting to a domestic 
audience how far integration in this policy sector has proceeded' (Forster 
2000: 47). Instead of asking why the Europeanisation has been masked in 
Britain, the aim of the remainder of this section is to explicate how it was 
possible for the policy-makers to marginalise the Europeanisation of 
foreign 
and security policy in the official foreign and security policy 
discourse. 
4.1.2 Re-articulating the British Great Power Discourse: The End of the 
Cold War and the CFSP 
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The purpose of this section is to examine the official foreign and security 
policy discourse(s) in Britain until 1998 when the more engaged 
articulations of the EU foreign and security policy emerged. I analyse the 
official policy papers, election manifestation and Prime Minister's speeches 
formulated prior to the British-French declaration on European Defence in 
1998. A discourse analytic approach, utilising the analytical tools of 
predication, presupposition and subject positioning, is employed to map out 
the key features of the official discourse, in which the Europeanisation in 
terms of the CFSP and the ESDP was first raised. 
Predication 
The main sub ects and objects and their predication in the texts is presented j 
in Table 4.1. The numbers in the brackets in the table refer to the source 
document. The documents are listed in Appendix 2. The table is suggestive 
of a dominant foreign and security policy discourse. That is, the 
representations arrived at by assigning predicates, adverbs and adjectives to 
the subjects and objects (i. e. predication) in the texts corresponds with each 
other and none seem to be radically out of place. For instance, the 
predication of Britain as a 'major participant in world affairs, ' a 'leading 
member' of several international organisations' and a 'responsible nuclear 
power' which 'Promotes democracy, liberal capitalism and the rule of law' 
(Table 4.1) make sense within the particular discursive context of the 
official British foreign and security policy. They establish a particular kind 
of British subject characterised with greatness, influence and ability to 
provide leadership. I label this dominant discourse as a great power 
discourse. 
The table also suggests that the official discourse is euro-centric and, 
although, the dramatic changes related to the end of the Cold War are noted 
in the texts, the construction of the subject reflects bi-polar world order in 
terms of the East-West division. That is, the main subjects established in the 
texts are western subjects such as NATO (also cited as the Alliance), the 
European Union, the WEU, the United States and the western European 
states, or eastern subjects including the Soviet Union, its predecessor 
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Russian Federation and the former eastern European states. In addition, 
some other important subjects such as Israel in relation to the Palestine 
question, Iraq and other Gulf states in relation to the Gulf crisis in 1990 as 
well as several international organisations such as the UN, the CSCE, G7, 
the WTO and the Commonwealth are articulated in this discourse. 
In the great power discourse, the adjectives, attributes and predicates 
assigned to subjects hang together in a certain way. The representations 
generated indicate distinct political spaces. I suggest that three geopolitical 
dimensions were central for British state identity. These were the West, the 
East and the Globe. Moreover, Britain was clearly located within the West. 
The representations of western subjects highlighted similarity, particularly 
in terms of political tradition reflecting a set of values. Whereas Britain 
'promotes democracy, liberal capitalism and the rule of law, ' NATO is 
'committed to peace, democracy and the rule of law', and the European 
Union, including the majority of the western European states, can build 
'democratic systems and enhance liberal democracy and the rule of law' 
(Table 4.1). However, and importantly for this study, within the realm of 
security and defence, the predication of the western subjects, in particular, 
NATO and the European Union, differs. 
Whereas NATO is seen as the 'only credible' defence organisation in 
Europe, the European Union is construed mainly as 'an economic 
organisation' with 'a developing foreign and security policy' dimension 
(Table 4.1). Whereas the credibility of NATO is based on its military 
supremacy guaranteed by the United States and its member states' full 
4commitment to the common defence' (Table 4.1), the European Union 
lacks capabilities and political will in this field. For instance, it 'includes 
four neutral member states' with distinct security and 
defence policies 
(Table 4.1). Accordingly, whereas -more cooperation 
is seen as feasible 
within the field of the CFSP, development of a common 
defence policy is 
construed as 'not credible' and 'not 
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The official discourse suggests that the CFSP clearly 'distinguishes between 
security and defence'. Further, it is seen to have a 'long history' (Table 4.1). 
As such, it does not mark a break with the past. Rather, it relates to a longer- 
term development of the 'intergovernmental' European Political 
Cooperation (Table 4.1). Importantly, due to the continuing salience of 
NATO and the increasing importance of the European Union, Britain 
emerges as a particularly pivotal western subject. The British initiative of 
the 'Atlantic assembly' re-articulated Britain as a 'bridge' between the 
western European and the North-American states as well as between the 
European Union and NATO. 
The representations of the eastern subjects also construe a particular kind of 
political space. In the East, Russia has a dominant role. Russia largely 
inherits the Soviet Union's 'military might' and it constitutes 'a great 
power' (Table 4.1). However, in the post-Cold War 'Russia is not a menace' 
and it does not poses a clear and present 'military threat' to the West (Table 
4.1) Nevertheless, it retains its potential to do so. Several predicates, 
adjectives and attributes assigned to the eastern subjects highlight the 
ongoing process of 'political, economic and social transformation' (Table 
4.1). Although this process is attached some positive features, the 
predication of some eastern subjects, such as the (former) Yugoslavia, 
generated representations of unpredictability and instability of the ongoing 
transition (Table 4.1). The general representation of the East as an 'unstable' 
region is arrived at through the predication of the eastern subjects in terms 
of the 'political instability, ' 'nationality disputes' and 'environmental 
degradation' (Table 4.1). Yet some positive developments are 
acknowledged in relation to some eastern subjects. Nevertheless, the East is 
77 largely constructed in terms of difference to the West. 
77 Neumann suggests that in the contemporary discourses of the European identity 
formations the East is used as a sign of otherness on the all-European, regional, and 
national levels (Neumann 1998) 
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The respect with which Britain is regarded in the world has rarely been higher. We 
play a central part in world affairs as a member of the European Community, 
NATO, the Commonwealth and the Group of 7 leading industrial countries, and as 
a Pen-nanent Member of the UN Security Council. No other country holds all these 
positions. (Conservative Party General Election Manifestation 1992) 
Even if the scholarly literature of Britain's post-war foreign and security 
policy is preoccupied with the question of decline, in the official foreign and 
security policy discourse Britain's pre-eminence in the world politics is 
clearly re-articulated. However, the overwhelming emphasis on British great 
power status can be interpreted as a response to the representations 
suggesting decline. For instance, Thatcher argues that 'we re-establish 
respect for Britain abroad' and she suggests in a defensive manner how 
Britain's economic achievement's 'are not measured just in statistic, but in 
changing attitudes and in our much greater influence in the greater world' 
(cited in Macleod 1997: 178). Even if Thatcher's successor, Prime Minister 
Major, was more willing to accept Britain as a European power, he also 
insisted that Britain was a power 'with continuing responsibilities in many 
parts of the world. ' (Major 199 1, cited in Macleod 1997: 178). 
Central for British greatness is its global rather than local interests and 
responsibilities. The great power discourse suggests that the well-being, 
prosperity and the greatness of Britain is distinctively tied to its global reach 
as an island state depending on sea and air transportation. As the SDE in 
1996 argues: 
... our well-being 
depends to a greater degree than the most other developed 
economies on international trade and investment. We are as a consequent reliant 
on the secure transport of goods by sea and on the supply of raw materials from 
overseas. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996) 
This presupposition underpins one of the core aspects of Britain's greatness, 
that is, its global military reach. The first paragraph of the first chapter of 
the SDE in 1994 argued: 
The United Kingdom remains one of the world's most formidable military powers. 
Only the United States, Russia and France can deploy as broad a range of 
capabilities as the armed forces of the United Kingdom who, in terms of their 
experience, training, leadership and spirit, are the match of any in the world. 
(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 7) 
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The other key subjects constructed in the discourse do not construct a 
definable geopolitical region. Rather, they relate to Britain's global 
presence. The predication of some subjects like Iraq generated 
representations of enmity. Iraq is straight-forwardly construed as an 
'enemy' and 'threat' to the regional and international peace and the British 
interests in a strategically important region. Moreover, its leader is seen as a 
'brutal dictator' who can acquire 'weapons of mass destruction' (Table 4.1). 
On the one hand, the representations of Africa and the African states 
highlight the 'problems' and 'instability' of the continent related to 
'underdevelopment' (Table 4.1). Then again, the predication of several 
international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the G8 group 
of leading industrial economies and Russia, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), generated representations which emphasise the 
importance of these sub ects in enhancing British interests in the world. j 
Presupposition 
The above representations make sense within certain background 
knowledge. As the theoretical and methodological framework of this study 
suggest, the knowledge presupposed in the process of the articulation and 
re-articulation of a discourse simultaneously position the subjects and 
objects created in the discourse. The positioning in turn usually takes place 
along the binaries established by certain core oppositions. Therefore, the 
identification and discussion of these oppositions shed light into the identity 
construction related to a particular discourse. I suggest that whilst the 
British great power discourse included one core opposition of greatlminor, 
several other oppositions such as global/local, liberatorloppressor, 
stable/unstable and developedl underdeveloped can 
be subsumed under the 
core oppositions. Taken together, these oppositions enabled the construction 
of a particular kind of British state identity. 
GreatIminor. In the great power discourse, Britain is straightforwardly 
construed as a great power. The ruling 
Conservative Party's general election 
manifestation in 1992 is illustrative. 
It argued: 
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security policy discourse Britain's pre-eminence in the world politics is 
clearly re-articulated. However, the overwhelming emphasis on British great 
power status can be interpreted as a response to the representations 
suggesting decline. For instance, Thatcher argues that 'we re-establish 
respect for Britain abroad' and she suggests in a defensive manner how 
Britain's economic achievement's 'are not measured just in statistic, but in 
changing attitudes and in our much greater influence in the greater world' 
(cited in Macleod 1997: 178). Even if Thatcher's successor, Prime Minister 
Major, was more willing to accept Britain as a European power, he also 
insisted that Britain was a power 'with continuing responsibilities in many 
parts of the world. ' (Major 1991, cited in Macleod 1997: 178). 
Central for British greatness is its global rather than local interests and 
responsibilities. The great power discourse suggests that the well-being, 
prosperity and the greatness of Britain is distinctively tied to its global reach 
as an island state depending on sea and air transportation. As the SDE in 
1996 argues: 
... our well-being 
depends to a greater degree than the most other developed 
economies on international trade and investment. We are as a consequent reliant 
on the secure transport of goods by sea and on the supply of raw materials from 
overseas. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996) 
This presupposition underpins one of the core aspects of Britain's greatness, 
that is, its global military reach. The first paragraph of the first chapter of 
the SDE in 1994 argued: 
The United Kingdom remains one of the world's most formidable military powers. 
Only the United States, Russia and France can deploy as broad a range of 
capabilities as the armed forces of the United Kingdom who, in terms of their 
experience, training, leadership and spirit, are the match of any in the world. 
(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 7) 
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The focus on the military power is also indicative of a realist world-view in 
which states' seek to maximise their power in world politics and to 
safeguard their interests. On the other hand, in the great power discourse, 
Britain's global responsibilities reflect Britain's historical role in several 
regions around the globe. In this presupposition, Britain is positioned along 
the binary opposition of liberatorloppressor. Interestingly, in the mid 1990s, 
this opposition informed the representation of the on going transition in the 
eastern Europe. As Prime Minister Major argued in 1994: 
... the challenge now is to catch the tide of events that have flown in recent years so 
very strongly in our favour, to draw the nations of eastern Europe - historic, vivid 
nation states: Poland, Hungary, the Czech lands, and others - back into the 
European camera [sic], to make democratic Russia an ally and not a threat, to help 
the democracies in the third world escape the excessive debt that cripples their 
development - and time after time it has been British initiatives that have led the 
way in achieving this, to use our age-old links with Africa to help prepare that 
troubled continent for a better future. 
These are historic roles; historic roles for which Britain and the 
Conservative Party are marked out by history and by experience. We will use that 
experience. (Major 1994) 
Central for the great power discourse, then, is Britain's ability 'to lead the 
way' in the post-Cold War Europe. This representation, in turn, assumes a 
particular British role in world; that is, a liberator. Although this 'historical 
role' draws on specific and rather positive representations of Britain's 
colonial rule and its role in the Second World War, in the 1990s Britain's 
historical role was re-articulated in terms of the end of the Cold War. 
The 1992 SDE argues that the 'lowering of the Red Flag over the Kremlin 
on Christmas Day last year brought to an end the menace of the discredited 
ideology with its struggle for the global dominance by every means 
available... ' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992: 5). It notes that 
when the communist rule collapsed 'nations in Central and Eastern Europe 
have elected democratic governments... ' and Britain in turn is 'helping the 
former communist countries to achieve the unprecedented transition... ' 
(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992: 7). Moreover, Britain's major 
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role as a liberator is also re-articulated in relation to the Gulf crisis in 1990. 
The 1991 SDE argues: 
The British forces from all three Services made the largest European contribution 
to deterring further aggression and defending Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; to 
enforcing the embargo against Iraq; and eventually to the military operations that 
liberated Kuwait. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991: 7) 
Here British greatness is arrived at by combining representations of its 
material global reach with its normative responsibilities in the world. 
Thatcher's speech given in 1990 is illustrative: 
My Lord Mayor, I can't remember a time when the demands upon us-upon 
Britain and the Western countries-have been greater: calls for help to sustain 
democracy and reform in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe; 
the call to help defend countries outside Europe threatened by aggression. Thank 
goodness we kept our defences strong so that we could respond to the crisis in the 
Gulf with our Tornados and our Royal Navy ships and the Desert Rats! 
In the great power discourse, Britain emerges as a particular kind of great 
power -a power with a global reach and a normative commitment to 
liberate peoples from oppression. 
Stablelunstable. On the other hand, the representation of specific and rather 
great British responsibilities presupposed and generated knowledge that was 
familiar, for instance, in the field of security and development studies in the 
post Cold War world. The binary oppositions of stable/unstable and 
developed/underdeveloped are of key importance here. The SDE in 1995 
argued: 
The removal of the constraints imposed by the structure of ideological 
confirontation has resulted in civil war, cross-border conflict and the collapse of 
economic links in Europe and elsewhere. The previous low risk of global war has 
as a result been replaced by greater risk of smaller-scale conflict and suffering, 
spawned by the instability present in many parts of the world, exacerbated in many 
cases by resource and economic pressures. The consequences of the rise of 
nationalism, extremism and ethnocentrism are nowhere more apparent than in 
some of the newly independent states of eastern Europe and in the former 
Yugoslavia, where we have seen how quickly regional instability can erupt into 
violence and how quickly conflict in one state can spill over into a neighbour. 
(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995: 23) 
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The presupposition relating to the core opposition of stablelunstable 
constructed particular kind of subjects. They were stable and developed or 
unstable and underdeveloped. For instance, in the great power discourse the 
former communist states, African states as well as Middle Eastern states are 
constituted a particular kind of subjects. That is, developing and unstable 
states. 
A short extract taken from the SDE in 1996 is illustrative of how the core 
opposition of stable/unstable established a certain knowledge about the 
world in which a particular British identity emerged. The White Paper said: 
The United Kingdom has interests and responsibilities across the globe. We have a 
commitment to the security of our 14 Dependent Territories. Our trading history 
has resulted in a large expatriate population, with significant numbers of British 
nationals living in areas of potential instability such as Africa and the Middle East, 
to whom we have obligations (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 3) 
Straightforwardly, this world is exhibited with certain kind of subjects. That 
is, global and stable powers and more regional developing and unstable 
subjects. In this world it is presupposed that Britain is an influential global 
and stable power with significant international responsibilities. 
Subject Positioning 
The construction of subjects along the oppositional dimensions discussed 
above simultaneously positioned these subjects in a hierarchical order. This 
hierarchical positioning is evident in the degree of agency assigned to the 
subjects in the discourse. I suggest that the arrangement positioning the 
subjects in relation to others was the anarchical international society. In the 
light of the increasing interdependence, however, the emphasis on common 
interests and shared norms became more visible towards the end of the 
1990s. I suggest that the great power discourse incorporated four major 
subject positions: (i) the powerful, global and transatlantic Britain; (ii) the 
credible and transatlantic NATO; (iii) the increasingly powerful 
but 
unreliable European Union; and (iv) the dependent and developing countries 
in the East, the Middle East and Africa. The relationships among the 
positioned subjects (re-) produced a particular 
kind of British state identity. 
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As the central subject of the discourse, Britain was attributed a significant 
degree of agency. Specifically, Britain's global reach and ability to 
safeguard its interests were emphasised. As the extracts in the previous 
sections suggest, Britain had the capacity to defend itself and its interests 
militarily as well as to influence through international organisations. 
Moreover, the historical constructions of Britain as a 'former maritime 
empire', one of the oldest 'democracies', the 'founder of industrial 
development and technological innovation' and the 'victorious power of the 
two world wars' (Table 4.1), underlined Britain's power and responsibility 
as an international subject. Britain could and should 'shape the world' 
(Table 4.1). 
These aspects of British leadership and power were particularly pertinent in 
Britain's position in relation to the former communist states in Europe and 
to the developing states in the third world, for instance. Britain had 
responsibilities based on its history, society and economics to 'lead' and 
'show the way' within the Commonwealth and in Africa, as well as in Asia 
and former Eastern Europe. Although the representation(s) of Russia also 
indicated significant agency in terms of capabilities and resources, the 
subject position available for Russia in the hierarchical arrangement of the 
great power discourse was the one of a collapsed great power. As such, 
Russia was re-articulated as an unstable and developing subject, which 
needed guidance and assistance. 
The other western subjects include mainly NATO, the United States and the 
western European states. Whereas the United States was associated with 
NATO, the other western European states were largely addressed 
increasingly linked to the European Community and, after 1993, to the 
European Union. The most significant difference between NATO and the 
European Union in the field of foreign and security policy reflected the 
degree of agency assigned to them. NATO's supremacy was arrived at by 
allotting the United States a greater degree of agency than Britain or other 
western European states. Although, the United States was rarely explicitly 
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mentioned in the documents, it clearly underpinned the agency of NATO. 
As the SDE in 1994 argues: 
NATO is the only security organisation with the military to back up its security 
guarantees. It secures the vital link between Europe and North America: vital in 
political terms because of our shared fundamental values and common interests, 
and in military terms because no other European country or group of counties is 
likely to be able to field the intelligence capabilities, sophisticated firepower or 
strategic lift supplied by the United States. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1994: 9) 
Here the United States is empowering the West. The US military power 
invested in NATO which constituted the comer stone of the western 
European defence and military arrangements against the traditional large- 
scale military attack as well as the new post-Cold War security issues and 
threats. Moreover, NATO's increasing political role in Europe was directly 
noted in the texts. NATO was 'enlarging' and due to its cooperation and 
partnership programmes, it was becoming a more political and inclusive 
organisation (Table 4.1). Moreover, notwithstanding Britain's own nuclear 
capabilities, the United States largely reinforced the United Kingdom's 
nuclear deterrence. 
Significantly, in the great power discourse, Britain's special relationship 
with the United States signified an influential role within NATO. That is, 
the close political and cultural ties with the United States, 'who share our 
belief in freedom, democracy, the rule of law and the non-violent 
mechanisms for political change' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1994: 9) politically empowered Britain within NATO and, consequently, in 
Europe. On the other hand, Britain's relationship with western Europe and 
the European Union was also significant for British influence in the world 
economy. 
Accordingly, and although the role of the European Union in the field of 
foreign and security policy was noted already in the early 1990s, it did not 
translate into a powerful subject-position in this policy field. As the 
common sense of the 'capabilities-expectations gap' thinking 
indicates, the 
CFSP was seen to lack institutional structures and political will enabling a 
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strong and decisive policy. On the other hand, the development of common 
defence was constructed as an unfeasible project. Nevertheless, Britain 
'endorsed a development of European security and defence identity, which 
will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance... ' (Statement on the 
Defence Estimates 1994: 15). That is, a more prominent European and 
British role within NATO. 
Important representation constitutive of the British great power identity 
highlighted Britain's ability to shape European developments. As Prime 
Minister Major put it, he was 'to carve out a right position for Britain in the 
right sort of Europe' (Major 1994). On the other hand, none of the major 
representations generated in the discourse highlighted the impact of the 
European Union upon Britain. In the light of the Europeanisation of the 
foreign and security policy, the 'right sort of Europe' had the more effective 
CFSP, but not the ESDP. In so doing, the relationships among the subject 
positions that were established in the great power discourse highlighted 
NATO's and the United States' continuing significance in Europe and for 
the British foreign and security policy. Moreover, whereas the CFSP was 
constructed potentially beneficial and developing the EU policy, the ESDP 
was merely seen as incredible and unfeasible in the near future. 
4.1.3. Hegemony of the Great Power Discourse and the European Union 
V- 
I breign and Security Policy 
Notwithstanding the struggles in the discursive field, and the continuous 
need of re-production of identities, I suggest that until 1998 the re- 
articulation of the British foreign and security policy discourse continued in 
a familiar way. That is, the policy-makers continued to identify their state 
with the subject position established in the great power discourse. Given this 
particular kind of great power identity, I argue that there was very little 
discursive space for re-articulations that highlighted the significance of the 
EU developments in the field of the foreign and security discourse. 
Consequently, the British foreign and security policy documentation 
largely ignored and downplayed the development of the CFSP with the 
prospect of the ESDP until 1998. On the other hand, the representations that 
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were generated were highlighting the developing and problematic nature of 
the CFSP and the ESDP. 
The predication, presupposition and subject positioning of the great power 
discourse indicated that the development of a European Union foreign and 
security policy was, however, not beyond reason. The CFSP and the ESDP 
could be intelligibly articulated. Indeed, these twin policies were articulated 
in a seemingly radical way in the official discourse in 1994. As the SDE 
argued: 
There is a long tradition of co-operation with our European partners on foreign and 
security policy issues. The growing interdependence of our economies and in 
increasing coincidence of foreign policy concerns and goals will mean that our 
foreign and security policies will to greater degree be coordinated and 
implemented at European level. We have declared through our signature of the 
Maastricht Treaty our intention to contribute to work towards a common European 
defence policy which may, in time, lead the European Union to a common 
defence. (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 15). 
However, it is striking how little this re-articulation of the CFSP, with a 
prospect of the ESDP, was discussed and elaborated. The lack of debate 
over EU foreign and security policy is evident in the empirical material that 
I looked at until 1998. However, it was also reflected in the foreign policy 
discourse more generally. As Hill notes, in the Prime Minister's address to 
the British government conference on British foreign policy at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs in 1995, John Major did not mention the 
CFSP even once (Hill 1997: 89, footnote 28). 1 suggest that the lack of 
discussion and elaboration of the CFSP and the ESDP was indicative of 
hegemony of the great power discourse. In short, in the great power 
discourse this articulation of the CFSP and the ESDP appeared to be 
political rhetoric rather than political reality. 
First, the notion of the 'long tradition of the European foreign policy 
cooperation' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 15) highlighted the 
incremental nature of the recent developments. That is, the CFSP and the 
ESDP did not represent a break with the past. Rather they highlighted 
continuity. Given the failure of European efforts to establish a more 
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independent foreign and security policy role, and the continuing salience of 
NATO and the Unites States in European security, a particular construction 
of the CFSP and the ESDP emerged. Within the great power discourse, the 
European Union foreign and security policy was rendered deeply suspect. 
Whereas the CFSP was constructed as indecisive and weak, the ESDP was 
seen as a not viable security arrangement. The SDE in 1994 directly 
mentioned the weaknesses of the CFSP. It argued: 'the United Kingdom 
wishes to ensure an effective CFSP, and to preserve its intergovernmental 
status. The CFSP should be more active, less declaratory than previous 
foreign policy co-operation... ' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994: 
15). 
Second, the development of a common European Union defence capability 
and the merging of the WEU in to European Union were seen as deeply 
problematic and unfeasible. Here, the European Union's lack of capabilities 
and political will to act in the field of defence was explicitly underlined with 
reference to the three 'neutral' states of Austria, Finland and Sweden that 
joined the European Union in 1995. As the SDE in 1996 suggests: 
... common 
decisions and actions in the defence field - most sensitive area of 
policy - must proceed by consent ... Here we are particularly conscious of the way 
in which the Inter-Governmentalism and the principle of consensus have served 
the Atlantic Alliance and WEU well over nearly 50 years... The European Union 
contains at present four neutral countries which do not share obligations to mutual 
defence. Against that background, we do not believe it realistic for the European 
Council to take decisions in the area of defence - nor is it equipped to do so. 
(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 13) 
Here, the difference between the European Union and NATO is re- 
articulated. Within the great power discourse NATO is constructed as a 
distinct and credible defence organisation. On the other hand, the diversity 
among the European Union member states indicates a break 
down of 
consensus and commitment in the sensitive area of 
defence. Accordingly, 
the SDE in 1996, published prior the IGC in Amsterdam in 1997, in which 
the issues related to the CFSP and ESDP were high on the agenda, argues: 
We believe that the European Union can achieve the extension of security and 
prosperity we enjoy by helping to embed 
liberal democracy, freedom and 
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prosperity in the countries of central and eastern Europe, without any needfor it to 
emergeftom the IGC as an organisation with a defence component. (Statement on 
the Defence Estimates 1996: 13, my emphasis) 
The great power discourse, then, constructed the ESDP as an unfeasible 
development in the field of the European foreign and security policy/ies. 
This discursive construction of the CFSP and ESDP was still re-articulated 
by the ruling Conservative Party in 1997. Although the 1997 Conservative 
Party manifestation argued that 'we will seek more co-operation between 
national governments on areas of common interest - defence, foreign policy 
and the fight against international crime and drugs' (Concervative Party 
General Election Manifestation 1997), the kind of cooperation underlined 
was very limited. The manifestation continued: 
We will retain Britain's veto and oppose further extension of qualified majority 
voting in order to ensure we can prevent policies that would be harmful to the 
national interest. (Concervative Party General Election Manifestation 1997) 
In terms of the European Union's defence capabilities, the ruling party 
suggested that, 
NATO will remain the cornerstone of our security. We will resist attempts to bring 
the Western European Union under the control of the European Union, and ensure 
that defence policy remains a matter for sovereign nations. (Concervative Party 
General Election Manifestation 1997) 
However, the Conservative Party were voted out of the office after 18 years 
in power, and the New Labour entered office with a seemingly more 
engaging policy towards the European Union's foreign and security policy. 
Whether this represented a break with the past in the level of discourse, or a 
Europeanisation of British state identity, is the question underpinning the 
remainder of the case study. 
4.2 Articulation of the CFSP and the ESDP and the Re-Articulation of the 
Great Power Discourse 
Whereas the first section laid out the discursive context in which the 
CFSP 
and ESDP were first raised 
in 1990s, this section analyses how these EU 
policies were constructed 
in Britain in the late 1990s. For many, the entry of 
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the Labour government in office in 1997, a new Strategic Defence Review 
and the British-French declaration on European defence at St. Malo in 1998, 
marked a turning point in the British foreign, security and defence policy 
debate. A key feature of this turn was Britain's seemingly new and more 
engaged approach to the European integration. Whether this reflected, or 
postulated, a change in the dominant foreign and security policy discourse is 
the key question of this section. I suggest that although these policies had a 
central role in the British foreign and security policy debates after 1997, the 
articulation of these policies represented a twist, rather than a turn, in the 
official discourse. That is, the re-articulation of the great power discourse 
was characterised with significant continuity. 
I first situate the articulation of the EU foreign and security policy by 
describing the assumed turn in the official British foreign and security 
policy discourse in the light of the emerging ESDP. I then utilise the 
discourse analytic tools of predication, presupposition and subject 
positioning to analyse the re-articulation of Britain's place in the world. 
Finally, through the examination of the parliamentary debates over the 1998 
re-articulations, I analyse whether the government's re-articulation of the 
great power discourse interpellated the parliamentarians. 
4.2.1 Situating the Re-Articulation of the EU Foreign and Security Policy: 
Strategic Defence Review and St. Malo Declaration in 1998 
Although the post Cold War era is mostly seen as a period of large scale 
transformations in Europe and beyond, scholars have noted that these 
changes did not lead to a dramatic re-evaluation of the British foreign and 
security policy in terms of Britain's self-image. Rather, they argue that 
despite the transition in world politics 'the debate on Britain's place in the 
world continued in familiar lines' (Forster 2000: 47). 
In terms of the European foreign and security policy integration, Forster 
notes an interesting paradox: while the British 
involvement in the 
development of the ECP, the CFSP and the ESDP has been notable, the 
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official foreign policy documents on these policies have been obstructing. 
As Foster argues: 
... the imagery of intergovernmentalism, first through the development of 
European Political Cooperation (EPQ outside of the Community structure and 
then pillarisation of the CFSP, has been used to deliberately obscure important 
concessions on substance, including the incremental introduction of majority 
voting, the merger of the ECP and the Council Secretariat and developing linkage 
between the communautaire and intergovernmental pillars, both functionally and 
through the budget. (Forster 2000: 47, emphasis in original) 
Therefore, the EU foreign and security policy and the British involvement in 
it have been much deeper than the foreign policy leadership has ever 
admitted to the domestic audience in Britain (Forster 2000). 
I suggested that this aspect of the British foreign and security policy debate 
changed in 1998. That is, in 1998 the recent developments in this field were 
explicitly acknowledged by the foreign policy leadership. Moreover, 
Britain's full engagement and commitment with the CFSP and the ESDP 
were noted. A brief descriptive journey into the New Labour re-articulation 
of foreign and security policy discourse is illustrative. 
Part of the novelty of New Labour was the party's allegedly more positive 
and engaged stance towards European integration (Driver and Martell 1998: 
145-146). Prime Minister Tony Blair clarified the British position towards 
Europe in his speech at the French National Assembly in 1998. He argued: 
Yet it is these same fundamental changes which call for new ways of working and 
organising our society that impel us to cooperate ever more closely between 
nations. Just over half a century ago, Europe was at war. Then for 40 years or 
more, the Iron Curtain descended. Now we are members of the European Union, 
and clamouring to enter are the former East European communist 
dictatorships. It 
is on any basis a remarkable achievement. 
Yet here too the challenge of change confronts us. Let me first clear away 
any remaining doubts about the new British Government's position. 
Britain's 
future lies in being full partners in Europe. At Amsterdam, we played a 
constructive part in bringing about a new European 
Treaty. Now, as EU President, 
we are launching the enlargement negotiations and 
doing our best to ensure the 
Euro starts successfully. (Blair 1998) 
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Blair also highlighted his personal commitment to integration. He 
continued: 
I believe in a Europe of enlightened self-interest. Without chauvinism. It is the 
nation-state's rational response to the modem world. If globalisation of the world 
economy is a reality; if peace and security can only be guaranteed collectively; if 
the world is moving to larger blocs of trade and cooperation and look at ASEAN 
or Latin America: if all this is so, then the EU is a practical necessity. I happen to 
share the European idealism. I am by instinct internationalist. But even if I 
werenýt, I should be internationalist through realism. The forces of necessity, even 
of survival are driving us to cooperation. In the United Nations, in Bosnia, no less 
than in international trade. 
The traditional British argument suggesting that the integration was about 
economy and that the political aspects of it, including the foreign and 
security policy issues, should be kept at a minimum level, was revised. 
Conversely, Blair embraced a 'political vision' of the EU (Blair 1998). 
Nevertheless, Blair indicated that the Europeans felt strongly about their 
states and integration must consider public opinion(s). He implied that the 
political vision for Europe was not an easy task to achieve. However, in 
addition to the obvious benefits of the economic integration, Blair suggested 
that there was another increasingly important field in which the UK could 
take part. Blair argued that in the field of defence Britain and France were 
particularly qualified states to cooperate (Blair 1998). He argued: 
Now is the time for a new initiative on the military side. We are in the final stages 
of conducting a major Defence Review. You are in the middle of the complex 
process of professionalising and restructuring your armed forces. When our review 
is complete, I am asking the Defence Secretary and Chiefs of Staff to report to me 
urgently on the scope for future Anglo-French co-operation. How we can create a 
capacity to deploy forces rapidly on a joint basis in future crises, where 
both 
countries agee. (Blair 1998) 
These initial suggestions materialized later during the year in the British- 
French Joint Declaration issued in St. Malo. 
Strategic Defence Review and St. Malo Declaration 
Launched on 28 May 1997, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) set out to 
determine the future direction of the British defence policy. The main 
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objective of the review was to respond to the challenges of the post-Cold 
War world and it addressed both the traditional and new security threats and 
issues. The new threats were largely constituted by political instability and 
increasing transnationalism. As the review argued: 
Instability inside Europe as in Bosnia, and now Kosovo, threatens our security. 
Instability elsewhere - for example in Africa - may not always appear to threaten 
us directly. But it can do indirectly, and we cannot stand aside when it leads to 
massive human suffering. 
There are also new risks which threaten our security by attacking our 
way of life. Drugs and organised crime are today powerful enough to threaten the 
entire fabric of some societies. They certainly pose a serious threat to the well- 
being of our own society. We have seen new and horrifying forms of terrorism and 
how serious environmental degradation can cause not only immediate suffering 
but also dangerous instabilities. And the benefits of the information technology 
revolution that has swept the world are accompanied by potential new 
vulnerabilities. ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998) 
Although, the CFSP and the ESDP had a rather minor over-all role in the 
review, it laid out the wider context in which the CFSP and the ESDP were 
re-articulated. The review argued that 'the European Union has a vital role 
in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability, 
including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy ('Strategic 
Defence Review' 1998). Accordingly, and later during the same year in St. 
Malo, the European Union was given a key role in European security. 
In St. Malo the British Prime Minister and the French President agreed on 
several issues aimed to strengthen the CFSP and the ESDP. They argued 
first (i) that 'the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full 
role on the international stage. ' It was argued that this involved enforcement 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which re-formulated the decision-making 
process of the CFSP; (ii) to this end, it was argued, that the 
Union must 
develop 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, 
in order to 
respond to international crises. ' However, the 
declaration re-assured Britain 
and France's commitment to NATO, (iii) the 
declarations noted that in order 
for the European Union to 'take decisions and to approve military action, 
where the Alliance [NATO] as a whole 
is not engaged, the Union must be 
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given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources 
of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without 
unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU 
and the evolution of its relations with the EU. ' In this regard, the European 
Union was argued to need recourse to suitable military means (European 
capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or 
multinational European means outside the NATO framework); (iv) Europe 
needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and 
which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry 
and technology; and (v) the United Kingdom and France expressed that they 
are united in their efforts to enable the European Union to give a concrete 
expression to these objectives ('British-French Joint Declaration on 
European Defence' 1998). 
The St Malo declaration is central for this study because it is widely 
considered to represent a major shift in the United Kingdom's official 
foreign and security policy discourse. Significantly, the CFSP and the ESDP 
were seen as the key features of this change. In so doing, the number of 
studies suggesting Europeanisation of the British foreign and security policy 
increased. As. for instance, Rutten argues that in St. Malo Britain lifted 'its 
decades-long objections to the EU acquiring an 'autonomous' military 
capacity' (see also, Rutten 2001; see also, Howorth 2004). Howorth argued 
that in so doing the British foreign and security policy elite constructed a 
radically new discourse on the European security (Howorth 2004). On the 
other hand, the SDR is significant for this study because it constructed the 
foreign and security policy context in which the re-articulation of this new 
discourse took place. 
4.2.2 Europeanisation of the British Foreign and security Policy Discourse: 
A New Discourse? A New Identity? 
In order to examine what, if anything, changed in the British official 
foreign 
and security policy discourse, and whether the re-articulations 
indicated the 
emergence of a new discourse in 1998, a 
discourse analysis of the official 
foreign and security policy documentation is needed. The empirical material 
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includes the SDR, speeches made by the PM Tony Blair and the St. Malo 
declaration. The analysis suggests that, rather than articulating a radically 
new discourse, the traditional British great power discourse was re- 
articulated. However, some significant changes took place within the 
discourse. These related to Britain's position within the other major western 
subjects, namely the European Union and the United States. 
Predication 
The examination of ad ectives, attributes and predicates assigned to the 
subjects and objects constructed in the 1998 texts indicated that the key 
subjects were constructed somewhat differently than previously. The 
predication is presented in Table 4.2. Again the numbers in the brackets in 
the table refers to the source documents which are listed in Appendix 3. 
Significantly, these changes mainly relate to the predication within the 
West. That is, Britain, the European Union, NATO and the United States. 
However, continuity is also remarkable in the Table. 
In documents examined, predication generates representations that 
emphasise Britain's status and leadership in the world. Britain is referred to 
as 'a leader in the world' and it was articulated to have 'immense 
importance to the international community as a whole' (Table 4.2). Britain 
is also seen as a 'major' and a 'leading' power in several international 
organisations (Table 4.2). Moreover, its global reach is underlined in the 
representations generated in the texts. Britain has 'overseas territories', it is 
4a major global economic power' and the British people are 'international 
people (Ibid. ). In this respect, not much has changed in comparison to the 
earlier foreign and security policy articulations. However, the number of 
references emphasising the British leadership and power in military affairs 
increased. On the other hand, the number of textual qualifiers accentuating 
normative leadership in the world also increased. Moreover, and 
significantly, the adjective (attribute) 'European' was 
directly attached to 
Britain. For instance, the UK was a 'major European state' and 'a leading 
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The predication of NATO in 1998 also reflected significant continuity in 
comparison to the pre-St. Malo discourse. NATO was re-articulated as the 
4corner stone of the UK security and defence' (Table 4.2). Significantly, the 
representations generated in the official documentation suggest that 
NATO's role was increasing and its purpose was widening. NATO was 
4engaged with peacekeeping operations' in Kosovo and Bosnia, and it was 
4enlarging' to the former communist states (Table 4.2). As the SDR argues: 
'Politically, it [NATO] has responded positively and imaginatively to the 
aspirations of the new European democracies' ('Strategic Defence Review' 
1998). In so doing, the predication of the official discourse also highlighted 
NATO's political role in Europe. Through enlargement, embracing the 
former eastern Europe, and cooperation with Russia and the Ukraine, for 
instance, NATO was constructed to strengthen the 'political and security 
relationships in Europe' and to bring about 'stability' (Table 4.2). 
In terms of the pre-1998 articulations, the United States retained a minor 
role in the 1998 SDR and the St. Malo declaration. However, and implicitly, 
its dominant role in NATO was re-articulated. The SDR noted that the 
'partnership between Europe and North America has been a uniquely 
effective' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). On the other hand, Britain's 
relationship with the United States is increasingly addressed directly in the 
Prime Minister's speeches in 1997 and 1998. This change in the official 
discourse can be partly explained by the new British government's 
aspiration to re-articulate its continuing transatlantic commitment. However, 
in these speeches, the British-US relations were mostly addressed in 
conjunction with Britain's relations with Europe and the European Union. 
An extract taken from the Prime Minister Blair's key foreign policy speech 
in 1998 is illustrative. He said: 
... Britain 
does not have to choose between being strong with the US, or strong 
with Europe; it means having the confidence to see that Britain can 
be both. 
Indeed, that Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our 
strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe 
because of our strength with the 
US. (Blair 1998) 
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Accordingly, in 1998 the British-US relationship became a key issue in the 
official discourse. Although the difference among the United States and the 
United Kingdom is noted, the representations of similarity of these two 
states are arrived at through predication of shared culture, politics, 
economics and security. The US had 'strong bonds with the UK in history 
and heritage' as well as through 'language, ' 'political pluralism' and 
'freedom' (Table 4.2). In terms of world economy, the United States and 
Britain had 'defended free and open markets' (Table 4.2). 
In addition, the predication of the United States as the 'mightiest military 
and economic power' in the world generated representations of the United 
States importance for the world order and peace. The United States is 'able 
and willing to provide assistance' for others. For example, the US had 
'helped the UK and Europe preserve democracy and freedom' and it was 
'willing to stand for what it believes' Table 4.2). However, representations 
of unwished for isolationism also emerged. Blair's speech in Washingtion 
DC is evocative. He said: 'we [Britain] are back as a country engaged and 
constructive in Europe. Internationalist not isolationist in perspective. There 
is no future in isolationism in today's world. ' (Blair 1998). Here, Britain's 
increasing engagement in Europe is made meaningful in relation to 
increasing internationalism. Simultaneously, and implicitly United States is 
construed as a potentially isolationist superpower. 
In 1998 the predication of the European Union generated the representation 
of its increasing economic and political significance. Although the key 
representation still highlighted the European Union as and an 
'intergovernmental' and state-based 'international organisation' (Table 4.2), 
the representation of the European Union as a more autonomous and distinct 
political entity emerged, specifically, in the field of the world economy. As 
Blair argued in 1998: 
We have an economic framework for the EU. We now need a political framework 
that is dramatically more relevant, more in touch than the present one. I say this 
quite apart from the pressure of enlargement. The next step for Europe is to match 
its vision of its economic role with one for its political and social role. (Blair 1998) 
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In addition to its increasing weight, ever since the late 1980s, to 'preserve 
and extend economic prosperity, ' the predication of the European Union in 
the above extract is rather different from the pre-1998 discourse. First, the 
European Union's role to 'enhance political stability' in the former Eastern 
Europe, for instance, through cooperation programmes and enlargement 
increased. Importantly, the political dimension of the European Union is 
underlined in the representations of the European Union's increasing 
importance in the field of foreign and security policy. 
Prior to 1998, the representations of the CFSP and the ESDP were few in 
number and they tended to emphasise the initial steps taken in this policy 
fieldAn 1998, the number of representations associated with the CFSP and 
the ESDP increased and official discourse suggested that the European 
Union have 'a common foreign and security policy' and it was 'about to 
have a defence policy' (Table 4.2). Whereas the SDR argued that 'The 
European Union has a vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic 
prosperity and political stability, including through the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998), the St. Malo 
Declaration went further. Whereas the earlier discourse merely noted that, in 
the future the European Union could develop its defence policy, in St. Malo 
Britain calledfor an independent military capability of the European Union. 
The document argues: 
1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union... 
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to 
do so, in order to respond to international crises. ('British-French Joint Declaration 
on European Defence' 1998) 
The predication of the European Union, then, changed quite dramatically. 
Although the developing nature of the CFSP and the ESDP is still clearly 
noted, these policies became a central issue 
in the British foreign and 
security policy discourse. Moreover, establishing the 
ESDP became the 
explicitly articulated objective of the British policy towards 
Europe. 
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Several other subjects were also constructed in the 1998 re-articulation of 
the official foreign and security policy discourse. Significantly for this 
study, the predication of the East continued to highlight 'transition', 
4political instability' and 'environmental degradation', for instance (Table 
4.2). The crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo were explicitly mentioned as threats 
to European and British security (Table 4.2). Some positive developments 
were also articulated. The eastern European states were increasingly 
included 'within NATO umbrella' and hence the possibility of direct 
military threat decreased (Table 4.2). The predication also noted the 
progress that some of the eastern European states had made in their 
transition towards democracy and the market economy. 
Presupposition 
Although the predication of the subjects constructed in the British foreign 
and security policy discourse in 1998 changed to some extent, the key 
binary oppositions remained very similar to the pre-1998 discourse. The 
binary opposition of greatlminor and the related oppositions of globalllocal, 
liberatorloppressor, stablelunstable and developed/ underdeveloped largely 
constituted the operational logic of the texts according to which the 
subjects/objects were given meaning. However, some changes also took 
place. These were related to the core opposition of great/minor and the 
global/local distinction presupposing an increasingly interdependent world. 
The presupposition of greatIminor formed an important operational logic 
through which subjects construed in the discourse were given meaning and 
simultaneously positioned vis-a-vis each other. Several aspects of British 
statehood presupposed a great power status. As Prime Minister Blair argued: 
By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain 
is a 
global player. 
As an island nation, Britain looks outward naturally. The British are 
inveterate travellers. We are the second biggest outward investors, and the second 
biggest recipients of inward investment, behind the US in both cases. 
Our task has to be to shape these strengths and give them definition 
within a foreign Policy that is clear and stated. (Blair 1997) 
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However, whereas previously Britain was presupposed to be a global rather 
than regional power, in 1998 Britain was constructed as a global and 
regional state in an increasingly interdependent world. Blair asserted: 
We live in a global economy, and an interdependent world. Nations must 
maximise their influence wherever they can. To be a country of our size and 
population, and to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear 
power, a leading player in NATO, a leading player in the Commonwealth, gives us 
huge advantages which we must exploit to the full. 
Our membership of the EU gives us huge advantages too, and we must 
exploit those to the full as well. It requires a new maturity in our relations with 
Europe. This new Government will deliver that new maturity, and Britain will be 
the winner from it. (Blair 1998) 
The kind of regional integration embraced in the 1998 re-articulation of the 
official discourse, presupposes a global rather than local world out there. 
Moreover, being a great power is increasingly construed in terms of 
prominent role in the international organisations. 
Although, Britain's material and military capabilities were still highlighted 
especially in defence policy documents, Britain's greatness was increasingly 
constructed through its ability to provide leadership (global and regional). 
As Blair argued: 'for the first time in many years there is a growing 
consensus in Britain in favour of constructive engagement with Europe... 
when British people see a strong, dynamic Britain influencing Europe, they 
support our stance... ' (Blair 1998). Moreover, the Prime Ministerargued 
that the emerging 'alliance of people who believe that British values of 
creativity, tolerance, fairness and democracy can influence the shape and 
destination of Europe... People who are in favour of Europe, but in favour 
of a refonned Europe' (Blair 1998). 
Consequently, Britain's more positive role in European Union politics 
largely makes sense in the light of Britain's ability to lead. Here the binary 
opposition of global/local provides important background knowledge 
for the 
re-articulation of the British leadership in contemporary world and 
Europe. 
Although British autonomy still features in the discourse, it is presupposed 
that the world is increasingly interdependent. In so doing, the aim of the 
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British foreign and security policy is not full autonomy (i. e. sovereignty). 
Rather, the British interests and status in the world could be secured and 
enhanced through interaction, cooperation and integration in an increasingly 
interdependent world. Britain should 'exploit' its political and economic 
relationships around the globe. As the Prime Minister argued: 
We live in a multilateral world where influence comes from working with others. 
We willingly pay the price of pooled sovereignty in defence, for the greater prize 
of collective security through NATO. We should be ready to pay a similar price in 
the European Union for the prizes of political security and stability, liberal and 
open markets, higher incomes and more jobs. Security used to come from self- 
reliance and defensive barriers. Today, it comes increasingly from openness and 
the removal of barriers. (Blair 1998) 
In the interdependent world, greatness is associated with leadership in 
institutions representing emerging global or regional governance. Prime 
Minister Blair's reasoning is illustrative. In 1998 he said: 
On External Policy, the EU must be both effective and seen to be effective 
internationally. Political will, not hot air. We need to project our values on the 
world stage, to be open, outward- looking, supportive of free trade, human rights 
and democracy, and playing a major role in the great international issues of the 
day. We must equip Europe with better machinery. This means the right candidate 
to be the EU's voice on common foreign and security policy issues, and the right 
back-up. It also means enabling Europe to act in a sensible and co-ordinated way 
both politically and economically... (Blair 1998) 
The presupposition of interdependence is, thus, important for the 
construction of Britain's more engaged relationship with the European 
Union foreign and security policy. Simultaneously, the acronyms of the 
CFSP and the ESDP are given particular and more central meaning in the 
discourse. They become vehicles in advancing certain values and norms 
such as openness, free trade, human rights and democracy. 
Subject Positioning 
I suggest that the re-articulation of the great power discourse in 1998 
included five key subject positions: (i) the influential, global and 
transatlantic Britain; (ii) the powerful and credible NATO, supported by the 
(iii) influential and global United States; (iv) the increasingly influential 
European Union with developing foreign and security policy; and (v) the 
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developing and unstable states in eastern Europe and elsewhere. 78 In 
comparison to the earlier re-articulations, the European Union was given a 
more prominent role in the world politics. Nevertheless, the key subject 
positions and their availability for the subjects construed in the discourse 
indicated significant continuity. Moreover, although the hierarchical order 
of the discourse in 1998 was increasingly shaped by the ideas of 
interdependence, the subject positioning still corresponded with the 
traditional views to power and security in an anarchical international 
society. 
In the re-articulations of the great power discourse, Britain was still 
assigned a great degree of agency in terms of its influence in the world 
politics. In the light of the traditional views on foreign and security policy, 
Britain undoubtedly possessed a great power identity. This identity was 
arrived at by constructing Britain as the key player in combating the dangers 
of the contemporary world. For instance, Britain is re-articulated as the key 
US ally. In 1998, Prime Minister Blair argued that Britain is 'absolutely 
together [with the US] in our analysis of the continuing dangers posed by 
Saddam. Hussein and our determination not to allow him Weapons of Mass 
Destruction' (Blair 1998). 
Relatedly, the defence policy documentation argued that Britain must 
prepare itself for possible military interventions around the globe in order to 
secure its interests and to help others to solve conflicts. As the Defence 
Secretary Robertson argued in the foreword to the SDR: 
The Government is committed to strong defence, and sound defence is sound 
foreign policy. As Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, said 'You can do a lot 
with diplomacy but, of course, you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up 
with firmness and force'. It is my strong belief that the Strategic Defence Review 
will deliver Modem Forces for the Modem World which will enable Britain to 
achieve a 'lot more' in the 21st century. ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998) 
78The East characterised with political and economic instability that could lead to disputes 
and conflicts, was important, if not influential, in that it was constructed as a test for the 
EU's ability to establish stability. The developing South had a marginal role in the 1997 
and 1998 foreign policy documents. That is, the discussions were euro- and the US-centric. 
Accordingly, the British subject position emerged in relation to the European Union and the 
United States in 1998. 
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The re-articulation of the great power discourse explicitly re-stated the link 
between foreign policy and military capabilities as a constitutive feature of 
the great power identity. Moreover, and as the above extracts suggest, the 
United Stated had a central role in the re-production of the great power 
identity. In the SDR and Prime Minister's speeches in 1998, the United 
States was constructed as the most powerful international actor. It was the 
only remaining superpower with immense importance in the world 
economy, politics and military affairs. Moreover, Britain was still 
empowered with the special relationship with the United States. That is, the 
close cultural and political ties with the United States highlighted Britain's 
influence in the world and in Europe. Therefore, the hierarchical order 
positioning the subject retained several traditional features that reflected an 
anarchic intemational system or society. 
Significantly for this study, the European Union was clearly assigned more 
agency than before, and the need to further develop its abilities to engage 
with the world politics were highlighted. I have suggested that the 
availability of this more influential subject position is linked to the idea of 
interdependence. That is, the representations of the increasingly 
interdependent world enabled a more prominent subject position for the 
European Union. However, the construction of the means to achieve a more 
prominent EU role largely reflected the traditional ideas of power and 
influence embedded in the great power discourse. 
In the St. Malo Declaration Britain emerged as the key advocate of, and the 
central player in, EU defence. As the Prime Minister Blair said: 
In defence we [Britain and France] can and should do more together. We are both 
nations that are used to power. We are not frightened of it or ashamed of 
it. We 
both want to remain a power for good in the world. And we start off with great 
advantages. We both possess a minimum nuclear deterrent. 
We are both 
permanent members of the Security Council. We have without 
doubt the best 
equipped, most deployable, most effective military forces in Europe. 
(Blair 1998) 
Crucially, the British engagement with the development of the ESDP 
reflects continuity rather than change. That 
is, the traditional British subject 
position highlighting power and greatness 
is here being re-produced through 
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the participation in the ESDP. Relatedly, the more engaged role in the 
European Union was also reflected in the British-United States relationship. 
Significantly, Britain's role as 'a leading member of the EU' was tied with 
the representations highlighting Britain's pivotal role for the United States. 
In so doing, Britain's traditional identity as the transatlantic bridge between 
the US and Europe was re-produced. As Prime Minister Blair argued: 
I have said before that though Britain will never be the mightiest nation on earth, 
we can be pivotal. 
It means building on the strengths of our history; it means building new 
alliances; developing new influence; charting a new course for British foreign 
policy. 
It means realising once and for all that Britain does not have to choose 
between being strong with the US, or strong with Europe; it means having the 
confidence to see that Britain can be both. Indeedg that Britain must be both; that 
we are stronger with the US because of our strength in Europe; that we are 
stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US. (Blair 1998) 
The increasing agency assigned to the European Union through the British 
engagement in the development of the CFSP and the ESDP, emphasised 
Britain's influential position in the world politics. Therefore, in Britain the 
Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy became an important 
element of the re-production of the British great power identity. However, I 
have suggested that this represents a twist, rather than a turn in the 
discourse. 
4.2.3 Parliamentary Debates 
The examination of the parliamentary debates in 1998 suggests that, 
although the goverm-nent's re-articulation of British foreign and security 
policy discourse did not mark a break with the past, the representations of 
the European Union's more prominent role for Britain sparked a debate and 
significant opposition . 
79 In other words, the discursive constructions 
79 The examination of the debates proceeded in two phases. First, I examined the 
Official 
Reports of the UK Parliament called Hansard for the relevant time periods. Hansard was 
read with an eye to the debates in which the SDR, the CFSP and the 
ESDP were addressed. 
Second, and after this initial phase, I chose seven debates for analysis. These were the 
debates on SDR, after its publication, on 8 July 1998 and 19 October 1998; the 
debate on 
the European Union on II November 1998; and the debate on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence 
on 27 November 1998. The post St. 
Malo debates included a debate on the European 
Council, 14 December 1998; a debate on defence on 22 March 1999, and on Foreign and 
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generated in the official re-articulations of the discourse were not accepted 
as adequate representations of the world out there and Britain's place in it. 
The findings of the analysis presented in the Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 
confirmed that the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy became 
80 
one of the most debated issues in Britain in 1998. In the debates related to 
the SDR after its publication in June 1998, the question of the CFSP and the 
ESDP was explicitly raised. However, and as the further analysis indicated, 
the new discourse did not appear to govern the majority of the speeches and 
remarks. Yet, there was clear evidence that a re-articulated discourse shaped 
by the CFSP and the ESDP emerged; and the remarks drawing on this 
discourse were put under closer scrutiny through references to the more 
traditional great power discourse. Importantly, after the St. Malo declaration 
the CFSP and the ESDP gained a substantially more prominent role in the 
parliamentary debates. Moreover, the number of the remarks structured by 
the re-articulated discourse increased. However, so did the opposition 
drawing on the pre- 1998 great power discourse. 
Commonwealth Affairs on 18 May 1999 (in both 
debates the European defence cooperation 
was addressed in distinct sections). 
80 The acronym 'GPD V is used 
for the Great Power discourse prior to the 1998 re- 
articulation and the 'GPD 
2' for the 1998 re-articulation of the discourse 
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Remarks and Speeches GPD I 6-PD 
1&2 
-UPD 2 -K/-A Total 
Defence Policy 27.11.97 42 4 4 46 96 
SDR 8.7.98 25 4 20 51 
SDR 19. -20.10.98 60 6 10 182 258 
EU (Defence Policy) 
11.11.98 
8 2 25 23 58 
Foreign Affairs and 
Defence 27.11.98 
17 2 34 37 90 
European Council (Vienna) 
14.12.98 
13 0 31 16 60 




70 0 23 16 108 
Overall 226 14 140 325 704 
Table 4.3: The Europeanisation of great power discourse (GPD) in 1998 
Parliamentary Debates 




GDP2 SDR 2 19. -20.10.98 
EU (Defence Pol icy) 11.11.98 
Foreign Affairs and Defence 27.11.98 
European Council (Vienna) 14.12.98 
Defece 22.3.99 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 18.5.99 
Overall 
Figure4.1: The Europeanisation of great power discourse (GPD) in 1998 
Parliamentary Debates 
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The analysis of the parliamentary debates largely confirmed the findings of 
the discourse analysis of the previous section. That isq the predication, 
presupposition and subject positioning of the re-articulations of the 
government in the parliament indicated a twist rather than a turn in the 
discourse. The remark of the Secretary of State for Defence, Robertson, is 
illustrative. He said: (Campbell 1998) 
The review will fundamentally reshape and modemise Britain's armed forces, 
sorting out the weaknesses, building on our strengths and providing a structure to 
deal with tomorrow's threats, not yester days enemies. Our forces will be more 
mobile, better manned, better supported and equipped, and better able to act as a 
force for good in the world, where we can and when we choose. ('Commons 
Hansard' 1998) 
Although the increasing interdependence presupposed a world of 
cooperation and integration, representations created by the Labour ministers 
and MPs continued to highlight Britain's leadership and influence, rather 
than dependence, in the world. The modernisation of British defence was 
intended to improve Britain's ability to deploy troops and use force if 
needed. In so doing, the re-articulation that generated representations of the 
feasibility of the European Union foreign and security policy largely 
resonated with the traditional presuppositions of the great power discourse 
re-articulated in the increasingly interdependent world. 
In the debate, the representations that suggested a more prominent role of 
the European Union foreign and security policy were explicitly questioned. 
For instance, the key representation created by the foreign and security 
policy leadership of 'strong in Europe and strong with the US' was 
questioned in several remarks in the debate. MP Maples' remark is 
illustrative. He said: 
History teaches us that - in Henry Kissinger's memorable phrase - 
international 
stability can come only from equilibrium or domination. There is, as yet, no new 
world order but, if there is to be one, surely it will be American 
for the foreseeable 
future. Europe's role will be subsidiary, and should be supportive. While European 
co-operation at all levels is vital, the context for our defence partnership must 
be 
NATO, and cannot be the European Union. ('Commons Hansard' 1998) 
Straightforwardly, the extract downplayed the role of the European Union in 
world politics. The logic structuring this representation 
drew on the pre- 
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1998 great power discourse. Whereas the 1998 re-articulation of the great 
power discourse constructed Britain's relationship with NATO and the 
European Union foreign and security policy as mutually beneficial, the 
above extract constructed it as mutually exclusive. This in turn is arrived at 
by presupposing a world in which order (or equilibrium) is established by 
hegemonic state rather than interdependence among various kinds of actors. 
Crucially the data collected (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1) suggests that the re- 
articulation of the great power discourse was not turning into a hegemonic 
discourse among the British policy-makers. That is, the twist in the 
discourse was not accepted by the policy-makers. Quite the opposite, the 
hegemonic struggle within the foreign and security policy discourse 
intensified when the European Union foreign and security policy was given 
a more substantial role. 
4.3 Re-Articulating British Foreign and Security Policy Discourse After St 
Malo 
The purpose of this section is to further examine what impact, if any, the 
1998 re-articulation of the British foreign and security policy discourse had 
on British state identity. To do so, I analysed the subsequent security and 
defence policy white papers published in 1999.1 also examined the policy 
paper of the Ministry of Defence on European defence published in 2001. 
The analysis of these official documents suggests that the new discourse 
was becoming more prominent and the discourse was Europeamsed. In 
order to examine how these re-articulations were scrutinised, and to 
determine whether they interpellated other policy-makers, I analysed the 
parliamentary debates over these policy documents. The findings suggested 
that the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy became a key 
feature in the British foreign and security policy debates, the Europeanised 
discourse did not become hegemonic. In particular, the representations of 
the foreign and security policy leadership related to the CFSP and the ESDP 
faced significant opposition in the parliamentary debates. Accordingly, the 
pre-1998 great power discourse was re-articulated. 
In this discourse 
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Britain's closer relationship with the European Union's defence policy 
effectively undermined Britain's special relationship with the United States. 
4.3.1 The Europeanisation of Discourse: The Defence Policy Papers in 
1999 and 2001 
The 1999 Defence White Paper ('Defence White Paper' 1999) is a 24 page 
long document. It set out the progress that had been made, and it illuminated 
some new issues that had arisen since the publication of the SDR. The white 
paper argued that the recognition of the new post-Cold War threats and 
security issues made in the SDR was correct. The paper noted that since the 
policy framework to address these issues was made, 'there has been ample 
confirmation of that judgement' ('Defence White Paper' 1999). 
Significantly, of the first two chapters which set out the strategic context in 
which Britain found itself; the latter specifically deals with the European 
security in the light of the institutional development of the European Union 
and NATO. The paper argues: 
NATO is and must remain at the heart of our security and defence policy. But 
events such as those in the Balkans have shown us that Europe needs to shoulder a 
greater share of the burden of its own security. Britain and the other nations of the 
EU also wish to play an appropriate part in the response by the wider international 
community to crises elsewhere. ('Defence White Paper' 1999) 
Although the commensurability of the European Union foreign and security 
policy and transatlantic link was noted, Britain highlighted the need to 
establish independent capabilities. The paper suggested: 
Britain has consistently argued that the European defence debate should be about 
how to provide genuine capability improvements... At the Helsinki European 
qouncil, on the basis of UK proposals, EU Member States committed themselves 
to concrete goals for capability improvement. They specified the scale of armed 
forces that they should be able to deploy rapidly, with the right skills and 
equipment, and be able to sustain in a theatre of operations until the military job is 
done. ('Defence White Paper' 1999). 
Nevertheless, it was suggested that this was not a European (federal) army. 
Rather, the EU forces were under command of the member states as in 
NATO. Significantly, for this study the developments in defence policy 
were argued to require further developments 
in defence related areas. The 
1999 paper argued: 
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... it makes real sense to create arrangements such that when EU nations decide to 
act together, they can act with maximum effect' ... Thus, for the EU to undertake 
crisis management operations in support of its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, it also needs the ability to take informed decisions in the defence field and 
see them through. Our approach is to establish within the EU just what is required 
to properly support defence decision making and the political control and strategic 
direction of crisis management operations. ('Defence White Paper' 1999) 
On the other hand, due to these major developments in the European Union 
the 2001 policy paper ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy 
Paper' 2001) exclusively addressed the topical issue of European Defence 
and its evolving institutional arrangements. The 2001 policy paper outlined 
the development of the CFSP and the ESDP from 1992 to the present. It 
clarified the aims of these policies and the British government's policy 
towards the future developments. The paper argued: 
We want to strengthen the ability of European nations to act together on foreign 
policy objectives. In addition to national efforts and efforts within NATO, this 
means strengthening the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and enabling the EU to respond to crises, co-ordinating its civilian 
and humanitarian assistance with, as necessary, a military element. ffuropean 
Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper'2001) 
Both papers indicated increasing Europeanisation of the British foreign and 
security policy discourse. The European Union constituted a key feature and 
the rationale of the British government's policy papers in the field of 
security and defence. Moreover, both papers created representations of 
Britain's place in the world in relation to the European Union and NATO. 
As such, these policy documents formed a set of artefacts adequate for the 
analysis of the impact of the Europeanisation to the discourse. 
4.3.2. Re-Articulation of the Great Power Discourse 
I suggest that the representations of the world generated in the 1999 and 
2001 policy papers reflected the great power discourse as re-articulated in 
1998. That is, the predication of subjects, the knowledge presupposed and 
the subject position available were structured by the great power discourse. 
However, the increasing Europeanisation of foreign and security policy 
discourse - namely, the European Union's 
CFSP and the ESDP increased 
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visibility in the re-articulations of the discourse - did not alter the key 
features which largely structured the meaning within the discourse. 
The main subject constructed in the 1999 and 2001 policy papers was 
largely the same as in 1998. Nevertheless, due to an increasing focus on the 
European Union, the discourse became more Euro-centric. The identities of 
the developing and potentially unstable East and other regions were re- 
produced and they continued to be central for the construction of 
insecurities. As the 1999 white paper suggested: 'The SDR focused 
attention to consequences of the break-up of states, and on ethnic and 
religious conflict, population and environmental pressures, competition for 
scarce resources, on the effects of illegal drugs, terrorism and crime' 
('Defence White Paper' 1999). The paper highlighted that nothing in the past 
two years had changed that assessment. Rather, the events in the East and 
around the globe underlined the severity of these issues. The paper argued: 
Indeed, events in Kosovo and East Timor and work we are undertaking on 
proliferation of asymmetric threats, have reinforced some of our concerns and 
underlined importance of much of the defence modernisation that we are 
undertaking. ' ('Defence White Paper' 1999) 
Significantly, the documents did not include a lengthy discussion or analysis 
of these insecurities. Rather, they were mentioned as facts and largely taken 
as given. Moreover, the threats were mainly assumed to be located outside 
the boundaries of the West. Yet, the insecurities in the East took place in the 
borderlands of the West and as such, they were constructed as essential for 
the security of the West. 
Britain in the West: Interplay of the EU and NATO 
The 1999 and 2001 papers largely re-articulated the British great power 
discourse as in 1998. In short, both papers explicitly quoted the SDR 
in this 
respect. The 1999 white paper argued: 
Britain's place in the world is determined by our interests as a nation and as a 
leading member of the international community. indeed, the two are 
inextricably 
linked because our national interests have a vital international dimension. 
' 
('Defence White Paper' 1999). 
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Moreover, the 2001 paper suggested that 'other European nations have also 
recognised the need for change and most have recently conducted defence 
reviews that have come broadly similar conclusions as the SDR' ('European 
Decence - Minitry of Defence Policy Paper' 2001). The British subject 
position, here, emphasises Britain's ability to lead the way in Europe and 
beyond. 
The representations of the other key western subjects, namely NATO, the 
United States and the European Union were also re-articulated in terms of 
the 1998 re-articulation. First, the EU foreign and security policy was seen 
increasingly important for Britain, NATO and the United States. Second, the 
relationships among these subjects were constructed as complementary. The 
predication of the European Union highlighted common values and shared 
interests. As the paper argued: 
Aims to safeguard common values and fundamental interests, strengthen the 
security of the Union, preserve peace and international security, promote 
international co-operation and develop and consolidate democracy, rule of law, 
respect for human rights and freedoms. ('European Decence - Minitry of Defence 
Policy Paper' 200 1) 
The sub . ect position available for the European Union was increasingly 
similar to the one of NATO, Britain and the United States. The European 
Union was assigned a significant degree of agency in the British discourse. 
This representation was arrived at by emphasising the recent developments 
related to the EU foreign and security policy in particular in the military 
field. As the paper continued: 
In short, it [The ESDP] will strengthen European military capabilities and thereby 
strengthen the European contribution to NATO. It will bring new responsibilities 
to the European Union - responsibilities which the EU is uniquely well placed to 
carry out. It will ensure that Europe takes a fairer share of the security burden and 
reinforce and sustain the relationship between Europe and North America. These 
aims are supported by Europeans and North Americans alike. ('European Decence 
- Minitry of Defence Policy 
Paper'200 1) 
Although the European Union is re-articulated in terms of influence and 
uniqueness, the presupposition of the world out there 
is characterised with 
significant continuity. The world is inhabited 
by states and their alliances 
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and the influence is tied to the traditional conceptualisations of the foreign 
and security policy. 
4.3.3 The Parliamentary debates in 1998 and 2001 
At the outset, the examination of the interpellation of the British policy- 
makers appeared secondary. This is because of the significant continuities in 
the British foreign and security policy discourse. In other words, as the re- 
articulations of the official discourse represented a twist rather than a turn 
(i. e. rupture) in the discourse, the official discourse was likely to retain its 
hegemony. However, the examination of the parliamentary debates 
indicated that due to Europeanisation of the British foreign and security 
policy discourse the foreign and security policy debate in Britain 
81 intensified. Significantly, the competing representation of Britain's place 
in the world generated in the debates corresponded with same discourse. 
That is, the debate occurred within the great power discourse rather than 
between two different discourses. 
The data presented in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2 suggested that the 
government's re-articulation of the great power discourse did not 
interpellate the parliamentarians. Rather, it was increasingly questioned by 
the MPs. Moreover, the remarks opposing the government's Europeanised 
discourse were structured by the pre-1998 great power discourse. The 
analysis of the most debated issues further elucidates these arguments. 
81 1 examined the UK parliamentary debates in the House of 
Commons on foreign and 
security policy in 1999,2000 and 2001. The analysis suggested 
that the EU foreign and 
security policy became one of the most 
debated issues during this period. For a closer 
analysis, I chose two debates: (i) the 1999 
White Paper was debated in the UK Parliaments 
House of Commons on 22 and 28 February 2000; (ii) the 
debated on the European Security 
and Defence Policy on 19 March 2001 explicitly addressed 
the issues clarified in the 2001 
policy paper on European Defence. 
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Figure 4.2: Europeanisation of the great power discourse (GPD) in 1999 and 2001 
Parliamentary Debates 
The most debated issue in both debates was the relationship between NATO 
and the EU foreign and security policy and the Britain's position between 
the EU and NATO. This was to be expected in the 2001 debate on European 
Defence in the light of the ESDP. However, in the 1999 Defence White 
Paper, the issue was also extensively debated. The institutional 
developments in the European foreign and security policy/ies were 
explicitly linked to the events in Balkans: the Kosovo crisis and the 
NATO's Serbian bombing campaign, as well as to the continuing and 
expanding peacekeeping operations in the region ('Commons Hansard' 
2000; 'Commons Hansard' 2000; 'Commons Hansard' 2001). Two rival 
positions emerged in the parliamentary debates. 
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First, the foreign policy leadership argued that engaging with the European 
Union in the foreign and security policy field was imperative due the events 
in Balkans in 1990s. The Secretary of State for Defence Hoon's 
argumentation is illustrative. He said: 
... it is wrong that Europe collectively can contribute such a small proportion of 
the total forces required to solve a problem on its doorstep [Crisis in Balkans]. 
At the Helsinki European summit in December, the European Union 
took an enormous step forward in the process of solving Europe's military 
capability problems, which were so evident in the first half of last year as we 
pulled together forces to go into Kosovo. We seek to improve Europe's ability to 
put more forces in the field and to put them there more rapidly. ('Commons 
Hansard'2000) 
Moreover, through participation Britain enhanced its wider military 
influence in the world and its status in the world politics. As Hoon 
continued: 
We will be judged by one thing, and one only: our ability to deliver that force 
better than ever before. As I speak, we have men in Kosovo acting with skill and 
courage of which we can all be proud. We have HMS Illustrious in the Gulf at the 
head of a major naval deployment. We have Royal Air Force aircraft in the skies 
over Iraq. Those interventions show that we are acting as a force for good, day 
after day. All the developments that I have described are designed to increase the 
effectiveness of our forces. I commend them to the House. ('Commons Hansard' 
2000) 
The representations of Britain's place in the world generated in these 
extracts reflected the 1998 re-articulation of the great power discourse. The 
predication of the subjects, the presupposition of knowledge about the world 
out there and the agency assigned to the actors, were indicative of a great 
power identity in an increasingly interdependent world. In this world, the 
EU foreign and security policy was increasingly important for various 
subjects constructed in the discourse. The Minister for Armed Forces Vaz's 
argumentation was illustrative in this respect. He said: 
Let me, in closing, re-state the fundamental points for the benefit for of the right 
hon. Member for Wokingham. The ESDP is good news for Britain, Europe and 
NATO. That is why the Government developed it, why Europe supports it and 
why the United States and NATO have welcomed it in the statement made by 
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President Bush and Prime Minister on 23 February. This Government, the United 
States Government, our EU partners and NATO allies bare engaged in making 
success of the ESDP. Nice was important step towards realising the goals of a 
NATO-friendly ESDP. It was good in result for NATO and a good result for 
Britain. ('Commons Hansard' 1998) 
In this extract, the ESDP is discursively constructed as complementary to 
NATO and other subjects such as the United States and Britain. The 
complementary relationship between these subjects implicitly suggested 
shared interests and values. 82 
However, and second, a number of MPs questioned the representations 
initiated by the government's re-articulation of the great power discourse. 
Specifically, it was argued that St. Malo was a mistake, that the CFSP and 
the ESDP was a myth rather than reality, and that NATO was the only 
credible security organisation in Europe. The leader of the opposition, 
Duncan Smith, argued: 'I warned that, in late 1998, at St. Malo, the Prime 
Minister's rushed attempt to change policy, which then moved at an 
alarming pace in 1999, was a big mistake' ('Commons Hansard' 2000). In 
Duncan Smith's view the developments put in motion in St. Malo were 
opposed by the United States. He continued: 
... Americans and others 
have spotted that the words in the series of agreements 
show up the ambitions to create a defence identity beyond NATO - outside 
NATO. Those are the lines and words that have been used from St. Malo to 
Helsinki. It is a reality. That is what the Government have signed up to. 
('Commons Hansard'2000) 
On the other hand, the credibility of the ESDP was rendered deeply suspect. 
MP Cash's speech is illustrative. He argued: 
The European security and defence policy is a sort of satire, reminiscent of 
'Gulliver's Travels' and the tales of Baron von Munchhausen. It is a myth; a 
voyage in time and space, which is completely at variance with judgment, 
experience and reality - ('Commons 
Hansard' 200 1) 
Significantly, the former British Prime Minister Thatcher re-appeared in the 
debate in relation to the credibility question. As MP Frank Cook noted: 
82 For a detailed analysis of the re-articulation of the great power 
discourse see the section 
4.2.2 of this chapter. 
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Some of her [Thatcher] views were very reasonable. For example: 'As the Kosovo 
conflict showed, and as the figures for defence spending confirm, European 
defence capabilities are lagging dangerously far behind those of the United States. 
That is eminently sensible and perfectly accurate. She added: 'This is particularly 
true in the vital area of military technology. ' That point is as plain as the nose on 
one's face and it is absolutely right. However, Baroness Thatcher said that there 
would be a problem because the impulse towards developing a new European 
defence and separate European armed forces has little to do with the fact that 
Europe is cutting its defences while America is increasing hers... ('Commons 
Hansard'2001) 
The remarks opposing the Europeanised discourse of the government 
created several alternative representation's of Britain's place in the world. 
The closer participation in the EU foreign and security policy could 
undermine NATO's pre-eminence in the European security, it could 
jeopardise the United States' commitment in the continent and, crucially, 
Britain's special relationship with the United States. I suggest that the 
predication of subjects established, the knowledge presupposed and the 
subject position available for the subjects of these representations were 
indicative of the pre-1998 British great power discourse. In so doing, the 
Europeanised official foreign and security policy discourse in Britain did 
not translate in to a hegemonic discourse. Quite the opposite, the 
Europeanised discourse was increasingly resisted in the parliament. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy 
discourse in Britain. The analysis has suggested that European Union 
membership and the European Union's developing foreign and security 
policy became central features of the British foreign and security policy 
debate in the 1998. However, the discourse analysis indicated that the 
Europeanisation of the discourse did not mark a break with the past. Instead, 
the hegemonic great power discourse was re-articulated in a familiar way. It 
highlighted Britain's great power status, leadership and international 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, the analysis 
has showed that the European 
Union and its foreign and security policy became 
increasingly important for 
the re-production of the British great power 
identity. That is, in the late 
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1990s and early 2000s Britain emerged as a pivotal and influential state, 
because it 'was strong in Europe' and 'strong with the United States' (Blair 
1998). On the other hand, the late 1990s re-articulation of the British great 
power discourse did not interpellate the British parliamentarians. Rather the 
traditional discourse continued to structure the representations generated by 
the policy-makers. However, this significant struggle took place within the 
boundaries of the great power discourse. 
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Chapter 5 
The Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy: 
Comparing the re-production of State-Identities in Finland 
and Britain 
Introduction 
Following the analysis of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy 
discourses in Finland and Britain, this chapter turns the focus on the 
relationship between the European Union and the member state foreign and 
security policy/ies. Specifically, my task is to discuss the similarities and 
differences between Finland and Britain in the light of the findings of the 
case studies. In so doing, this chapter also elucidates the contribution of a 
context specific discourse analysis with a comparative element. 
The case studies suggest that the EU foreign and security policy has been 
central for the re-articulations of the foreign and security policy discourses 
in Finland and Britain. As such, it has shaped the re-production of these 
states identities. However, the comparison of the findings of the discourse 
analysis indicates that the process has had very different effects on these 
states identities. Whilst in Finland, the Europeanisation of foreign and 
security policy was fundamental in the transformation of the neutrality 
identity to the (non-) alignment identity, in Britain it enabled the re- 
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production of the great power identity along familiar lines. Three key 
arguments follow. 
First, the comparison suggests that the Europeanisation of foreign and 
security policy is more than state-centric cooperation. The findings indicate 
that the identities of the states that participated in the integration are shaped 
or even transformed. On the other hand, and second, the variation between 
Finland and Britain is suggestive of the continuing importance of the 
member state level in the process of Europeanisation of foreign and security 
policy. Therefore, convergence and divergence is possible. Finally, the 
differences between Finland and Britain underline that the context specific 
discourse analysis is helpful in establishing knowledge about the foreign 
and security policy governance in Europe. On the other hand, the 
comparative element is imperative in explicating what, if anything, is 
context specific in the analysis. 
In order to illustrate these arguments, I first re-visit the broader background 
of the dissertation in the light of two questions: Why the comparison? Why 
these cases? Second, I compare and contrast the findings of the case studies. 
Third, I discuss the relevance of these findings for the analysis of the 
European foreign policy/ies. 
5.1 Europeanisation of Foreign and Security Policy Discourses and the 
Comparative Element of the Study 
This dissertation analyses how the process of European integration in the 
field foreign and security policy is shaping the European Union member 
states' identities. It has been suggested that the 
dominant modes of analyses 
based on cooperation and integration approach 
fail to account for the 
complex relationship between the 
different levels of governance in the 
European foreign and security policy/ies. 
The dissertation asserts that the understandings of the recent 
developments 
in the European foreign and security policy/ies 
have been largely based on 
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the IR inspired cooperation approach. In general, the domination of the 
cooperation approach has resulted in a narrow state-centric 
conceptualisation of Europeanisation. Although the scholars have 
acknowledged the increasing cooperation among the EU member states, the 
number of studies explicitly addressing the emerging EU foreign and 
security policy have been, until recently, marginal. When the EU 
developments have been addressed, the analysis has tended to focus on the 
member states interest and influence in the process. In so doing, the role and 
impact of the small states have been frequently downplayed (Arter 2000; 
Joenniemi 200 1; Hansen 2002; Smith, M. 2003). On the other hand, the 
interests of the major member states have been largely taken as granted. As 
such, their role in the process has been reduced to commonsense 
understandings such as, Britain in opposition to, and France in favour of, 
further integration in the field. 
The recent developments in European foreign and security policy/ies have 
highlighted, however, the role of the small states as well as the changing 
interests of the major powers. Small states have had a central role in the 
development of the EU foreign and security policy. For instance, Finland 
and Sweden played a key role in the development of the European Union's 
military crisis management. First, they opposed the merger plans of the 
WEU and the European Union. Second, a Finnish-Swedish counterproposal 
was adopted as a compromise: the so-called military crisis management 
tasks were transferred to the European Union, the territorial defence aspect 
of the WEU was left outside the European Union competences (GrWger, 
Larsen et al. 2002: 22-23). In relation to the European Union's decision to 
establish the Rapid Reaction Troops for crisis management missions, 
Finland and Sweden wished to see an explicit statement that the aim was not 
establish a European Army. Subsequently, the Helsinki Presidency 
Conclusions stated that the process 'does not imply the creation of a 
European Army' (Tresidency Conclusions' 1999; Grxger, Larsen et al. 
2002: 165). On the other hand, the major EU member states' traditional 
roles in the European foreign and security policy/ies 
have changed. For 
example, Germany has acquired a more prominent role 
in European foreign 
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and security policy/ies partly through the EU foreign and security policy 
(Lankowski 2001: 107-111). Moreover, observers have noted that whereas 
France has revised its traditional reluctance in participating in NATO 
(Sauder 1999), Britain has been engaged with the CFSP and the ESDP since 
the St. Malo declaration (Howorth 2001). In so doing, the cooperation 
approach appears to be rather ill-suited to examine the European foreign and 
security policy/ies. 
Moreover, due to the rapid institutionalisation and the further development 
of the EU foreign and security policy towards the end of the 1990s, the 
cooperation approach has been increasingly challenged by scholars 
operating within a more integrationist understanding of the European 
politics. Some theories and theorists have drawn explicitly on the 
functionalist inspired integration theory, in particular the neo-functionalist 
idea of spill-over. Neo-functionalism suggests that the integration in one 
policy area will over time move on to other areas. For the integrationists the 
developments in the 1990s indicated that integration was spilling over to the 
most sensitive policy fields of the member states, namely foreign, security 
and defence affairs. Consequently, they argued that the explanations of the 
European foreign and security policy/ies should account for supranational 
governance of the European Union. 
The adequacy or quality of a research strategy must be evaluated with 
reference to the questions asked and problems raised. Therefore, there is 
nothing inherently wrong in seeking to explain the European foreign and 
security policy/ies from the member state or European Union perspectives. 
However, these two seemingly mutually exclusive choices appear to be ill- 
suited to address the complex relationship between the levels of governance 
in the contemporary European foreign and security policy/ies. That is, how 
each member state constructs its interests and 
identity, and how these 
constructions feed back to the process of 
integration. Some important 
theoretical innovations follow. 
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First, the acknowledgement of the emergence of a distinct European system 
of foreign and security policy with the European Union at its core has made 
it sensible to examine the impact of the EU policy upon the member states. 
Second, to deal with the levels of analysis problem scholars have deployed 
the concept of Europeanisation. The concept suggests that the domestic 
contexts may entail different policy outcomes, which may feed back on to 
process of Europeanisation (Jupille and Caporaso 1999). By this logic, the 
member state level serves as the dependent variable at one (time) point and 
becomes the independent variable at the next. Finally, and relatedly, the 
national variation in EU member states foreign and security policies have 
highlighted the utility of comparative frameworks in elucidating governance 
in Europe. 
However, the Europeanisation literature has been largely rationalism- 
inspired and conventional social scientific methods driven (White 2004). In 
so doing, the recent theoretical innovations of the 'critical', 'constructivist' 
and 'Poststructural' IR (Doty 1996; Campbell 1998; Weldes, Laffey et al. 
1999), which have recently fed into the European studies (Christiansen, 
Jorgensen et al. 2001; Diez 2001; Wwver 2002), have been largely missing 
in the analysis of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy. In 
these accounts, the question of structure and agency as well as the levels of 
analysis are dissolved in an understanding which highlights the mutually 
constitution of social relationship. Within in this understanding, either 
structures or agents do not exist independently of each other. Rather, they 
are (mutually) constituted at various levels of social interaction (Doty 1997; 
Doty 1999) such as global, regional, sub-regional, state, sub-state, for 
instance. 
The acknowledgement of the Europeanisation of the 
foreign and security 
policy, then, takes us towards the question of the re-production of state 
identities through the foreign and security policy discourses (Campbell 
1998; Neumann 1998). Here, states are not exogenous to the process of 
integration. Rather, they are re-produced and re-shaped through continuous 
re-articulations of the discourses that are crucial 
for our understanding of 
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state. Accordingly, to elucidate the relationship between the EU and the 
member state level foreign and security policy governance we need to 
enquire into the discourses surrounding the identity formation in specific 
contexts. On the other hand, the comparison of the findings made within 
certain contexts, contributes to our understanding of the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the EU and the member state level foreign 
and security policy governance. 
The Case Selection 
The EU member states share some basic features such as a democratic 
political system, market economy, respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. However, the historical and cultural diversity is often highlighted 
(Graham 1998: 3-9). Moreover, the comparison of groups of even more 
seemingly similar states, such as the major European powers (Larsen 1997; 
Wwver 2005) or the Nordic states (Ojanen, Herolf et al. 2000; Huldt 2001; 
Hansen 2002) has lead to conclusions that the states are not so similar after 
all. Accordingly, the specific purpose of the context specific analysis with 
comparative element is to account for the re-production of similarity and 
difference of the member state identities. In so doing, the similarity and 
difference of the cases chosen is approached as a research outcome rather 
than a presumption. 
However, this is not to suggest that the differences or similarities of the 
states chosen would be secondary for the rationale of the case selection. 
Quite the reverse, the criteria for the case selection made in this study was 
the analytic relevance of the selection for the specific questions raised. First, 
to account for the diversity and difference between the EU member states 
two different member states, Finland and Britain, were chosen. These states 
are different in size, geopolitical location and cultural tradition, for instance. 
Moreover, these states have had a very different relationship to the 
European foreign and security policy cooperation in the post-war period. 
Whereas Britain has been a key player in NATO and in the process of 
European Integration, Finland has sought a neutral status and limited 
cooperation with the European security organisations. 
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Second, the case selection also reflected a rejection of generalisation 
(quantity) in favour of particularity (quality) (Kerdnen 2001). That is, the 
aim of this dissertation is not to provide a general picture or to develop a 
general theory of the European foreign and security policy/ies. The number 
of the cases is limited in order to provide a detailed context specific analysis 
of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourses. Relatedly, 
my language skills and background knowledge of these cases as a Finnish 
person living in Britain has a role to play in the case selection. 
In sum, the comparative element of this dissertation has two dimensions - 
temporal and spatial. Whereas the temporal dimension of the research 
design is imperative for the analysis of the Europeanisation, the spatial 
element is crucial to establish the context specificity of the Europeanization. 
In other words, the comparison of the foreign and security policy discourses 
over time enables detailed analysis of the Europeanisation of the foreign and 
security policy discourses in the given contexts. On the other hand, 
comparison over space is needed to elucidate the relationship between the 
EU and member state levels of governance. The comparative element is 
helpful to elucidate the key question of the Europeanisation research 
agendas; in this study the context specificity of the foreign and security 
policy discourses. The comparison is a valuable tool in establishing what, if 
anything, is context specific. This, in turn, has a wider adaptability for the 
analysis of the European foreign and security policy/ies. 
5.2 Comparison of Foreign and Security Policy Discourses in Finland and 
Britain in the Light of Europeanisation 
The degree and impact of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy 
discourse differed in Finland and Britain. Whilst in Finland the 
Europeanisation of the discourse was evident already in the early and mid 
1990s, in Britain it occurred in late 1990s. On the other hand, the discourse 
analysis indicates that although the EU foreign and security policy had a 
limited impact on the re-articulation of the traditional foreign and security 
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policy discourse in Britain; in Finland, it was central for the articulation of a 
new discourse and identity in 1995. Moreover, whereas in Finland the new 
discourse largely interpellated the parliamentarians by the early 2000s, in 
Britain the Europeanised re-articulation of the traditional discourse in 1998 
was increasingly scrutinised in 2000s. 
5.2.1 The Discursive Context of the Europeanisation in Finland and Britain 
The Finnish foreign and security policy discourse in the early 1990s, 
generated representations of a relatively powerless neutral state located 
between two political, economic and military blocks of the East and the 
West. As such, Finland had to adapt to its external environment and avoid 
involvement in international value based considerations (Kekkonen 1982: 
17-22). Until 1992, the membership was seen to be totally incompatible 
with the policy of neutrality. However, the dramatic changes in Finland's 
security environment, such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 
opened up space for alternative considerations. 
Accordingly, the membership of the European Union and the participation 
in the developing EU foreign and security policy became the central 
question in the national foreign and security policy debates (Lipponen 1990; 
Koivisto 1995). Importantly, and notwithstanding representations that 
highlighted the economic aspects of European integration, the membership 
in the European Union was largely constructed as a political question with a 
security dimension. As President Koivisto have argued 'the security policy 
reasons spoke most powerfully for the membership application. Economic 
considerations were secondary after all. ' (Koivisto 1995: 554, my 
translation). When Finland accessed the European Union in 1995 it also 
gave up the policy of neutrality and re-articulated its foreign and security 
policy in terms of economic and political alignment, and military non- 
alignment, with the West. 
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Finland Britain 
Timing Early and mid 1990s Late 1990s 
Context of the The end of the Cold War and Increasing interdependence and Europeanisation superpower rivalry globalisation 
articulated in Large scale economic, political New security threats related to 
the official and social transformations in the instabilities of the discourse Europe transformation 
New security threats related to Developing transatlantic 
the instabilities of the relationship 
transformation The NATO-EU relations 
Deepening western integration 
EU membership application in 
1992 and accession in 1995 
Rationalefor Neutrality is no longer a viable The European Union needs to be 
the line of action in a position to play its full 
Europeanisation European Union is not a military role on the international stage 
articulated in alliance A more engaged relationship with 
the official Participation is in line with the the European Union is needed 
discourse policy of military non- to safeguard British interests 
alignment Europe needs strengthened armed 
Participation in the European forces that can react rapidly to 
Union foreign and security the new risks 
policy will re-enforce Although Britain cannot be the 
Finnish security most powerful country in the 
world, it can be pivotal 
Britain should be strong in 
Europe and strong with the 
us. 
Table 5.1: Europeanisation of foreign and security policy discourse in Finland and 
Britain 83 
In Britain, the first signs of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security 
policy were also identifiable in the early 1990s. However, the case study 
indicates that it was only towards the end of the decade when the CFSP and 
the ESDP became one of the most debated issues in the British foreign and 
security policy discourse. That is, although the development of the 
European Union based political and security cooperation was noted and, to 
some extent, welcomed already in the early and mid 1990s, these issues 
were not central for the re-articulation(s) of the British foreign and security 
policy discourse. The discourse analysis suggests that in the British foreign 
and security policy discourse, the CFSP and the ESDP were constructed 
in 
terms of high expectations but insufficient decision-making and military 
capabilities. The scholars and policy-makers argued that a clear 
4capabilities-expectations gap' (Hill 1993) existed. As such, the twin EU 
policies were largely marginalised within the great power 
discourse. The 
83 The table is based on the reviews of scholarly and political 
discourses in Finland and 
Britain ftirther discussed in Chapter 3 (sections 3.1.1 and 
3.2.1) and Chapter 4 (sections 
4.1.1 and 4.2.1). 
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Seeretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd's 
reasoning in 1994 is illustrative. He argued: 
The European Union is ambitious in foreign affairs. We feel strength in numbers 
and we pursue a far-reaching agenda. CFSP is still in its infancy. Entry into force 
of the Treaty on European Union did not overnight produce a ready-made 
common foreign policy... As any builder knows, it is important to get the 
foundations and the framework of the structure right first. ' (Hurd 1994: 427). 
Despite the rather positive tone of Hurd's reasoning, he nevertheless 
suggested that there were no foundations, framework of structure in place in 
1994. Thus, and in contrast to Finland, the European Union's security 
dimension did not constitute significant adaptation pressures in Britain. 
Rather, the initial representations of the EU foreign and security policy 
suggested that the increasing EU based cooperation was among the many 
international engagements of Britain. 
Nevertheless, the case study suggests that the entry of the Labour Party in 
government in 1997, the Strategic Defence Review and, in particular, the 
joint British-French declaration on European defence in St. Malo in 1998 
represented a break with the past in terms of British policy towards the 
emerging EU foreign and security policy (Howorth 2001; Howorth 2004). 
The policy-makers, both for and against the more engaging policy, argued 
that the traditional British position, laid out in the so-called 'three circles 
doctrine' which highlighted Britain's international location in the 
intersection of the Commonwealth, the United States and Europe, was 
changing in favour of Europe. Accordingly, the Europeanisation of foreign 
and security policy turned into one of the most debated issues in the late 
1990s ('British-French Joint Declaration on European Defence' 1998; 
'Defence White Paper' 1999). 
The temporal difference of the Europeanisation of the foreign and security 
policy discourse between Finland and Britain 
is significant. Relatedly, the 
rationale given for the Europeanisation 
diverged. Whereas in Finland 
Europeanisation was explicitly related to the context of the 
immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War and the representation of neutrality 
as 'no longer 
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a viable line of action' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 58), in Britain 
it was related to the continuing British internationalism and great power 
status. As the 1998 SDR argued: 
The British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe that as well as 
defending our rights, we should discharge our responsibilities in the world. We do 
not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of 
dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good. 
('Strategic Defence Review' 1998) 
More precisely, in Britain, the developments of the CFSP and the ESDP 
were linked to Europe's need of 'strengthened armed forces that can react 
rapidly to the new risks' ('British-French Joint Declaration on European 
Defence' 1998). This reflected the ideas of increasing contribution of the 
European states to the NATO and to the developing EU foreign and security 
policy and crisis management capabilities ('Strategic Defence Review' 
1998). On the other hand, international responsibilities and the ESDP as 
well as the EU's crisis management capabilities gained weight in the 
Finnish foreign and security policy discourse due the course of the 1990s. 
5.2.2 Impact upon Finnish and British Foreign and Security Policy 
Discourses 
Finland The discourse analysis of the Finnish case suggests that instead of 
re-articulating the traditional post-war neutrality discourse, the foreign 
policy leadership articulated a new discourse in 1995, which highlighted 
Finland's economic and political alignment with the West. The alignment 
discourse emphasised Finland's new location within the West, increased 
influence in world politics, and responsibility in international affairs. On the 
other hand, Finland remained militarily non-aligned. Importantly, the 
discourse analysis suggest that the EU and its developing foreign and 
security policy, was central for the transformation. 
The case study shows that in conjunction with Finland's accession to the 
European Union in 1995, the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse 
was europeanised. Right from the beginning of 
its membership, the Finnish 
foreign policy leadership made it clear that Finland would engage 
constructively in the development of the 
EU developing foreign and security 
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policy. The government said that Finland did not have 'any security policy 
reservations' and that Finland 'wishes to play an active and constructive role 
in creating and implementing a common foreign and security policy' 
(Report by the Council of State 1995: 58). Finland aimed to contribute in 
particular to the European Union's preventive diplomacy and civil and 
military crisis management tasks. Consequently, Finland supported the 
further development of the CFSP in Amsterdam lGC in 1996 and the ESDP 
in Helsinki ICG in 1999, for instance. Although the foreign policy 
leadership re-articulated Finland's continuing commitment in military non- 
alignment and independent defence, towards the end of the 1990s, Finland's 
engagements in western security organisations, such as the WEU, NATO 
and the European Union in terms of the ESDP raised questions concerning 
the feasibility and credibility of the policy. After all, the new discourse 
emphasised alignment rather than non-alignment with the West. (Table 5.2) 
The change in official discourse is extraordinary. In 1990 the Prime 
Minister of Finland argued that the EC membership was totally 
incompatible with Finland's long term interest to seek a neutral international 
status (Joenniemi 2001). However, in 1995 the foreign policy leadership 
declared the 'the European Union will reinforce the foundations of Finnish 
security and provide a significant channel through which Finland can pursue 
its interests... ' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 5). The analysis of the 
case study suggests that this radically different articulation of Finland's 
place in the world reflected a new discourse. That is, the structuring of the 
meaning of subjects and objects constructed in the discourse was 
substantially different from the earlier re-articulations. The key findings of 
the discourse analysis presented in Table 5.2 illustrate the differences 
among the traditional neutrality discourse and the new alignment 
discourse. 
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Neutrality discourse Al 1.2nment discourse 
Predication (key Finland: Finland: 
representation of the A small, independent and Stable state and developed discourse) democratic state state 
Is a neutral state Is a member of the core Located between the East group of European 
and the West democracies (the 
The West: European Union) 
Great powers Has international 
Democratic states responsibilities 
NA TO: The West 
Western military alliance Stable, developed and 
The EC: influential major and 
Western economic minor states 
organisation The EU. - 
The East: Inclusive economic and 
Great power(s) with a political might with 
different social political foreign and security 
and economic system policy 
Warsaw Pact: Crisis management 
Eastern military alliance NA TO: 
Inclusive military alliance 
with political dimension 
Crisis management 
The East: 
Unstable, developing and 
potentially but 
influential major and 
minor states 
Presupposition Finland is a minor rather Finland is a stable rather 
(Knowledge created in than great power than unstable state 
the discourse) Peripheral rather than Democratic rather that 
central state undemocratic 
Developed rather than 
underdeveloped 
Order rather than disorder 
subject Position Small and relatively Stable, developed and 
powerless and peripheral influential states in the 
state(s) in the North North 
Powerful and central Stable, developed and 
power(s) in the East powerful West 
Powerful and central powers Unstable, developing and 
in the West potentially powerful 
East 
Table 5.2: Structuring of meaning in the neutrality discourse and the alignment 
discourse in Finland 
The European Union. The analysis of the Finnish case points out that over- 
time the representation of the European Union changes from a western 
European economic organisation to a European economic and political 
organisation with a 'security dimension'; and, later to a political entity with 
a full scale foreign and security policy. Whilst, 
in the early 1990s the 
European integration was constructed as a process reflecting the Cold War's 
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division in Europe; in the mid 1990s the European Union was articulated as 
an inclusive and enlarging organisation enhancing Finland's aim to create 
regional stability and to prevent the emergence of the old or new dividing 
lines in Europe. Moreover, in the mid 1990s the European Union is 
explicitly attributed the western values of democracy, the rule of law and 
market economy. Previously these norms were more exclusively associated 
with the western states. 
Importantly, the CFSP and the ESDP have a crucial role in this new 
articulation. In Finland these EU policies reflect a new kind of security 
assessment: 
As a member of the European Union, Finland is involved in a community of 
democratic states which has vital role to play in international security policy 
cooperation. The aim is to prevent any re-emergence of confrontation or a new 
division of Europe. Preconditions must be created for over coming and managing 
security problems and countries' security concerns in cooperation and on a basis 
of equality. ' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 67) 
According to the representations generated by the Finnish foreign policy 
leadership, the EU, the CFSP and the ESDP are not based on traditional and 
boundary producing security thinking that reflect the traditional security 
concerns of a large-scale military confrontation highlighting the importance 
of military alliances. Rather, the CFSP is portrayed as an inclusive policy 
enabling a wide participation and support, for instance, in the field of 
preventive diplomacy. On the other hand, the ESDP is construed to enable 
military crisis-management missions also based on broader international 
support. Moreover, in Finland, the continuing enlargement of the European 
Union and the entry of the three previously neutral member states and their 
participation in the CFSP and the ESDP is constructed as an example of 
European Union's comprehensiveness. 
NATO. In Finland, the representations of NATO also highlight the change. 
Whereas in the early 1990s, NATO was seen as a traditional military 
alliance, towards the end of the decade 
NATO is constructed as a more 
inclusive political and security actor in Europe. This representation 
draws 
on NATO's new partnership programs, 
the NATO led peacekeeping 
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mission in which Finland was participating as well as the NATO 
enlargement. However, the traditional role of the military alliance in the 
field of common defence was significant for the construction of the CFSP 
and the ESDP in Finland in the early 1990s and beyond. The 1995 report 
argued: 'As the members of the European Union which are NATO countries 
rely on NATO for their defence, the establishment of common defence of 
the EU, separate from NATO, is not in sight (Report by the Council of State 
1995: 48). As a traditional military alliance, NATO constituted the basis of 
the defence of the majority of European Union member states. Accordingly, 
there was no need to develop common European defence in conjunction 
with the ESDP. More over, the developing relationship between the 
European Union and the NATO had significant role for the re-articulations 
of the 'new' NATO. The 1997 and 2001 security and defence policy reports 
emphasised the increasing 'interoperability' of Finnish and NATO troops 
(Report by the Council of State 1997: 25; Report by the Council of State 
2001: 24) The analysis suggests that in Finland, NATO's military resources 
were seen as crucial for the European crisis management missions agreed 
within the structures of the CFSP. As such, not withstanding the difference 
of NATO and the European Union, the relationship between the European 
Union and NATO was articulated in complementary terms in Finland. 
The East. The construction of the East was significantly different in the 
alignment discourse. Although the Russian Federation inherited some of the 
great power characters of the Soviet Union, the subject positions available 
for the eastern subjects in the new discourse development and transition to 
democracy and market economy. In 1997, the government argued that the 
changes in central and eastern European countries 'are taking place at 
disparate rates. Wars, territorial disputes and minority conflicts in the 
countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have affected and 
continue to affect the security of the entire continent... 
' (Report by the 
Council of State 1997: 15). In the alignment discourse the East was 
constructed as a very different kind of region than previously. 
In the 
neutrality discourse, the East represented a 
developed superpower block and 
its rivalry with the West constituted 
insecurities. On the other hand, in the 
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alignment discourse, the East constituted an underdeveloped region which 
instability created insecurity. 
The Finnish case study indicates in 1995 a hegemonic struggle between the 
neutrality and alignment discourse was clearly identifiable in the key 
foreign and security policy documents, and the parliamentary debates over 
these statements. However, by 2001 the new discourse had become 
hegemonic. In the official documentation Finland's influence, responsibility 
and location in the West was highlighted. Simultaneously, references to 
Finland's smallness, limited agency or peripheral location withered away. In 
the parliament, the number of remarks made by Members of the Parliament 
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Figure 5.1: Interpellation of the alignment discourse in Finland 
Britain. In comparison to Finland, the analysis of the British official 
foreign 
and security policy discourse indicated continuity rather than change. 
That 
is, the re-articulation of a more engaging British policy towards 
Europe in 
the realm of the foreign and security policy was 
largely based on the 
traditional great power discourse. The key features of this 
discourse were 
Britain as a great power with a global reach, a 
leading member of several 
international organisations such as the European Union and 
NATO, and the 
closest ally to the United 
States. Britain was also constructed to represent 
particular western values and, as a great power, 
it had a responsibility to 
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lead the way and shape the world. However, the analysis shows that the 
1998 re-articulation gave Britain a more engaged role in the development of 





Pre-1998 Re-Articulation of 
the greatpower discourse 
Britain: 
Major power 
Leading member of several 
international organisations 
Closest ally to the US 
Responsible great power 
The West: 
NA TO: 
Credible and powerful military 
alliance 
Bridge between Europe and 
North America 
Comer stone of the Britain's 
security and defence 
The ECIEU. - 
Increasingly influential 
economic organisation 
Developing political and 
foreign and security policy 
actor 
Unreliable organisation for 
common defence 
The East: 
Former Communist states 
Significant military might 




Dependent and developing 
countries around the globe 
Hostile Countries 
Great rather than a middle size 
Global rather than regional 
Liberator from oppression 
Stable state instead unstable 
Developed instead of 
underdeveloped 
(i) Powerful, global and 
transatlantic Britain; 
(ii) Credible and transatlantic 
NATO; 
(iii) Increasingly powerful but 
unreliable European 
Union; and 
(iv) Dependent and developing 
countries in the East, the 
Middle East and Africa. 
The 1998 Re-Articulation of the 
great power discourse 
Britain: 
Major Power 
Leading member in several 
international organisations 
Strong in Europe, strong with the 
us 
Responsible great power with 
normative foreign policy 
The West: 
NA TO: 
Powerful and credible military 
alliance and political actor 
Crisis management 
Supported by the influential and 
global United States 
Transatlantic organisation 
Base for Britain's defence policy 
The EU. - 
Major economic actor in world 
politics 
Increasingly influential political 
actor with developing foreign, 
security and defence policies 
The East: 
Transition to democracy and 
market economy 
Unstable and developing states 
The Globe: 
Trading partners 
Dependent and developing 
countries around the globe 
Hostile Countries 
Great rather than a middle size 
Global rather than regional 
Liberator from oppression 
Stable state instead unstable 
Developed instead of 
(i) Influential, global and 
transatlantic Britain; 
(ii) Powerful and credible NATO, 
supported by the 
(iii) Influential and global United 
States; 
(iv) Increasingly influential 
European Union with 
developing foreign and security 
policy 
(v) Developing and instable states 
in eastern Europe and 
elsewhere. 
.,. - 'm ImImia -----A. -I 
4-u- -4. 
Table 5.3: Structuring oi ineaning m uiv vi v, -jL 77. j; - 
1998 great power discourse in Britain 
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Given the large scale political, economic and social transition in the post- 
Cold War Europe the continuity in British official discourse is remarkable. 
Although the political rhetoric changed, the analysis indicated that the 
discourse enabling and constraining what can be intelligibly said about 
Britain's place in the world was not altered. Indeed, in the 1998 re- 
articulation of the great power discourse, Britain remained a very similar 
kind of subject as before; that is, a great power. As Prime Minister Blair 
argued in 1997, 'by virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of 
our people, Britain is a global player' (Blair 1997). Nevertheless, the 
European Union, and in particular its developing foreign and security 
policy, was given a more prominent role in the discourse. 
European Union. As in Finland, so in Britain, the representation of the 
European Union in the field of foreign and security policy changed. In the 
early and mid 1990s, the European Union was seen as an economic 
organisation with a developing political dimension. Specifically, the 
European Union sought a more prominent role in world politics and 
European foreign and security policy/ies. Conversely, in the late 1990s, the 
European Union emerged as a global economic player and an increasingly 
important foreign and security policy actor in Europe and beyond. As Prime 
Minister Blair argued in 1998: 
On External Policy, the EU must be both effective and seen to be effective 
internationally... We need to project our values on the world stage, to be open, 
outward-looking, supportive of free trade, human rights and democracy, and 
playing a major role in the great international issues of the day 
(Blair 1998) 
However, although the representation of the European Union changes, the 
British position towards it was articulated in a rather familiar way. 
That is, 
Britain should seek leadership in Europe. In of leadership 
in Europe, Britain 
engaged with the development of the ESDP- 
In 1998 at St. Malo it emerged 
as the key player of the military and 
defence affairs of the European Union. 
However, in terms of the British foreign and security policy discourse, this 
marked a twist rather than turn 
in the discourse. That is, the re-articulation 
reflected the traditional great power 
discourse. As Blair noted: 'Europe 
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wants us there as a leading player. Britain may need to be part of Europe but 
Europe needs Britain to be part of it. For four centuries, our destiny has 
been to help shape Europe. Let it be so again' (Blair 1997). 
NATO. In Britain, the representation of NATO was characterised with 
continuity and change. The uncertainty concerning the future of the 
organisation noted in some political discussion on the European level in the 
immediate post-Cold War years (Fierke and Wiener 2001), never fed into 
the British official foreign and security policy discourse. Rather, NATO was 
continuously re-articulated as the only credible European security actor. As 
such, the government argued that the 'membership of NATO will continue 
to provide the UK with its best insurance against all these [new and old 
security] risks' ('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). On the other hand, 
NATO was seen to be undergoing changes. It was no longer merely a 
military alliance but a comprehensive security actor with political 
importance. As the SDR argued: 'Militarily, NATO has been reinvigorated 
and has shown its continuing value by its role in Bosnia and its response to 
events in Kosovo. Politically, it has responded positively and imaginatively 
to the aspirations of the new European democracies. ' ('Strategic Defence 
Review' 1998). NATO also retained its role as a pivotal organisation in 
terms of the transatlantic link between Europe and the United States. The 
1998 SDR argued that the 'partnership between Europe and North America 
has been a uniquely effective' in terms of political and military security 
('Strategic Defence Review' 1998). Moreover, the transatlantic link was 
central for the construction of Britain as a particularly powerful actor in 
Europe and the United States. As Blair argued, Britain is 'stronger with the 
US because of our strength in Europe' and 'we are stronger in Europe 
because of our strength with the US' (Blair 1998). 
The East and the Globe. The representations of Russia and other eastern 
subjects changed from a powerful superpower 
block with significant 
security interest in Europe, to a developing state going 
through political, 
economic and social reforms. These 
developments in the British discourse 
were very similar to the Finnish 
discourse. In terms of the other subjects 
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constructed in the British discourse, the global dimension retained its 
importance. An extract taken form the SDR is illustrative: 
We are a major European state and a leading member of the European Union. Our 
economic and political future is as part of Europe. Our security is indivisible from 
that of our European partners and allies... But our vital interests are not confined to 
Europe. Our economy is founded on international trade. Exports form a higher 
proportion of Gross Domestic Product than for the US, Japan, Germany or France. 
We invest more of our income abroad than any other major economy. ('Strategic 
Defence Review' 1998) 
Thus, the global dimension of the British foreign and security policy 
discourse is clearly re-articulated. Britain emerges as a European great 
power with global interests. In short, Britain is global rather and regional, 
developed instead of underdeveloped, and a leader rather than follower. 
The discourse analysis of subsequent foreign and security policy documents 
in 1999 and 2001 suggested that the 1998 re-articulation was increasingly 
shaping the official foreign and security policy statements. The eminence of 
the European Union and its foreign and security policy increased, and the 
representations generated in the policy papers largely reflected the 1998 re- 
articulation of the great power discourse. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
parliamentary debates revealed that the 1998 re-articulation did not become 
hegemonic among the British parliamentarians. Instead, the traditional great 
power discourse prevailed and continued to structure the remarks made in 
the parliamentary debates (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Interpellation of the 1998 Re-Articulation of British great power discourse 
(GPD) 
The significant degree of change in the Finnish foreign and security policy 
discourse and the lack of it in the British discourse may seem somewhat 
expected according to commonsense understandings of the small and major 
states. Conventionally, minor states are given a rather marginal role in the 
world politics (Hey 2003: 1,4) and European integration (Arter 2000). Due 
to their size and limited resources, they are expected to adapt to the external 
changes. On the other hand, great powers are seen more able to shape the 
context within which they find themselves. 
However, the analysis of the Finnish and British discourses highlighted the 
context specificity of these constructions. For instance, whilst in 1995 
Finland declared that neutrality was a 'no longer a viable line of action' 
(Report by the Council of State 1995: 58), in 1996 Britain acknowledged the 
contribution 'which the neutral members of the European Union are able to 
make to building security in Europe' (Statement on the Defence Estimates 
1996: 13). On the other hand, the Finnish foreign policy leadership argued 
that 'Finland has not made any security policy reservations concerning its 
obligations under its founding treaties or the Maastricht Treaty' (Report by 
the Council of State 1995: 58). Conversely, Britain argued that the neutral 
member states' full participation in the western foreign and security policy 
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cooperation was uncertain in the near future (Statement on the Defence 
Estimates 1995: 17; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996: 13). 
According to British representations of European developments, Finland 
could have retained its neutrality and it was expected to opt out from any 
deeper engagements with EU foreign and security policy. On the other hand, 
in the Finnish foreign and security policy discourse, Britain was seen as a 
leading western European power which had a central role in European 
84 security (Koivisto 1995) . As such Britain was constructed as a leading 
actor in Europe and it was assumed to play a constructive role in the 
ongoing changes in European foreign and security policy/ies. Importantly, 
the Finnish official foreign and security policy documentation in the 1990s 
did not distinguish between the major western European powers. However, 
due to increasing interest in European Union politics in the 1990s, the 
British and European constructions of Britain as a reluctant partner gained a 
more prominent role in Finnish political discourses. 
5.3 Finland and Britain: Comparing and Contrasting 
The purpose of this section is to consider the relationship between the 
European Union and the member states. This will be done by assessing the 
similarities and differences in the construction of state identities in Finland 
and Britain in the light of increasing European Union level foreign and 
security policy governance. However, it is also important to remind us about 
the limitations and character of the comparative element of this study. 
Notably, I am not seeking to establish a general theory of the complex 
relationship between the European Union and its member states 
in the realm 
of foreign and security policy. That is, to generate a model applicable 
to 
explain this relationship over time and/or space. 
Rather, the aim of this 
section and the dissertation is to elucidate this relationship and provide us 
84 President Koivisto reasoning in the Baltic State question 
in 1991 is illustrative. He noted 
the British Prime Minister John Major's activism 
in finding a peaceful solution to the Baltic 
State independence aspirations. His conclusion that after 
Major's talks with the Soviet 
Union, there was no need for active Finnish policy towards the 
Baltic States (Koivisto 
1995) generated representation of Finland a passive and neutral 
state, and Britain as the 
major western power in European security. 
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with insights that are valuable for our understanding(s) of the European 
foreign and security policy/ies. 
The findings of the case studies broadly support the claims and the rationale 
of the Europeanisation literature (Manners and Whitman 2000; Christianseng 
Jorgensen et al. 2001; Green Cowles, Caporaso et al. 2001; White 2001; 
Tiilikainen and Raunio 2003; Tonra 2003). That is, the state level foreign 
and security policy discourses in these two member states were increasingly 
shaped by the European Union. The 'presence' of the EU foreign and 
security policy in this particularly central and sensitive policy field for the 
state identity (Wallace 1991; Doty 1996; Campbell 1998; George 1998; 
Wwver 2002) in two different contexts is a considerable finding. 
Nevertheless, the impact of the Europeanisation in the re-production of 
these states identities was rather different (Table 5.4). 1 suggest that this is 
symptomatic for the context specific character of the Europeanisation of the 
foreign and security policy. Discussion of some of the key similarities and 
differences is illustrative. 
Finland Britain 
Context of the Early 1990: The End of the Late 1990s-: Increasing 
Europeanisation Cold War integration and new security 
threats in Europe 
Rationale of the Stable and more influential To exercise power and 
Europeanisation international position influence 
Impact on state identity Becomes a more stable and Remains a great power 
influential state 
Position in relation to the Becomes a more central Remains a central state 
EU state (Complementary) 
(Similarity) 
Position in relation to the Constructive and responsible Britain provides leadership 
EUforeign and security participant (Complementary) 
policy (Complementary) 
Position in relation to Increasing interoperability Comer stone of British 
NA TO (Complementary) defence 
(Complementary) 
n in relation to the Increasingly alienated Increasingly alienated 
(Difference) (Difference) 
Table 5.4: Similarities and Differences in the Europeanisation of foreign and security 
policy in Finland and Britain 
In both cases, the re-production of state identity in the realm of foreign and 
security policy reflected euro-centric understanding of the world and 
security. In tenns of Finland, this is hardly surprising. After all, Finland's 
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post-war neutrality identity was explicitly related to the balance of power 
between the two rival superpower blocks in Europe. However, in the British 
case it is interesting to learn that the traditional foreign and security issues 
of a great power with a global reach were rather exclusively debated in 
terms of European security. The official documents and the parliamentary 
debates generated representation that highlighted Britain's importance in 
several international organisations as well as its ability to safeguard its 
global interests militarily. However, in doing so, two institutions were given 
utmost importance. These were NATO and the European Union. 
Within the institutional arrangements related to foreign and security policy, 
the importance of the European Union augmented in both cases. In Finland, 
the European Union became the key feature of 'Finnish security' in the 
post-Cold War world. In Britain, the European Union signified an 
increasingly influential political actor within which Britain should seek 
leadership. The case studies also suggested that both states constructed the 
relationship between NATO and the European Union in similar ways. 
Although the relationship between the European Union's developing foreign 
and security policy and NATO was largely seen as complementary, the 
difference between these organisations was highlighted. In both states, the 
importance of NATO's military resources was highlighted in terms of its 
member states defence as well as the crisis management operations in 
Europe. On the other hand, the representations the European Union 
emphasised its increasing role in preventive diplomacy and civil and 
military crisis management. Therefore, the creation of the European Union's 
Rapid Reaction Force in Helsinki in 1999 did not constitute a 'Euro-Army'. 
Neither did it propel a common defence of the European Union. Instead, it 
signified European Union's willingness to take greater responsibility in 
solving European disputes and conflicts in the field of crisis management. 
In the British and Finnish foreign and security policy discourses, broadly 
similar subjects and objects were articulated. These were states, political 
communities that desired to become states, and international organisations 
largely constituted by the states. Significantly, in the official discourses 
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there was no evidence of the decreasing importance of the states implied in 
the integration, regionalisation or, indeed, globalisation literatures. Instead, 
in both contexts, the EU foreign and security policy was constructed to be in 
the interest of the state in question. In Finland, it was seen as crucial for 
Finnish security. It provided tools to address the security issues in the post- 
Cold War world. More generally, Finland's EU membership was seen to 
consolidate Finland's international position in the context of the large-scale 
political, economic and social transition. In Britain, the construction of the 
Europeanisation highlighted Britain's will to stay in power in Europe and 
beyond. Britain was 'used to power' and it indents to 'stay in power' (Blair 
1998). The foreign policy leadership constructed the more engaging policy 
towards the European Union and the participation in the CFSP and the 
ESDP as a strategic move to consolidate and further exploit Britain's pivotal 
position in the world politics. 
In sum, in the light of the re-production of state identities the analysis 
suggested that whilst Britain retained a great power identity, Finland 
acquired a more influential identity. However, the analysis suggested that 
retaining and gaining influence in these two contexts was arrived at rather 
differently. Although the Finnish and British foreign and security policy 
discourses were converging, they also retained their specific character. That 
is, given Europeanisation, distinct Finnish and British state identities were 
re-produced in the realm of foreign and security policy. 
In Finland, the EU membership and Finland's participation in all the areas 
of integration were central for the more influential identity (partly) 
constituted by the alignment discourse. The general representation of EU 
membership suggested that it had 'clarified and strengthened Finland's 
international position' (Report by the Council of State 1995: 10). As an EU 
member state, Finland gained stability and influence. On the other 
hand, the 
membership assigned 'Finland with more responsibility 
for European 
security and the future of the whole world community' 
(Report by the 
Council of State 1995: 10). In terms of Finnish state identity, 
by joining the 
European Union Finland became a greater power. 
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However, by the late 1990s smallness itself was constructed to indicate 
influence. As Finnish scholar Joenniemi, hypothesized: 'in an international 
system where the very idea of sovereignty itself is under challenge and large 
multilateral institutions - the EU being the most obvious example - are 
assuming greater importance, small states could become more influential' 
(Joenniemi 1998: 62; see also, Arter 2000: 678). He added that 'having none 
of the 'hang-ups' associated with being a large power, small could indeed 
became a synonym for smart in the post-Cold War era' (Joenniemi 1998: 
62; see also, Arter 2000: 678). According to this reasoning, a state's ability 
to influence its external envirom-nent was no longer tied to its size but rather 
its capacity for innovative thinking. Whilst in the Cold War world Finland's 
smartness and influence was constrained by the bi-polar world order, in the 
post-Cold War world the European Union enabled small states' increasing 
influence on wider international agenda. This partly explains the remarkable 
speed with which the alignment discourse became hegemonic in Finland. In 
Finland, the alignment with the European Union quickly replaced neutrality 
as the 'code word' for independence. Moreover, alignment with the 
European Union and the participation in the EU foreign and security policy 
was seen to enlarge rather than endanger Finnish autonomy. 
On the other hand, in Britain, the discourse analysis suggested that the 
European Union and its developing foreign and security policy was central 
(rather than marginal) for the re-articulation of the British great power 
identity. Notwithstanding the hegemonic struggle within the great power 
discourse, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy was 
increasingly seen to consolidate British influence in the world. Prime 
Minister Blair argued that Britain should overcome the 'hang ups' related to 
its history as a great power and its independent international position. In 
terms of increasing 'Euro-scepticism' he argued: 
The logical conclusion of the Euro-sceptic approach that says everything that 
comes out of Europe is bad; that says Europe is something that is done to us, rather 
than something that we can shape; is to get out of Europe altogether ... But 
it would 
be a disaster for British jobs, British trade, British influence in the world. Far 
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better is to be in there, engage in the arguments, and win the arguments. (Blair 
1998) 
Accordingly, in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s British state identity 
was increasingly constructed terms of the ongoing debate concerning the 
British relationship with the European Union and its developing foreign and 
security policy. The government attempted to articulate a more 
complementary relationship with the European Union, the CFSP and the 
ESDP. On the other hand, the more traditional discourse that highlighted the 
oppositional aspects of this relationship remained strong in the 
parliamentary debates. Nevertheless, given the seemingly intense and 
significant debate related to the EU foreign and security policy, the findings 
of the discourse analysis revealed a considerable degree of continuity and 
consensus. That is, the hegemonic discourse was not challenged by the 
process of Europeanisation. In so doing, the Europeanisation of foreign and 
security policy discourse in Britain did not imply a dislocation of the 
hegemonic discourse. Instead, the struggle took place within the traditional 
discourse. 
Conclusion 
In terms of the questions raised in this study, the continuing salience of the 
state and state interests and influence in the Finnish and the British foreign 
and security policy discourses did not imply an impossibility or 
undesirability of the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. Rather, 
these very different states with a distinct historical, cultural and geopolitical 
background could construct the process of Europeanisation as 
complementary with their interests. Within the temporal and spatial 
boundaries of this dissertation, the context specific character of 
Europeanisation appears to be a strength rather than weakness. That is, the 
possibility of national variation makes the process more acceptable within 
the distinct contexts of the European Union. On the other hand, the context 
specificity also enables divergence. That is, the development of the EU and 
its foreign and security policy is not necessarily linear process. Rather, its 
pace and speed is likely to vary over time and space. 
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Conclusion 
The central argument of this dissertation has been that analysis of the 
production of state identities can add to our understanding of the 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy. This is because the context 
specific identities enable and constrain the process of change or 
transformation embedded in the idea of Europeanisation. The dissertation 
began with a critique of the dominant cooperation approach of the 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy, which comprise the majority 
of accounts tackling European foreign and security policy/ies. 
Notwithstanding significant variation within realism(s) and neo-liberal 
institutionalism(s), I argued that the accounts operating within the 
cooperation approach share significant limitations. In sum, the central 
problem inherent in these theoretical approaches is state-centrism which, in 
turn, has led to a narrow conceptualisation of the integration as cooperation 
between states. For instance, in the 1990s the realist-inspired accounts of 
European security and conventional Foreign Policy Analysis rendered the 
development of the CFSP and the ESDP deeply suspect. On the other hand, 
given the increased interdependence that is underlined by the neo-liberal 
institutionalists, the key (liberal) theory of European integration - 
intergovernmentalism - has continued to highlight the role of the major 
states. 
I have suggested that there is nothing inherently wrong in seeking to explain 
the European foreign and security policy from the state perspective. Any 
social explanation is likely to be partial and 
different research agendas 
contribute to the accumulation of knowledge 
in the field. However, I have 
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argued that the cooperation approach is not particularly valuable in 
explicating the complex social relationships among different levels of 
governance. Moreover, its overwhelming dominance in the research 
agendas tackling European foreign and security policy/ies is not desirable in 
terms of the accumulation of knowledge in this field. Indeed, because of its 
prevalent position, alternative thinking has been marginalised. 
Therefore, this dissertation has embraced the recent engagements of the 
theories and theorists operating within a more integrationist understanding 
of the contemporary European foreign and security policy/ies. Specifically, 
these accounts assume that the development of the EU foreign and security 
policy have led to the emergence of a distinct European system of foreign 
and security policy. In this system, the European Union institutions have 
been given greater role in the formulation of the European foreign and 
security policy/ies. Whilst the integration theorists have emphasised, for 
instance, the utility of the concept of spill-over, other scholars have 
highlighted comparative frameworks and the concept of Europeanisation in 
accounting for the governance in Europe. 
For many, the recent theoretical ferment related to the concept 
Europeanisation indicates an analytical shift within the European studies. 
Instead of focusing on the creation and the development of the process of 
integration itself (bottom-up frame) - for instance, in terms of EU level 
institution building - Europeanisation literature concentrates on how the EU 
level politics and policies feed into the member states' domestic political 
processes (top-down frame). Notwithstanding these approaches' 
contribution to our understanding, they, however, seem to offer a limited set 
of tools to inquire into the EU and state level governance. Importantly, the 
conceptualisation of Europeanisation as a top-down process, fails to account 
for how the domestic processes feed back to the process of integration. 
Relatedly, Europeanisation and comparative politics remain rationalism 
inspired. They largely (although not exclusively) focuses on causal 
mechanisms of Europeanisation which are seen to 
be resulting from the 
increased activity on the EU level. 
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This dissertation has aimed to explore whether it is possible to conceptualise 
Europeanisation in a more comprehensive manner highlighting the 
reciprocal features of the relationship between the EU and member state 
governance. It has suggested that due to the centrality of the state for the 
any conceptualisation of foreign and security policy, Europeanisation 
scholars in this specific field have tended to approach the process more 
broadly. Instead of quantitatively analysing the 'mechanisms' of 
Europeanisation they have examined, for example, elite socialisation and 
cognitive aspects of the process more qualitatively. Drawing on these 
approaches, this research has explored ways to avoid studying the EU or 
state levels separately ('bracketing off) for analytical purposes. 
To follow a different path this study has found the IR literature on social 
constructivism and poststructuralism useful. These approaches have 
explicitly dealt with mutually constitutive social relationships and political 
agency located in various levels of analysis. In so doing, they have utilised 
concepts of identity and discourse. Further, the theoretical and 
methodological debates between and within there approaches are directly 
related to the analytical puzzles raised in this study. I have argued that the 
concept of state identity employed by the mainstream social constructivism 
appears- to reproduce several of the problems associated with the 
cooperation and integration approaches. As Wxver has noted, the problem 
with these accounts is that they operate within an ontology which assumes 
the pre-existence of states with a given identity. Whether the identity of the 
state is seen to reflect international system (Wendt 1999), a particular 
national culture (Katzenstein, P. J. 1996) or regional systems of governance 
such as the European Union, these approaches are unable to theorise 
the 
process of re-production of state identities 
(Wxver 2002: 21). Conversely, 
some of the critical variants of social constructivism and majority of 
the 
poststructuralism have embraced a radically 
different conceptualisation of 
identity. In these approaches, the process of differentiating the self 
from 
others is seen as fundamental to the process of 
identity production. In other 
words, establishing a presence 
for oneself necessarily implies a creation of 
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other selves. Moreover, the need to differentiate the self from others is a 
never-ending social process. That is, the identities are continuously re- 
produced in social and political practices. As such, socially constructed 
identities are inherently contingent. 
In this regard, poststructuralist scholars have suggested that the foreign 
policy understood as a state based political practice is central for the re- 
production of the identity of the state. They have re-conceptualised foreign 
policy as a boundary-producing political practice. As such, it is not a 
reflection of pre-given essence of a state (self), but as a practice re- 
inscribing the borders between the self and other, it is also the process by 
which that state is continually constituted and reconstituted in interaction 
with others (Doty 1996; Campbell 1998: 69-70). Central for poststructuralist 
approaches to foreign policy has been the concept of discourse which is not 
equivalent to language. Discourse is defined as structure and practices. As a 
structure, discourses are sociocultural resources enabling and constraining 
construction of meaning. As practice, they are structures of meaning in use 
(Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). As such, discourses are constitutive of 
identities because the meaning of the self and others is produced and re- 
produced in practices enabled and constrained by the discourse(s). 
The re-conceptualisation of foreign policy in the light of a poststructural 
theory of identity takes us back to the key theme of this dissertation. That is, 
the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and the re-production of 
the state identity. Thus the key empirical question raised in this study was, 
how the increasing Europeanisation of the foreign and security policy 
discourse translated into the state identities. Because of the commitment to 
context specificity rather than generality, the analysis focused on two 
preferably different EU member states, Finland and Britain. In so doing, the 
key analytical puzzle of the dissertation, namely, the relationship 
between 
the EU and state level governance, was addressed by comparing and 
contrasting the Europeanisation of state 
identity in these two contexts. 
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Empirical Findings 
The case studies suggested that although the Finnish and British foreign and 
security policies were Europeanised, significant national variation prevailed 
in the identity production of these states in the realm of foreign and security 
policy. In Finland, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy was 
central for the articulation of a radically different foreign and security policy 
discourse in the post-Cold War Europe. The new alignment discourse 
represented a break with the Cold War neutrality discourse and highlighted 
alignment with the West. Although, the discourse was initially resisted, it 
became hegemonic by the early 2000s. Accordingly, Finnish state identity 
was transformed. In Britain, the Europeanisation of foreign and security 
policy discourse took place in the late 1990s in conjunction with the 
development of the ESDP. However, in Britain Europeanisation did not 
translate into a radically different discourse or identity. Rather the re- 
articulation of the discourse displayed continuity. However, EU foreign and 
security policy had a central role in the re-articulation of the conventional 
great power discourse and identity. 
Combined, these two findings generated a third empirical finding: that the 
effects of EU policies had a differential impact on the foreign and security 
policy discourses and national identities of these member states. The 
detailed examination of the similarities and differences in the process of 
Europeanisation of foreign and security policy and in the re-production of 
state identity in Finland and Britain suggested that both convergence and 
divergence were possible. In so doing, the degree of indistinctness and 
elasticity often assigned to the process of Europeanisation(s) appeared to 
serve the process of integration well. That is, rather than threatening the 
identity and the very existence of the EU member states, the 
Europeanisation highlighting variation enabling the re-production of the 
context specific self and others. On the other 
hand, while the re-production 
of the state identities highlighted 
differences, the process of making and 
remaking the identities in question was 
increasingly taking place within the 
European Union context. This is somewhat expected in the case of 
Finland 
due the recent accession to the EU. However, the analysis suggests 
that 
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British great power identity was also increasingly tied to the European 
Union developments. 
One of the most remarkable findings of the discourse analysis in the Finnish 
case was the speed of change. Within less than ten years, Finnish state 
identity was transformed. This suggests that ostensibly fixed identities can 
change rapidly and fundamentally over a short period of time. Discourse 
theory can help us to explain how. The analysis in Chapter 3 suggested that 
the Finnish discursive context enabled the transformation. That is, the 
neutrality identity was intrinsically tied to the Cold War bi-polar world and 
to the Finland's special relationship with the Soviet Union. When the bi- 
polarity ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, Finnish state identity needed 
to be re-configured. On the other hand, the examination of neutrality 
identity elucidated why a particular re-articulation and identity emerged in 
1995 and how it became hegemonic by the early 2000s. 
The findings of the discourse analysis of the British case suggest that 
increasing 'euro-talk' does not necessarily translate into transformation of 
the more Europeanised discourse and identity. Quite the opposite. In the 
British case, the Europeanisation of foreign and security policy became an 
important feature in the re-production of the conventional great power 
identity. Moreover, the increasing debate and growing opposition towards 
the government's seemingly more integrationist discourse suggested that the 
traditional identity continues to frame the British policy towards the 
European Union. Indeed, the importance of the European Union in the re- 
production of the British great power identity has increased. This 
dissertation suggests that the context specific discourse analysis provided us 
with fuller understanding of the Europeanisation. Instead of highlighting 
further examination of the 'mechanisms' of the EuroPeanisation, this 




The analytical findings comprised two elements: firstly, that comparative 
discourse methodology enables us to gain new insights into the process of 
Europeanisation; and secondly, that Europeanisation should be understood 
as both a top-down and a bottom-up process, in which state identities are 
both transformed by EU discourses (differentially depending on prior 
national identities), and also themselves shape the nature of EU discourses. 
Although there is a disagreement amongst the discourse scholars over 
methodological questions (Milliken 1999: 226-227) this dissertation 
asserted that attention to method and rigor does not necessarily entail the 
sort of 'scientism' against which many discourse theorists define themselves 
(Laffey and Weldes 2004: 28). Instead, I suggest that the discourse analysts' 
methodological sensitivity is indicative of a self-reflection of discourse 
theory and method. The methodological reflections on this dissertation 
suggest that whilst the discourse analytic approaches can contribute to the 
Europeanisation analysis, Europeanisation literature can contribute to the 
discourse theorisation of the IR. 
Implicitly or explicitly discourse analysts often employ a comparative 
method. However, as with many more narrowly defined methodological 
questions, there is very little direct methodological reflection about 
comparative perspective in a discourse analytic approach (Howarth 2005: 
332). Moreover, the emergence of the 'comparative discourse analysis' 
(Kantola 2004) is a novel, although significant, theoretical development. 
The comparative element of this study draws on the Europeanisation 
literature. As a result of this theoretical dialogue between discourse theory 
and comparative analysis, the dissertation suggests that two key 
features are 
imperative for a comparative discourse theory. First, rather than being 
ýmethod-driven' comparative discourse theory must be question- and 
problem-driven. That is, the practice of comparison 
is relative to the 
questions raised and problems addressed 
in the study. For instance, in this 
study the comparative method was used 
to explain why Europeanisation 
give rise to similar and 
different representation of the world out there. 
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Second, and in so doing it became clear that comparison must comprise 
'thick descriptive interpretations' of the historical context and concrete 
specificity (Howarth 2005: 332). 
The problem-driven comparative approach grounded on the interpretation of 
the case studies also made a broader methodological contribution. It enabled 
explication what, if anything, was context specific in a given context. This 
has particular importance for poststructuralist IR since some of its critics 
have inferred that discourse analysis does not take us very far because the 
findings are often so obvious (Doty 1993: 308). However, drawing on 
Doty's reasoning, my reply is that we often do not have to look very far to 
find structures enabling and constraining the production of identities. 
Moreover, discourse analysis allows (rather than forecloses) analysis of less 
transparent cases. Crucially, it enables us to explain, despite such 
obviousness, how the commonsensical identities enabling and constraining 
action were arrived at. Crucially, the comparative element of this study 
added to this debate. It suggested that what was obvious in Britain was not 
necessarily obvious in Finland and vice versa. The obviousness of any 
particular finding or argument appears to be a rather relative phenomenon. 
To account for this relative character of social reality/ies we should inquire 
deeper into these common senses shaping our reasoning. 
In terms of the contribution of the discourse analytical approach to the 
Europeanisation literature, discourse theory can deepen our understanding 
of domestic contexts. It can help us to analyse and to understand more 
adequately why variation occurs within seemingly similar contexts such as 
the small member states and the major member states. Specifically, the 
method applied in this dissertation was valuable to account for the 
developments in the domestic contexts over time. Analytically, the research 
outcomes also supported the dissertation's attempt to move 
beyond the 
dominant theoretical assumptions based on cooperation and integration 
approaches. The findings propose that Europeanisation should 
be 
understood as a top-down and bottom-up process, 
in which the identities of 
the states are shaped by the EU discourses which then 
feed back to the EU 
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level (i. e. shapes the EU discourse). As the methodological reflections 
suggested, the empirical starting point of the analysis - the discursive 
context of the member state - proved to be fruitful. In so doing, the 
dissertation suggest that instead of brining the domestic arena back in to the 
analysis of European integration, we should avoid thinking them as 
(analytically or ontologically) separate dimensions of the inquiry; rather, 
they are mutually constitutive. Given the increased scholarly focus on local, 
regional and global processes which cut across conventional state 
boundaries, this key analytical finding has broader applicability. 
Relatedly, although the focus of this dissertation is on conventional foreign 
and security policy and the state, the theory and methods of this study 
overcomes the domestic/international distinction. That is, the approach does 
not foreclose the analysis of other kind of political communities. Rather, the 
study recognises the value and importance of the analysis dealing with 
collective identities of various kinds of political communities such as the 
European Union. In terms of political analysis, the findings underline the 
importance to be able to account for increasingly overlapping local, regional 
and global identities. The poststructural re-conceptualisation of foreign 
policy embraced in this study and the recognition'of Europeanisation as a 
top-down and bottom-up process calls scholars to engage with the diverse 
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